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1. Gödel’s theorems 20
1.1. Prerequisites to this section 20
1.2. Preliminaries to this section 21
1.3. Brief introduction to unprovable truths that are mathematically interesting 22
1.4. Unprovable mathematical statements that are mathematically interesting 27
1.5. Notions of computability, Turing’s universe and Intuitionism 32
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In this dissertation I am going to discuss structural reflection and the philosophy of set
theory. We can find many different kinds of reflection principles in set theory, but I found
structural reflection, as conceived by Joan Bagaria, an interesting and powerful method to
characterize large cardinals in terms of reflection. In fact, structural reflection can produce
a proper class of supercompact cardinals and a proper class of extendible cardinals (by
using different conditions). Thus, structural reflection is important because it provides an
intrinsic philosophical justification of large cardinals. In fact, the large cardinals, that we
are able to interpret as principles of structural reflection are fundamental for Ω-logic and
second-order arithmetic. By adopting structural reflection, we reflect an internal structural
property of the membership relation. We can try to clarify immediately what one may
mean by reflecting an internal structural property of the membership relation by following
Bagaria’s thought. We could answer that it is a property of some structure of the form
(X,∈, (Ri)i∈I), where X is a set or a proper class and (Ri)i∈I is a family of relations on
X, and where I is a set that may be empty. So, an internal structural property of ∈ would
be formally given by a formula φ(x), possibly with parameters, that defines a class of
structures of the form (X,∈, (Ri)i∈I). We might interpret this fact by saying that there
exists an ordinal α that reflects φ and such that for every structure A in the class (that
is, for every structure A that satisfies φ) there exists a structure B also in the class which
belongs to Vα and is like A. Since, in general, A may be much larger than any B in Vα,
the closest resemblance of B to A will be attained in the case that B can be elementarily
embedded into A. Thus we can now formulate the principle of structural reflection as
follows:
Definition 1. (Bagaria) (Structural reflection, SR) For every definable (in the first
order language of set theory, with parameters) class of structures C of the form (X,∈
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, (Ri)i∈I), there exists α such that α reflects C, i.e. C
Vα = C ∩ Vα and for every A in C
there exists B in C ∩ Vα and an elementary embedding from B into A.
From a mathematical perspective, the main objective of this dissertation is the ap-
plication of structural reflection to the canonical inner model for a measurable cardinal,
namely L[U ]. following Bagaria’s thought and his results [Bagaria 13], I will prove that
structural reflection for Π1 classes of structures definable in V relativized to this canonical
inner model is equivalent to the existence of 0†. Then, I will prove that structural reflection
for classes of structures (whatever complexity) definable within L[U ] is implied by the exis-
tence of 0†. The mathematical result concerning classes of structures Π1 definable in V will
support my philosophical thesis that considers Woodin’s Ultimate L as the true, noumenal
universe of mathematics very close to V. In fact, I will prove that if we apply structural
reflection with (Π1 definable in V) classes of structures to a weak extender model for a
supercompact cardinal, we do not get transcendence over this inner model. At the same
time, I will conjecture that if we apply structural reflection to a canonical inner model for
a strong cardinal, we obtain 0¶. Bagaria [Bagaria 13] proved that 0] existence is equivalent
to structural reflection (with Π1 definable classes of structures in V) relativized to Gödel’s
constructible universe L. Therefore, on one side, if we relativize structural reflection with
Π1 definable classes of structures in V to Gödel’s constructible universe, inner model of
iterated sharps, inner model of measurability, inner model of iterated daggers and inner
model for a strong cardinal we obtain a sharp for these specific inner models. On the
other side, if we relativize structural reflection for Π1 classes of structures definable in V
to a weak extender model for a supercompact cardinal, we do not get transcendence. So,
we may assert that structural reflection supports the philosophical thesis claiming that
Woodin’s Ultimate L (not yet constructed) is very close to V and it can be considered as
the true, noumenal (I will clarify immediately the philosophical meaning of this word) uni-
verse of mathematics where undecided mathematical statements, such as the Continuum
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Hypothesis, are settled. There are many aspects that justify structural reflection itself.
First of all, Σ1 structural reflection can be proved from the axioms of ZFC. So, structural
reflection is a feature of the universe of sets. Secondly, we have the concept of richness.
When we relativize structural reflection to inner models, we are able to transcend the
specific inner model and obtain a bigger, richer universe of sets. Thus, the philosophical
concept of richness justifies structural reflection. On the one side, structural reflection pro-
vides intrinsic philosophical justifications for large cardinals. On the other side, we have
philosophical reasons that support structural reflection and render structural reflection a
powerful method to interpret large cardinals as principles of reflection. Therefore, from a
philosophical perspective, structural reflection is able to justify intrinsically large cardinal
notions such as infinitely-many Woodin cardinals and a proper class of Woodin cardinals,
that are fundamental for second-order arithmetic and Ω-logic. The precedent two cardinal
notions reduce the phenomenon of incompleteness which arises within the universe of sets.
Surely, infinitely-many Woodin cardinals and a proper class of Woodin are justified also
extrinsically (fruitfullness of the results, i. e., what they are able to prove).
Structural reflection is fundamental from a philosophical perspective because it gives us an
intrinsic philosophical justification of large cardinals. Intrinsic philosophical justifications
are based on the conceptual analysis of the sets themselves. In fact, as we will see, reflec-
tion is an essential feature of the universe of sets. Bill Tait’s reflection [Koellner 09] could
not overcome the barrier represented by Gödel’s constructible universe and Philip Welch’s
[Welch 10] global reflection implies embeddings of proper classes which can be seen as
problematic mathematical objects. Therefore, structural reflection seems to be more nat-
ural and a more powerful method to characterize very large cardinal numbers. The best
feature of this kind of reflection is that it seems to improve on Tait’s and Welch’s methods
of reflection. On the one side, it produces a proper class of supercompact cardinals and so
it transcends Gödel’s constructible universe. On the other side structural reflection implies
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embeddings of sets without mentioning proper classes, which are problematic mathemati-
cal objects.
There are two main objectives that characterize this dissertation. First, I want to jus-
tify large cardinals by assuming structural reflection and I want to show that Woodin’s
Ultimate L is very close to V (the universal class). We will see that structural reflection
produces a proper class of supercompact cardinals. Then I will prove two small lemmas
suggesting that structural reflection supports the philosophical thesis that Woodin’s Ul-
timate L (inner model for a supercompact cardinal) is very close to V if the Ultimate L
conjecture is true.
Second, in this dissertation (as I was saying before) I will apply structural reflection to
inner models. In fact, I will introduce the philosophical concept of richness. When we
relativize structural reflection to inner models, we transcend these inner models by pro-
ducing sharps. We have thus a richer universe. Richness can also be used as a justification
for structural reflection itself. To understand richness we have to become aware that each
inner model is a universe and that when we transcend it, we get a richer picture of the
universe. I must stress also at this point that richness is a different concept from maxi-
mality. I will argue that structural reflection forces us to sustain weak metamathematical
potentialism concerning the universe of sets. In fact, we can speak of weak metamathemat-
ical potentialism concerning Π1 structural reflection relativized to inner models. This is
because when we relativize Π1 structural reflection to specific canonical inner models such
as Gödel constructible model, inner models for iterated sharps, inner models of measura-
bility, inner models of iterated daggers and an inner model for a strong cardinal, we obtain
transcendence over these inner models. Whereas I will prove that when we reach the level
of a supercompact cardinal and we relativize Π1 structural reflection to a weak extender
model N, because of the closure properties of this inner model we do not get transcendence
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over this inner model. Thus, the main objective of this dissertation is that structural re-
flection supports mathematically my philosophical belief that Woodin’s Ultimate L (inner
model for a supercompact cardinal) can be considered as the true, noumenal, universe of
mathematics and is very close to V. Surely, V is still the usual universe of mathematics
but if the Ultimate L conjecture were true, by Woodin’s theorem (Transference theorem)
[Woodin 10b] the Ultimate L would be very close to V and it could be considered as the
true, noumenal universe of mathematics. This is an important aspect because within the
Ultimate L, undecided mathematical statements such as CH would be settled.
I will apply a metaphysical Kantian distinction to set theory. Thus, to express my philo-
sophical position, I apply a Kantian distinction between phenomenal reality and noumenal
reality to set theory. For Kant, the phenomenal reality is the realm of appearance and it is
not what it is really (the reality in itself). While the noumenal reality is what it is really. I
will argue that in set theory the phenomenal reality is created by human mind and is repre-
sented by metamathematical models such that L[U ],KDJ , V [G], etc. While the noumenal
reality is the immutable, eternal, true world of sets itself independent from human mind
and where sets are not interpreted. Thus, I will argue that we have to distinguish within
set theory between the phenomenal metamathematical models (the phenomenal reality of
set theory) and the true noumenal universe of mathematics. In fact, we have to distinguish
between the mathematics of models concerning the phenomenal reality of set theory and
the mathematics concerning the true noumenal universe of sets1. I will argue that this
distinction disappears within the universe of mathematics if the Ultimate L conjecture is
true. In fact I will say that if we have an inner model (strategic variation), namely LΩS ,
for a supercompact cardinal, this inner model, although a phenomenal reality created by
human mind, would be close the true noumenal universe of sets. This inner model would
be very close to V (the universal class) since it would be like L in the case that 0] does not
1This idea is originated from a profound and intense discussion that I had with Hugh Woodin at the Isaac
Newton Mathematical Institute in Cambridge.
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exist and for a suitable extender inner model M strong large cardinal axioms transfer down
from V to M. So, if the Ultimate conjecture L is true, a phenomenal reality would be very
close to the noumenal universe of sets V. In this case, the inner model of a supercompact
cardinal would be the true universe of mathematics. So we have to distinguish between the
phenomenal set theory (mathematics of models) and noumenal set theory (mathematics
concerning the Ultimate L structure).
The phenomenal mathematics of models instead is characterized by all metamathematical
models, inner and outer models (forcing extensions). However, if the ultimate L conjecture
is true, all consistent enlargements of L (canonical inner models where condensation can
be seen as a noumenal property) can be seen as noumenal approximations to the true,
noumenal universe of mathematics (the Ultimate L), while the phenomenal mathematics
of models, where we combinatorially explore all possibilities for mathematics, is essentially
characterized by outer models (forcing extensions). In this picture, within the phenom-
enal mathematics of models, we have the failure of the Continuum Hypothesis. Instead,
if the Ultimate L conjecture is true, the Continuum Hypothesis holds within the Ulti-
mate L. Therefore, we have to distinguish between phenomenal truths, characterizing the
mathematics of models, and noumenal truths characterizing the true noumenal universe of
mathematics if the Ultimate L conjecture is true.
In order to decide questions within the universe of sets, we should capture the notion of the
noumenal, true, arbitrary set. We have two extreme methods to interpret the notion of the
noumenal, arbitrary set that lie on the notion of power set. On the one side, we have strict
definabilism represented by Gödel’s constructible universe L, where we take all definable
subsets at the successor stage. In this case, definabilism is strict because few large cardinal
notions are consistent with L. On the other side, when we construct forcing extensions, we
extend the notion of arbitrary set. In fact, by adopting forcing extensions, we add new
sets. Thus, we should ask ourselves when we capture the notion of the noumenal set. We
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have a solution if the Ultimate L conjecture is true. In fact, in this case we would have a
kind of extended definabilism. In fact, all known large cardinals would be consistent with
the inner model of a supercompact cardinal. Then, since definabilism is kind of strong
predicativism, the Ultimate L would be the true, noumenal universe of mathematics char-
acterized by predicativism. If we want to develop a modal logic for the universe of sets and
if the Ultimate L conjecture is true, truths concerning the Ultimate L would be necessary
truths such as 2 + 2 = 4 and so, if the Ultimate L conjecture is true, we would have that
the Continuum Hypothesis is a necessary truth. In fact, the Continuum Hypothesis would
be a necessary truth like 3 + 3 = 6.
If the Ultimate L conjecture were not true, I would argue that we do not have access to the
true, noumenal world of sets. In this case, we have to accept a strong form of pluralism.
We would have only a plurality of phenomenal metamathematical models or phenomenal
universes with their specific own truths. We would not have noumenal truths but only
phenomenal truths. In this case, the solution to the continuum hypothesis is that we do
not have a solution to the continuum hypothesis [Hamkins 10], but the countinuum hy-
pothesis would be true in some phenomenal models or phenomenal universes and it would
be false in other phenomenal universes. In this case, I will argue that we can make a philo-
sophical choice and choose a specific phenomenal model. I will argue that the Bounded
Proper Forcing Axiom does settle CH but this would be a phenomenal truth that holds in
a phenomenal universe. So, If the Ultimate L conjecture were false, we would have only
phenomenal set theory, a plurality of phenomenal models with their specific phenomenal
truths. I would argue that a phenomenal model, where the Bounded Proper Forcing Ax-
iom holds, is philosophically preferable. In fact, we need an Σ2-reflecting cardinal, whose
inner model is L, to prove the consistency of BPFA. So if the Ultimate L conjecture were
false, among the plurality of all phenomenal metamathematical models we would select
specific models supporting our choice with philosophical justifications . If the Ultimate L
14 CONTENTS
conjecture were false, we would have no access to the true, noumenal world of sets. Maybe,
some mathematicians might be concerned that if the Ultimate L conjecture is true, the
mathematical game of set theory is over. I would argue that this is not the case. In fact,
the goal of mathematicians would be discovering the richness of the Ultimate L structure.
If we relativize Π1-structural reflection to a weak extender model, N, for a supercompact
cardinal, we do not get transcendence over this inner model, but all embeddings of struc-
tures are within this inner model. In fact, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Woodin 10). Suppose that oNLong =∞. Suppose that γ ∈ Ord,
j : N ∩ Vγ+1 −→ N ∩ Vj(γ)+1
is an elementary embedding with critical point κ ≥ δ. Then j ∈ N .
So, now we can state the theorem that witnesses the closure properties of a weak
extender model for a supercompact cardinal.
Theorem 2. Suppose oNLong = ∞, N is a weak extender model for δ supercompact, N
is definable and C is a class of structures Π1 definable (with parameters) in V. Then all
embeddings of classes of structures relativized to N belong to N.
I will prove this theorem in the following sections. Instead, If we relativize Π1 struc-
tural reflection to inner models such as L, inner models of iterated sharps, inner model
of measurability, inner models of iterated daggers and inner model for a strong cardinal,
we get transcendence over these inner models. Whereas, if we relativize Π1-structural
reflection to inner model of a supercompact cardinal, we do not get transcendence over
this inner model. Thus, we can speak (as I was saying before) of weak metamathematical
potentialism concerning Π1 structural reflection relativized to these inner models.
I argue that principles of structural reflection transfer down from V to a suitable extender
model M.
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Definition 2 (Bagaria 10). A cardinal κ is C(n)-extendible if for every λ greater than
κ there exists an elementary embedding
j : Vλ −→ Vµ
some µ, with crit(j)=κ, and Vj(κ) is a Σn-elementary substructure of V.
We can state Bagaria’s theorem:
Theorem 3 (Bagaria 10). The following are equivalent:
(1) SR, i. e, Σn-SR for all n.
(2) There exists a C(n)-cardinal, for every n.
(3) Vopĕnka’s principle.
Since Hugh Woodin [Woodin 10], by assuming that the Ultimate L exists, is able to
transfer down from V to a suitable extender model very large cardinal notions, we should
be able to transfer down from V to M a proper class of C(n)-extendible cardinals (weaker
large cardinals than what Woodin is able to transfer down). I argue that within a suitable
extender model M there exists C(n)-extendible cardinal for every n and so, since they are
equivalent, also Σn-SR and Vopĕnka’s principle hold in M. In fact we have the following
theorem that implies that stronger large cardinals numbers than C(n)-extendible cardinals
transfer down from V to M.
Theorem 4 (Woodin 10). Suppose 2 < κ < ω, M is a suitable extender model, and
j : Vλ −→ Vλ
is an elementary embedding such that δM-supercompact < crit(j) and such that Vλ ≺Σκ V.
Then, there exists a λ′ ≤ λ and a nontrivial elementary embedding
j1 : M ∩ Vλ′ −→M ∩ Vλ′
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such that M ∩ Vλ′ ≺Σκ M and such that j1 ∈M.
Woodin is able to transfer down these very large cardinal numbers so we have to readapt
his proof to transfer a proper class of C(n)-extendible cardinals down from V to M.
Theorem 5. Assume that for every n, there exists a C(n)-extendible cardinal in V.
Then in M (suitable extender model), for every n, there exists a C(n)-extendible cardinal.
Since Σn-SR and Vopĕnka’s principle hold within a suitable extender model, structural
reflection witnesses that the Ultimate L is very close to V if the ultimate L conjecture is
true. In fact, these principles of structural reflection that hold in V, hold within a suitable
extender model.
As i was saying before, by applying structural reflection to inner models we get transcen-
dence over these inner models. If we apply structural reflection to L, we obtain 0] and then
we can iterate this operation. In the following sections, I will introduce the metamathe-
matical operation InnM,n by which we can form a canonical inner model when we apply
it to a sharp. Then, I will introduce the finite structural reflection hierarchy, a metamath-
ematical hierarchy which at successor stage is constituted by the application of structural
reflection to canonical inner models and by the application of the operation InnM,n to the
sharp produced in the first step by structural reflection. The finite structural reflection
hierarchy belongs to the Dodd-Jensen core model KDJ and it is equivalent to an initial
segment of the hierarchy of iterated mice. Then, following a result of Neeman [Neeman
06], I will introduce the following conjecture:
(SRC) For every natural number n, one can build a canonical inner model K for n-Woodin
cardinals, so that some form of structural reflection for this K is equivalent to Π1n+1-
determinacy.
The first part of this dissertation is devoted to see why the phenomenon of incompleteness
is an essential feature of mathematics. In the first chapter, we will examine first-order,
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second-order and third-order arithmetic. We will consider many attempts, conceived by
mathematicians, to avoid incompleteness. In fact, we will see that there are unprovable
mathematical statements within first-order, second-order and third-order arithmetic and
we will become aware that by introducing particular large cardinal axioms, we are able to
reduce the phenomenon of incompleteness. Thus, we must justify intrinsically these large
cardinals. I will argue that the justification of Determinacy axioms and Forcing axioms
follows from the justification of large cardinals. I will argue also that if the Ultimate L
conjecture is false we have a phenomenal solution to the Continuum Hypothesis. The sec-
ond chapter is devoted to reflection. In this chapter we will examine all different kinds
of reflection that occur in mathematics. In the third chapter, I will discuss structural re-
flection. This chapter is the most innovative from mathematical perspective. Here, I will
apply structural reflection to inner models and I will get transcendence over these inner
models. At the end of this chapter, I will discuss also the philosophy of mathematics which
I sustain. The fourth chapter is characterized by philosophical ideas. In this chapter, I will




The Dream of Completeness
0.1. Preliminaries to this chapter. In this chapter I will discuss the phenomenon of
incompleteness in arithmetic and set theory. I will discuss how the phenomenon of incom-
pleteness, discovered by Gödel, appears in first-order arithmetic, second-order arithmetic
and, finally, third-order arithmetic where the Continuum Hypothesis is formulated. This
chapter is fundamental since we will be aware that some truths cannot be proved. Along the
way towards third-order arithmetic, I will examine different axioms that were assumed by
mathematicians to settle undecided questions. In the first section, I will introduce Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems. Gödel’s sentences are unprovable truths of first-order arithmetic.
A fundamental aspect will be explained in section four when I will discuss set theory. In
fact, we will see that a problem formulated by Luzin, considered an unprovable truth at
the beginning of the last century, was settled by introducing an axiom which asserts the
existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals. In second section I will explain Turing’s
completeness result about transfinite progressions. Turing, by going into the transfinite,
attempted to settle first-order arithmetical sentences including Gödel’s sentences. Unfor-
tunately, Turing’s attempt was doomed to fail because of a problem connected with ordinal
notation, as we will see. In the third section I will discuss the phenomenon of incomplete-
ness in set theory. Departing from second-order arithmetic we will introduce the continuum
hypothesis, formulated in third-order arithmetic, which the axioms of ZFC theory do not
settle. In this section, I will discuss an axiom, namely the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom
[Woodin 10b], which, according to my philosophical beliefs, can be seen as a phenomenal
solution to the continuum hypothesis if the Ultimate L conjecture is false. At the end of
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this section, I will review Woodin’s result about Ω-logic. Woodin attempted to formulate
a complete theory for third-order arithmetic which depends on the Ω-conjecture.
1. Gödel’s theorems
1.1. Prerequisites to this section. The language of arithmetic consists of first-
order logic apparatus and the following symbols: 0-ary function symbol (costant) 0, unuary
function symbol S (the successor function), two binary function symbols +,×, two binary
relation symbols =, < and for each n, infinitely many n-ary predicate symbols Xn. Now
we can introduce Levy’s hierarchy. A formula φ is Σ0 or Π0 (∆0) if and only if it does
not contain unbounded quantificators. For n ≥ 1, by recursion, we assert that φ is Σn
if and only if has the form ∃x̃ψ(x̃) where ψ(x̃) is Πn−1. and that φ is Πn if and only if
it has the following form ∀x̃ψ(x̃) where ψ(x̃) is Σn−1. Therefore, when we assert that a
formula is Σn, we want to say, first of all, that it consists of a ∆0 formula which has n
blocks of existential quantificators in front . Secondly, this formula starts with a block of
existential quantificators. Thirdly, this formula is characterized by an alternation of blocks
of universal quantificators and blocks of existential quantificators. A formula is ∆1 if it is
equivalent to both a Σ1 and a Π1 formula. Usually, we will use also superscripts that point
out to the order of formulas. For example a Π01 formula starts with an unbounded block of
universal quantificators and it is a first-order formula. Let n > 0 be a natural number and
let us consider the nth order predicate calculus. There are variables of orders 1, 2, .....,n
and the quantifiers are applied to variables of all orders. An nth order formula contains, in
addition to first-order symbols and higher order quantifiers, predicates X(z) where X and
z are variables of order κ + 1 and κ respectively (for any κ < n). Satisfaction for an nth
order formula in a model M = (A,P, ......, f, ......., c, ......, ) is defined as follows: variables
of first-order are interpreted as elements of the set A, variables of second-order as elements
of P(A) (as subsets of A), etc; variables of order n are interpreted as elements of Pn−1(A).
The predicate X(z) is interpreted as z ∈ X. A Πnm formula is a formula of order n+ 1 of
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the form ∀X∃Y........ψ (m quantifiers) where X, Y, are (n + 1)th order variables and ψ is
such that all quantified variables are of order at most n. Similarly, a Σnm formula is the
same but with ∃ and ∀ interchanged. See [Jech 06]
1.2. Preliminaries to this section. In section 1.3 we will consider two arithmetical
statements that cannot be proven by PA. Sometimes mathematicians say that Gödel’s sen-
tences are not mathematically interesting. So, I want to consider Goodstein’s theorem and
an extension of the finite Ramsey theorem, two arithmetical statement which PA cannot
prove. So, we can say that the phenomenon of incompleteness is an essential feature of
first-order arithmetic. We will see in the following sections that the phenomenon of incom-
pleteness also appears naturally in second-order arithmetic and in third-order arithmetic.
To escape from incompleteness, we have to make very strong assumptions. In section 1.5
I will present some notions of computability. I will define the notions of primitive recur-
sive functions and partial recursive functions. Then, I will explain Church’s thesis and I
will discuss it philosophically in connection with the consistency of ZFC and Intuitionism.
Finally, I will introduce Turing’s Universe and Turing’s degrees of computability. Gödel’s
first incompleteness theorem establishes that there is a missmatch between truth and the-
oremhood within PA. This section aims at showing what is the distance between truth and
theoremhood within PA in terms of Turing’s degrees of computability. In this section, I
will introduce also some notions related to intuitionism. In fact, I will argue that Church’s
thesis can be considered as potentially true but it cannot be seen as an atemporal truth.
In section 1.6 I will discuss Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. I will show how it is possi-
ble to construct a Gödel’s sentence. In this section we will discuss how the phenomenon
of incompleteness was discovered by Gödel in 1931. In the first section we have discussed
statements unprovable within PA mathematically interesting (Goodstein’s theorem and the
extended finite Ramsay theorem), in this section we will examine the original construction
of Gödel.
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1.3. Brief introduction to unprovable truths that are mathematically inter-
esting. I entitled this chapter the dream of completeness because at the beginning of the
last century many mathematicians believed that all mathematical truths could be proved.
The axiomatic systems, such as Peano arithmetic and Zermelo-Frankel axiomatic set the-
ory, were considered to be complete. We could prove all truths by deducing them from the
axioms. A theory is complete if for every formula, the theory can prove the formula itself
or its negation. Unfortunately, in 1930, Kurt Gödel proved that no consistent axiomatic
theory that is sufficiently strong is negation complete. There are truths that cannot be
proved. The day after Gödel communicated his famous result to a philosophical meeting in
Könisberg, in September 1930, David Hilbert could be found in another part of the same
city delivering the opening address to the Society of German Scientists and Physicians,
famously declaring:
For the mathematician there is no Ignorabimus, and, in my opinion, not
at all for natural science either......... The true reason why (no one) has
succeeded in finding an unsolvable problem is, in my opininion, that there
is no unsolvable problem. In contrast to the foolish Ignorabimus, our credo
avers: We must know, We shall know.
For the first incompleteness theorem there is a sentence (Gödel sentence) that is true but
unprovable within Peano axiomatic number system. Gödel sentence says that I am unprov-
able and it is true because it is unprovable. At the first look, it can seem a self-referential
sentence which is similar to the liar paradox, but it is not the case. In fact, for Gödel’s
coding (as we will see later), Gödel sentence is an arithmetical sentence expressed in the
language of arithmetic. Only at the moment that we decode the sentence we discover that
this sentence says of itself to be unprovable. So Peano axiomatic system, which aims at
pinning down the structure of natural numbers is incomplete. There are truths that cannot
be proved.
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Let us introduce the axioms of Peano’s first-order axiomatic system (PA).
The language of PA is a first-order language whose non-logical vocabulary includes the
constant 0 (zero), the one-place function S (the successor function) and the two-place func-
tions + (addition) and × (multiplication). The axioms are the following:
1) ∀x(0 6= Sx)
2) ∀x∀y(Sx = Sy −→ x = y)
3) ∀x(x+ 0 = x)
4) ∀x∀y(x+ Sy = S(x+ y))
5) ∀x(x× 0 = 0)
6) ∀x∀y(x× Sy = (x× y) + x)
7) (Induction schema) φ(0) ∧ ∀x(φ(x) −→ φ(S(x)) −→ ∀xφ(x), for every formula.
The most problematic axiom is the Induction schema, since by assuming this axiom, we are
refering to numerical properties. Thus, ideally we should be able to quantify over numer-
ical properties (sets). So we should adopt a second-order version of it. But in first-order
axiomatic system, quantifiers range over the domain of numbers, so we are forced to adopt
first-order language. The solution is represented by the fact that we use a schema. Thus,
any first-order formula expressing a property which fits the template is an induction axiom.
An important subsystem of Peano axiomatic system is Robinson’s arithmetic, (Q), which
has the following axioms:
1) ∀x(0 6= Sx)
2) ∀x∀y(Sx = Sy −→ x = y)
3) ∀x(x 6= 0 −→ ∃y(x = Sy))
4) ∀x(x+ 0 = x)
5) ∀x∀y(x+ Sy = S(x+ y))
6) ∀x(x× 0 = 0)
7) ∀x∀y(x× Sy = (x× y) + x)
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Q is a sound theory, its axioms are all true in the standard model of arithmetic and its
logic is truth-preserving. But, Q is incomplete. There are very simple true quantified
sentences that Q cannot prove. It cannot prove universal generalizations. Since Q lacks
the induction schema, it cannot handle all quantified sentences. However, although Robin-
son’s arithmetic is a weak theory, it is very interesting. In fact, Q is sufficiently strong.
This weak subsystem of Peano’s arithmetic is Σ1-complete. It can prove all true Σ1 sen-
tences. Furthermore, all primitive recursive functions can be expressed by a Σ1 formula
in Q 1 sentences. Therefore, Q can represent all primitive recursive functions including
the demonstrability predicate, fundamental in the construction of the undecidable Gödel
sentence. Suppose a theory of arithmetic is formally axiomatized, consistent and can prove
everything that Q can prove (a very weak requirement). Then this theory will be suf-
ficiently strong and so will be incomplete since it will be possible within this theory to
construct Gödel’s undecidable sentence.
The first incompleteness theorem undermines Principia Mathematica’s logicism.2 However
in 1931, the logicist project was over. Instead, the dominant project was Hilbert’s program
which aimed at showing that infinitary mathematics was not contradictory. Hilbert was
thinking that we should divide mathematics into a core of uncontentious real mathematics
and a superstructure of ideal mathematics. Propositions of real mathematics are simply
true or false. Four plus two is six and two plus one is three. We could say according
to the simplicity of the statements [Smith 06] that Π1-statements of arithmetic belong to
Hilbert’s uncontentious real mathematics. We will discover later that many Π1-statement
are unprovable, such as Gödel sentence, the consistency statement (Gödel second incom-
pleteness theorem) and Goldbach’s conjecture whereas other Π1 statements are provable
1In the language of arithmetic ∆0 formulas are bounded formulas built up using identity, the less-then-or-
equal relation, propositional connectives and bounded quantifiers. Σ1 formulas are unbounded existential
quantifications of ∆0 formulas and Π1 are universal unbounded quantifications of ∆0 formulas.
2We mean by Logicism a theory which implies that all arithmetical truths can be derived from basic,
self-evident, logical truths. This theory aims at constructing mathematics upon logic.
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such as the Last theorem of Fermat. By contrast, ideal mathematics shouldn’t be thought
of as having representational content and its sentences aren’t strictly-speaking true or false.
In pursuing this idea, Hilbert took a very restricted view of real mathematics. Influenced
by Kant, Hilbert thought that the most certain of arithmetic was grounded on intuition,
which enabled us to understand finite sequences of numbers and results when we manipu-
lated them. Hilbert’s view is characterised by two components, namely strict finitism and
a formalistic approach towards mathematics. For the German mathematician mathemat-
ics is represented by finite strings of symbols that we manipulate. Maybe we can identify
what Hilbert was thinking by using the term real core mathematics, with the theory PRA,
namely first-order arithmetic plus primitive recursive functions. In fact from one side PRA
is a theory about arithmetic and from the other side it is strong enough to capture all
primitive recursive functions. So according to Hilbert’s view, we must distinguish real core
mathematics from its ideal superstructure (such as set theory). Then you want to know
which bits of ideal mathematics are safe to use, are real-sound, namely what ideal math-
ematics proves is true. For this one has to find which parts of ideal mathematics can be
proved finitistically consistent. A corollary of the first Gödel incompleteness theorem was
the second Gödel incompleteness theorem which states: no consistent sufficiently strong
theory can prove its own consistency. Robinson’s arithmetic (Q) and Peano arithmetic
(PA) cannot have a proof of their own consistency. So no modest formal arithmetic can
establish the consistency of a fancy ideal theory. So we cannot have consistency proofs
for branches of ideal mathematics. Therefore, Hilbert’s project of trying to establish the
real soundness of ideal mathematics by giving consistency proofs using real and contentual
mathematics was demolished by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
Returning to Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, we have that Gödel sentence is unprov-
able or undecidable. We can also say that it is incomputable. We use the term computable
for functions, namely computable by a Turing machine or by recursion, when the informal
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instructions of an algorithm are made formal. Using the term computable truth means
that we can give a proof of that truth (tree proof or linear sequence proof). At this point,
we have to clarify the concept of truth in mathematics: why a mathematical sentence is
true? We could answer that a mathematical sentence is true because it is proved within
the axiomatic system such as PA, or outside the system, or because there is an indepen-
dent mathematical reality which makes the sentence true. However, mathematical truth
is a definite and precise mathematical property that we express by inductive definitions.
Alfred Tarski introduced inductive definitions of truth which made the notion of truth a
precise mathematical property. Gödel proved his two incompleteness theorems by looking
outside the formal system3 and when we come accross Gödel sentence, we discover that it
is true because it is unprovable. So there is a strong link between truth and provability in
mathematics, but thanks to Gödel’s theorem we can say that there is a miss-match between
truths and proofs. I entitled this section the dream of completeness yet around 1929 many
mathematicians were believing that it would have been possible that Peano axiomatic sys-
tem was negation-complete. In fact in 1929 Mojźesz Presburger proved that the theory
P (PA Peano arithmetic minus multiplication) was negation-complete. In the same year,
Thoralf Skolem proved that a theory with multiplication, but lacking addition, was nega-
tion complete. Therefore, many mathematicians were hoping that also Peano arithmetic
was negation-complete. It is interesting to know that Presburger used in his proof a model-
theoretic procedure (quantifier elimination) which also Alfred Tarski later adopted to show
that the theory of real closed fields is negation-complete. Therefore in 1929 many math-
ematicians were thinking that also Peano arithmetic PA would be a negation-complete
theory. In fact, even Gödel attempted to prove the completeness of Peano arithmetic.
But if arithmetic with multiplication minus addition, and arithmetic with addition minus
multiplication, are negation-complete theories we should ask ourselves why when we put
together these two operations we have the phenomenon of incompleteness. The reason is
3In 1938 Hilbert and Bernays gave a formal proof of Gödel’s theorems within the system.
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that thanks to addition and multiplication we can construct a chain of primitive recursive
functions and we can show at the end that the predicate of demonstrability Bew is primi-
tive recursive. Since in Peano arithmetic all primitive recursive functions are representable,
also the predicate of demonstrability is representable and so we can construct Gödel’s sen-
tence which says of itself to be unprovable. Sometimes mathematicians assert that Gödel
sentences are not mathematically interesting.
1.4. Unprovable mathematical statements that are mathematically interest-
ing. Paris and Kirby proved that an arithmetical statement (mathematically interesting)
was undecidable by PA. Goodstein theorem is expressible in PA by a Π2
4 sentence. But we
can ask ourselves if Goodstein theorem can be proven in PA. Maybe we need a long proof
but at the end we can prove Goodstein theorem within PA. Unfortunately the answer is
negative for the following theorem:
Theorem 6 (Kirby-Paris 82). If PA is consistent, then Goodstein theorem is undecid-
able in PA.
Therefore the arithmetical proposition which expresses Goodstein theorem cannot be
proved in PA. Goodstein theorem is an example of an arithmetical statement unprovable
in PA and it is mathematically interesting . In 1977, Jeff Paris and Leo Harrington found
another arithmetical statement that PA could not prove. This statement is an extension
of the finite Ramsey theorem (Ext(FRT)). The extension of FRT (Ext(FRT)) is true in
the standard model (N |= Ext(FRT )) but it cannot be proven within PA. So Ext(FRT)
is another example of an arithmetical proposition undecidable in PA. To start, we have to
prove Ext-FRT, but in this proof we need to prove the infinite Ramsey theorem and this
proof cannot be accomplished within PA because this proof requires König Lemma which
4Alan Turing, in 1934, when he was working on transfinite progressions, he was really interested in obtaining
a completeness result for Π2 sentences, even if he was able to prove only the completeness of transfinite
progressions for Π1 sentences.
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cannot be formalised within PA. If we introduce a theory S by adding individual constants
to PA and we will have:
PA ` Con(S) −→ Con(PA)
then we will have:
PA ` Ext(FRT ) −→ Con(S)
Therefore if Ext(FRT) were proved within PA, it would be possible to prove the consis-
tency of PA, but this is impossible by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. So as in
the case of Goodstein’s theorem, we can say that Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem
is fundamental for obtaining undecidable arithmetical sentences. In the case of Goodstein
theorem, we have that if PA could prove it, then PA would be able to prove its own con-
sistency by Gentzen’s proof-theoretic reasoning. In the case of the finite Ramsey theorem,
we have that if PA could prove it, then PA would be able to prove its own consistency
because the extension of the finite Ramsey theorem implies the consistency of the theory
S and the consistency of the theory S implies the consistency of PA. But in both cases,
this is impossible by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. Thus, to prove that these
two interesting arithmetical sentences are undecidable within PA, it is fundamental to as-
sume Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. Gödel’s sentence (G) and the consistency
statement (Con(PA)) are both Π1 undecidable sentences. Between these sentences there
is a strong connection. In fact, the impossibility of proving Con(PA) derives directly (it
is a corollary) from the impossibility of proving Gödel sentence (G). If we take Gödel’s
sentence, Goodstein’s theorem and the finite Ramsey theorem, they are all undecidable
sentences but they are separated, there is not a direct connection between them. However,
the impossibility of proving Goodstein’s theorem and the finite Ramsey theorem within
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PA is based on the impossibility of proving Con(PA). Therefore we can say that the phe-
nomenon of incompleteness of PA stems from a combination of both Gödel’s theorems.
The impossibility of proving Gödel’s sentence renders impossible to prove Con(PA) and
the impossibility of proving Con(PA) makes impossible to prove Goodstein and the finite
Ramsey theorem within PA. The fact, that these two arithmetical sentences (mathemat-
ically interesting) are undecidable, is based essentially on Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem. Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem is also important in the theory ZFC
(Zermelo-Frankel axiomatic set theory). In fact, if κ is a large cardinal, Vκ would be a
model of ZFC and so the existence of this large cardinal cannot be proved in ZFC because
of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. Large cardinals can exist in ZFC universe but
their existence cannot be proved in ZFC because of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
The fact that we cannot prove directly Con(ZFC), forces us to have relative consistency
proof. Assuming only that a stronger theory is consistent (ZFC + Axiom(one)), we prove
Con(ZFC). Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem forces to go higher in the large cardi-
nal hierarchy. By introducing a new large cardinal 5 axiom, a stronger theory, (ZFC +
Axiom(one)) we can prove the consistency of a weaker theory, namely Con(ZFC). Then
by introducing a large cardinal λ > κ we can prove the consistency statement (Con(ZFC
+ Axiom(κ)) and so on. Mathematicians would say that we introduce large cardinals to
settle undecided questions (Gödel’s program). In fact Gödel’s second incompleteness the-
orem renders Con(ZFC), Con(ZFC+ Axiom(κ)), Con(ZFC + Axiom(λ)) all undecidable
sentences respectively within ZFC, ZFC + Axiom(κ) and ZFC + Axiom(λ) and we are
forced to introduce larger and larger cardinal numbers to settle all these undecidable sen-
tences. Therefore to sum up the structure of Paris and Harrington’s proof, we can state
the following formal expressions:
PA ` Con(S) −→ Con(PA)
5Even if it is too early for large cardinals, I want to introduce this idea related to arithmetic
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then we have:
PA ` Ext(FRT ) −→ Con(S)
Therefore if Ext(FRT) were proved within PA, it would be possible to prove the consistency
of PA, but this is impossible by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
At this point, let’s consider Isaacson’s conjecture that can be seen as a limit to the accept-
ability of Kirby-Paris and Paris-Harrington theorems. We have to notice that Paris-Kirby
theorem involves a kind of reasoning that goes beyond what is required for understanding
the basic arithmetic of finite numbers. In fact, in order to prove that Goodstein’s theorem
is independent from PA, we need to adopt transfinite induction up to ε0. We can say
the same also about Paris-Harrington theorem. To prove that the extension of the finite
Ramsey theorem is independent from PA, we need König’s lemma, namely an infinite tree
that only branches finitely at any point must have an infinite path through it. So we can
state Isaacson’s conjecture:
If we are to give a rationally compelling proof of any true sentence which is independent
of PA, then we will need to appeal to ideas that go beyond those which are constitutive of
basic arithmetic.
Also to understand the truth of undecidable Gödel’s sentences for PA, it seems to require
conceptual skills which go beyond our practise of elementary operations applied to finite
natural numbers. The problem that we face when we evaluate Isaacson’s conjecture is the
same as when we try to understand what Hilbert was thinking for real mathematics by
adopting finitistic methods. What do we mean for pure arithmetical knowledge? it is diffi-
cult to say what are the contents of pure arithmetical knowledge and what are the limits of
pure arithmetical reasoning. Therefore, the truth of Isaacson’s conjecture depends on our
personal and subjective evaluation of what we consider as pure arithmetical knowledge.
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When we were speaking about Goodstein’s theorem we have quoted Gentzen’s consistency
proof of PA. Now, I want to highlight the theory which is able to handle Gentzen’s proof-
theoretical reasoning. Gentzen was able to prove the consistency of PA by appealing to a
theory that was weaker then PA in some respects and stronger then PA in others. In fact,
he could not use a stronger theory which contained PA since all doubts about the consis-
tency of PA would become doubts about the stronger theory. Furthermore, he could not
use a weaker theory since Gödel second incompleteness theorem shows that no weaker the-
ory contained in PA can prove PA consistency. For his proof Gentzen adopted transfinite
induction up to ε0. It is possible to show that we can handle Gentzen’s proof by appealing
to the theory PRA0 (quantifier-free primitive recursive arithmetic) and by adding to this
theory enough transfinite induction to deal with quantifier-free formulae. In fact, in this
theory we have all primitive recursive functions and we can cope with transfinite induction
for quantifier free-formulae. We can say that the theory PRA0 +TI(ε0) is enough to show
the consistency of PA. This theory is neither contained in PA (since it can prove Con(PA)
by Gentzen’s proof theoretic reasoning, which PA cannot), nor it contains PA (since it
cannot prove quantifier-involving instances of the Induction schema). It is important to













1 ), we can
prove that the following induction principle:
TI(ωκ) = ∀x((∀y < xP (y) −→ P (x)) −→ ∀x < ωκP (x))
can be derived in PA, for every κ. Whereas this other principle:
TI(ε0) = ∀x((∀y < xP (y) −→ P (x)) −→ ∀xP (x))
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cannot be proved in PA. This principle is another sentence that it is true but independent
from PA.6
1.5. Notions of computability, Turing’s universe and Intuitionism. At this
point, before constructing Gödel’s sentence, I want to speak a little about computability.
This section aims at showing what is the distance between truth and theoremhood within
PA in terms of Turing’s degrees of computability. Computability is strongly connected to
completeness. Actually, we should say that incompleteness is a subclass of incomputability.
To compute a function, we need the notion of algorithm which is a set of finite informal
instructions. If we want to compute a function, we have to follow all informal steps of an
algorithm. However, we have always to cope with informal instructions. Alan Turing and
Kurt Gödel were focusing at rendering the informal notion of algorithm formal. At this
point, let’s introduce Church’s thesis.
Definition 3. (Church) f is effectively computable if and only if it is partial recursive.
Thanks to this thesis, the informal side of computation (algorithm) is combined with
the formal side of computation (partial recursive functions). f is effectively computable
if there exists some description of an algorithm, in some language, which can be used to
compute any value f(x) for which f(x) ↓. Church’s thesis is independent from the language
for computing. We establish a strong equivalence between all models of computations and
formulate Church’s thesis for all these different models (Lambda calculus, Turing machine,
and unlimited register machine). Functions, that can be computed, are the same indepen-
dently of the model of computation that we adopt. Church’s thesis states that if someone
can give a description of an algorithm for computing f , then there is a description of f as
a partial recursive function or a Turing machine or in Lambda calculus or as an unlimited
6It is interesting to notice that in 1931, Jaques Herbrand was able to prove the consistency of a fragment of
arithmetic. Kurt Gödel considered this result as the most important partial result for the Hilbert program;
Herbrand result was based on his fundamental theorem which implies a quantifier elimination procedure,
namely a reduction of predicate calculus to propositional calculus.
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register machine. Church’s thesis is true until now, because nobody has been able to find a
counterexample to this thesis. However, it is possible to conceive a counterfactual situation
or, possible world, where someone is capable of constructing an algorithm for computing
f(x) which does not have a formal description as a partial recursive function or as a Turing
machine. By considering Church’s thesis as true, we are introducing a temporal component
in our world of mathematics. Church’s thesis is true until now, but we cannot exclude that
in the future someone will disprove it (finding a particular informal algorithm). Further-
more, we can say that Church’s thesis is potentially true and has a temporal component
(I will clarify these notions immediately after the introduction of some ideas related to
intuitionism). When someone proves a theorem, according to classical mathematics, this
theorem is atemporally true and actual true (I will explain this notion immediately). In
classical mathematics, a truth does not have the dimension of time and is atemporal, be-
cause a proposition is true also before that a proof is constructed. Truths are outside the
dimension of time and by constructing proofs, according to the classical vision of math-
ematics, we simply discover and capture them. In the case of Church’s thesis, there is a
temporal component, namely until now it is true. Church’s thesis has a temporal compo-
nent. Maybe, we should adopt a different conception of mathematics, such as intuitionism
where the notion of time comes into the realm of mathematics. As Church’s thesis, also the
consistency of ZFC has a temporal component. Because of Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem, we cannot prove directly the consistency of ZFC. Of course, we can trust the ZFC
system, but we cannot exclude that in the future someone will discover a contradiction in
it. Thus, ZFC is consistent until now. It has a temporal component. For the consistency
of ZFC as for the truth of Church thesis, there is a temporal component which forces us
to consider intutionism. To clarify this conception, I want to discuss some ideas related
to intuitionism. Brouwer, the father of intuitionism, considered mathematics as activity
of mental construction independent from the language. So, for Brouwer, Logic was not
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essential to mathematics. For Brouwer, a mathematical proposition is true when we can
show a construction of it. At the beginning of his thought, Brouwer was rejecting hypo-
thetical constructions and contradictions, but then he adopted the same view of Heyting,
the other father of mathematical intuitionism. According to Heyting, ¬A is true if the
hypothesis that A is true causes a contradiction. This is the hypothetical interpretation of
negation which features the conception of Heyting. In 1923, Brouwer accepted hypothetical
constructions and contradictions. In fact, he took position against mathematics without
negation conceived by Griss. While for Brouwer mathematics was an activity without need
of any languages, for Heyting language was essential for mathematics in order to commu-
nicate mathematical constructions. In fact, Heyting developed intuitionistic logic because
he was thinking to render mathematics communicable in a formal language. According to
Heyting, the fundamental activity of our mind is that of creating entities. This construc-
tion of abstract entities is the foundation of intuitionistic mathematics. Heyting rejects a
platonistic-realistic philosophy of mathematics. In fact, in 1939, he wrote:
An intuitionistic mathematician would not take position against a philoso-
phy which holds that mind, during his creative activity, reproduces entities
of a transcendent world, but he would consider this doctrine too speculative
as foundation of pure mathematics. [Heyting 39]
Heyting rejects the idea that there is a transcendent world of mathematics independent
from human mind, which renders mathematical propositions true or false, but for Heyting
mathematics is a creation of human mind. Furthermore, he wants to change the clas-
sical vision of mathematics by saying that truth is not anymore the fundamental notion
but intuitionistic mathematics is based on the notion of knowledge. For Heyting, a math-
ematical proposition is true when we know that proposition because it is evident or by
showing a construction (proof) of it. So, intuitionistic mathematics there are not truths
independent from our act of knowing them or are preexisting to our knowledge. There
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are not atemporal truths in mathematics but there are only temporal truths. We could
say that according to intuitionism, a mathematical proposition starts to be true because
it is evident or after that we show a proof (construction) of it. In 1958, Heyting formu-
lated the positive principle which states that every mathematical theorem is the result of
a successful construction. For Brouwer and Heyting truth becomes a temporal property
of propositions. When we have an actual proof or construction of a proposition, we can
consider that proposition as true. Martin-Löf [Martin-Lof 91], combining Heyting’s view
with the classical mathematics’ point of view, distinguishes between actual truth and po-
tential truth of a proposition (he reconsiders the Aristotelian distinction between act and
potentiality). So, a proposition is actual true if we have a construction or a proof of it.
However, the same proposition was potentially true also before a proof of it and it will
be potentially true even if nobody will prove it. So, for Martin-Löf a potential truth is
independent from human knowledge and it is atemporal. Instead, following Heyting, he
sustains that actual truths are dependent from human knowledge and are temporal. Also
Prawitz [Prawitz 77] wants to combine intutionism with the belief that there are eternal-
atemporal truths. Prawits introduces a proof-theoretic platonism. He believes that there
is an independent world of proofs. Therefore, for Prawitz, proofs are actual existent but
only potentially knowable by human beings. So, there might be atemporal mathematical
truths because there are actual proofs in Prawitz’s independent world of proofs, but we do
not know them. Thus, Prawitz, in order to save atemporality in mathematics by adopting
intuitionism as a point of view, he assumes a realistic-platonic philosophy of mathematics
which Heyting and Brouwer would reject.
Now, we can discuss Church’s thesis and the consistency of ZFC. For Heyting and Brouwer,
since we do not have a construction or a proof of these two mathematical propositions,
Church’s thesis and Con(ZFC) cannot be considered as truths neither temporal truths.
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Heyting and Brouwer would have said that we do not know these mathematical proposi-
tions and so we do not know their truth values. If we adopt Martin-Löf conception, we
can say that Church’s thesis and Con(ZFC) are potential truths. Thus, they are atemporal
truths only because they are potential. However, they are not actual truths since we do
not have yet a construction or proof of them. If we adopt Prawitz’s view, we can say that,
maybe, there exist atemporal proofs or constructions of Church’s thesis and Con(ZFC) in
the realm of the platonic-proof theoretic world independent from human mind, but we do
not know these constructions. Even if I have a semi-realistic conception of mathematics (as
you will see in the following chapters), I believe that what makes a mathematical propo-
sition an atemporal-actual truth is the effective construction or proof of it. So, Church’s
thesis and Con(ZFC) are only potentially true. Maybe, they are atemporal truths only
potentially. Until now, they can be considered only temporal truths because even if they
are very convincing, we cannot exclude that in the future we will be able to find a counter-
example to Church thesis or a contradiction within ZFC. We can believe in them, but if we
do not have a construction or a proof of them, we cannot consider them as actual-atemporal
truths. As you will see in the following chapters, I believe that if the Ultimate L conjecture
is false, then the Continuum Hypothesis is settled by the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom
even if this would be a phenomenal solution according to my philosophical beliefs. The
fact that the continuum is ℵ2 (if the Ultimate L conjecture is false) is an actual-atemporal
truth and we have a proof of it. However, the mathematical community does not accept
completely this result. I have to say that within set theory, actual-atemporal truths are
dependent from the assumptions (phenomenal model) that a mathematician makes. So
the fact that the continuum is ℵ2 is an atemporal-actual proof relative to the assumption
of the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom. Thus, in set theory, we do not have an absolute
conception of actual-atemporal truths, but we have a relativistic conception of truths, since
actual-atemporal truth depends on actual proof relative to the assumptions (phenomenal
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model) that a mathematician makes. Sometimes, assumptions might be rejected by some
mathematicians and accepted by other mathematicians.
At this point we should look for examples of incomputable sets. However, before addressing
this issue, we must introduce the following definitions:
Definition 4. A ⊆ N is computably enumerable (c.e.) if there is an effective process
for enumerating all the members of A. A is computably enumerable if there is a computable
function f such that A = {f(0), f(1), f(2), f(3), f(4), f(5), ....} = range(f).
Now we should explain how the notion of being computably enumerable relates with
the notion of being computable. In 1944, Emil Post answered to this question by proving
the following theorem:
Theorem 7. (Emil Post) If A ⊆ N is computable, then A is also computably enumer-
able.
Proof. We say that A is computable, so that we can effectively decide if x ∈ A for
any given x ∈ N . Then we can effectively enumerate the members of A by asking, in turn,
is 0 ∈ A, is 1 ∈ A, is 2 ∈ A, is 3 ∈ A,........., and each time we get yes to the question: is
x ∈ A?. Enumerating x. 
At this point, we can introduce the following theorem:
Theorem 8. A ⊆ N is computable iff both A and A∗ (the complement of A) are
computably enumerable.
We can restate the notion of computably enumerable in the following manner:
Theorem 9. If W is an effectively enumerable set of natural numbers, then there is
some effectively decidable numerical relation R such that n ∈W if and only if ∃xRxn.
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We might also restate the notion of computably enumerable set by adopting the infor-
mal side of computation in the following way:
Theorem 10. W is an effectively enumerable set of numbers if and only if it is the
numerical domain of some algorithm Π.
Now we can introduce the first example of incomputable set. In fact, we state the
following theorem:
Theorem 11. There is an effectively enumerable set of numbers K such that its com-
plement K∗ is not effectively enumerable.
Proof. set K =def {e|e ∈We}. For any e, by definition e ∈ K∗ if and only if e /∈We.
Thus, K∗ cannot be identical to any of the We. Therefore, K
∗ is not one of the effectively
enumerable sets (since the We are all of them) . 
At this point, I want to present a sort of phenomenology of the latter theorem’s proof.
In this case, we have another example of diagonalization procedure. In fact, we have the
following: 
0 ∈W0?∗ 1 ∈W0? 2 ∈W0? 3 ∈W0?
0 ∈W1? 1 ∈W1?∗ 2 ∈W1? 3 ∈W1?
0 ∈W2? 1 ∈W2? 2 ∈W2?∗ 3 ∈W2?
0 ∈W3? 1 ∈W3? 2 ∈W3? 3 ∈W3?∗

In the proof, if Wx are all enumerable sets, K is the diagonal set or diagonal line which
is marked by the symbol ∗. K∗ (the complement of K) is the antidiagonal set or antidi-
agonal line and it does not belong to the list. In fact if x ∈ K, x /∈ K∗ by definition.
Diagonalization is a very important tool in mathematical logic. If we enumerate a list of
numbers, functions, sets or properties we might always diagonalise out . Furthermore if
the members of the list such as numbers, functions, sets or properties share a distinctive
feature, when we diagonalise out and we form the antidiagonal set, we can establish that
1. GÖDEL’S THEOREMS 39
the antidiagonal set does not have any more that distinctive feature. So, the first step to
diagonalise out is to enumerate a list of numbers, sets, functions. For example we cannot
diagonalise out from µ-recursive functions, because there is not an effective procedure to
determine if the search of the µ-operator terminates. So we cannot diagonalise out from
partial recursive functions and we cannot contradict Church’s Thesis.
We encounter another example of diagonalization when we discuss Richard paradox. In
logic, Richard’s paradox is a semantical antinomy in set theory and natural language first
described by the french mathematician Jules Richard in 1905. The original statement of
the paradox has a relation to Cantor’s diagonal argument of the uncountability of real
numbers. The paradox begins with the observation that ceratain expressions in English
unambiguosly define real numbers, while other expressions in English do not. Thus, there
is an infinite list of english phrases that unambiguosly define real numbers; at this point we
can use Cantor’s diagonal argument to see how Richard’s paradox works; arrange this list
by lenght and then order lexicographically, so that the ordering is canonical. This yields
an infinite list of the corresponding real numbers: r1, r2......,etc. Since real numbers are
dense (between two real numbers, there is always a third real number), we can consider








Go down the diagonal, taking the n-th digit of the n-th real number rn (in our example
produces 01001) and flip each digit, swapping 0s and 1s (in our example produces 10110).
By construction, this flipped diagonal real number differs from r1 in the first place, from r2
in the second place and so on. So our diagonal construction defines a new real (a richardian
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real) which differs from all the other reals. Now define a real number (Richardian real)
in the following way: the n-th digit of the n-th real number rn is the opposite
(if it is 0, it is 1 and if it is 1, it is 0). This definition is an expression in English which
unambiguosly defines a real number r (a richardian real number). Thus r must be one of
the rn numbers. However, r was constructed so that it cannot equal any of the rn. This
is a paradoxical contradiction. If we take formalised languages, it is possible to say that
a formula φ(x) defines a real number if there is exactly one real number r such that φ(r)
holds. Then it is not possible to define, in ZFC, the set of all formulas that define real
numbers. For, if it were possible to define this set, it would be possible to diagonalize over
it to produce a new definition of a real number, following the outline of Richard’s paradox
above.
One problem in logic is the nature of many irrational numbers. We do not know how they
are. Alan Turing was very keen on computing real numbers but we do not know their
nature. At this point, iI want to discuss this philosophical thought. When you have a
matrix of real numbers, namely a list of real numbers, you can form the antidiagonal set (a
Richardian real). Now we can think to add this antidiagonal set to the precedent matrix,
then we have a new matrix. We can diagonalise out from this matrix and form a new
antidiagonal set (the second Richardian real). By accomplishing this operation, we form
the third, the fourth Richardian real and so on. This operation can be iterated through the
infinite and it does not have any bound. So, maybe we can think that we might charcterise
a large part of irrational numbers as Richardian reals. If this operation does not have a
bound, we can always diagonilise out until the set of Richardian reals overlaps the set of
irrational numbers.
At this point, we can return to the original issue of computability. Let’s consider the notion
of creative set.
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Definition 5 (Cooper 07). We can say that A ⊆ N is creative if and only if 1) A
is c.e., and 2) there is a computable function f such that for each e, We ⊂ A∗ → f(e) ∈
A∗ −We. If A satisfies 1) e 2), we call f the creative function for A.
Now we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 12 (Cooper 07). Creative sets do exist. In particular K is creative.
Now we have seen an example of incomputable set within the realm of computability.
Do we have examples of incomputable sets outside the theoretical framework of computabil-
ity ?
Following the greek mathematician Diophantus, Hilbert stated his famous problem: Given
any polynominal equation in one or more variables, with integer coefficients, find a solu-
tion consisting entirely of integers, namely solve any Diophantine equation. (Hilbert’s tenth
problem) Find a general way of telling effectively whether a given Diophantine equation
has a solution or not. Now we can introduce the concept of Diophantine set:
Definition 6. A set A ⊆ N is Diophantine if
A = {x ∈ N |(∃y1, ........, yn ∈ N}[pA(x, y1, .......yn) = 0]}
for some polynominal pA(x, y1, ......, yn) (with integer coefficients).
Martin Davis in 1950 found the key to solve Hilbert’s tenth problem. Davis, Matia-
sevich, Putnam and Robinson proved later that the answer was negative. The strategy
of Martin Davis was focused on proving that every computably enumerable set is Dio-
phantine. In fact if K (the creative set and so incomputable) is diophantine, we obtain
a negative solution to Hilbert’s tenth problem. At the end, in pursuing the objective of
proving the diophantine nature of larger and larger classes of computably enumerable sets,
Julia Robinson, Yury Matiasevich and Hilary Putnam were able to prove the following
theorem:
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Theorem 13. (Davis, Matiasevich, Putnam, Robinson)
1) Every computable enumerable set is Diophantine.
2) There is not any positive solution to Hilbert’s tenth problem.
At this point, we can start to compare the computability of different sets of numbers
A and B. Now we can introduce the following definition:
Definition 7. (Emil Post) We say B is many-one reducible (or m-reducible) to A
(written B ≤m A) if and only if there is a computable function f such that for all x ∈ N :
x ∈ B ↔ f(x) ∈ A.
Now we can introduce the following two theorems:
Theorem 14 (Cooper 07). The ordering ≤m is reflexive and transitive.
Theorem 15 (Cooper 07). 1)If B ≤m A and A is computable, then B is computable.
2) If B ≤m A and A is computably enumerable, then B is computably enumerable.
At this point, we can collect different sets which cannot be distinguished from each
other by adopting many-one reducibility:
Definition 8. We write A ≡m B (A many-one equivalent to B) if A ≤m B and
B ≤m A.
Lemma 1. ≡m is an equivalence relation.
The ordering ≤m induces a structure on the equivalence classes under ≡m. Thus, we
can introduce the following definition:
Definition 9. (Turing) An equivalence class under ≡m is called an m − degree(or
many-one degree). We write am = degm(A) = {X ⊆ N |A ≡m X}
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and Dm = the of all m-degrees.
2) We write bm ≤m am if and only if B ≤m A for some A ∈ am, B ∈ bm
At this point, we can induce a partial ordering on Dm in the following manner:
Definition 10. Let am, bm, cm ∈ Dm. then ≤ satisfies:
1) (≤ is reflexive) am ≤ am.
2)(≤ is transitive) am ≤ bm ∧ bm ≤ cm −→ am ≤ cm.
3) (≤ is antisymmetric) am ≤ bm ∧ bm ≤ am −→ am = bm.
the properties 1)- 3) make ≤ a partial ordering on Dm.
Dm does have a least element but it does not have the greatest element. In fact, we
can state the following corollary:
Lemma 2. Dm has a least element 0m consisting of all computable sets (other than ∅
and N).
We do not know yet the fatness of Dm and the exact contents of 0
1
m where we can locate
all unsolvable problems, the creative sets. All computable sets, as we have said before, are
located in 0m, the least element of Dm (Turing universe). 0
1
m is the greatest element of
all computably enumerable sets. In fact, between 0m and 0
1
m we can find all computable
enumerable sets. The fundamental point to highlight for the following discussion is that
incomputability is located very low in Turing Universe. In fact, already at the level of 01m
we encounter incomputable sets, the creative sets. Since Dm (Turing universe) does not













m....., and we are able to find computable sets only at
the level of 0m. Already at the level of 0
1
m we find the creative sets and the phenomenon
of incomputability arises. Therefore, we can state that Turing universe is essentially char-
acterised by the phenomenon of incomputability and computability covers only a tiny part
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of this universe which includes computable and incomputable problems. There are much
more incomputable sets than computable sets. So, we should ask ourselves why we have
few examples of incomputable problems and many examples of computable problems. One
reason might be the fact that we are always looking for computable problems. When we
state a problem or a question to solve, there is already in the question a way to compute
or to solve the problem. For instance, Gödel (Gödel sentences), Cohen (continuum hy-
pothesis), Turing (halting problem) and Church (undecidability of first-order logic) were
looking at all these problems in order to compute them, but at the end, these problems
turn out to be unsolvable. To prove incomputability is much more difficult than proving
computability. We look at the problems, at least initially, with the eyes of computability.
Now, we can introduce an important lemma:
Lemma 3. (John Myll) The set of all creative sets is exactly = 01m.
I want to conclude this part about computability with the following observation. PA
(first-order arithmetic) is creative for Gödel incompleteness theorems and so it is contained
in 01m. The theory True(PA), the theory of true first-order arithmetic, is not even axioma-
tisable, for Tarski’s theorem about the undefinability of truth. However, can we locate the
degree of True(PA) ? So we could understand better how much of arithmetic, our axiomatic
theories do capture (the main purpose of this section). By adopting Barry Cooper’s words:
Well, it turns out that the theorems of PA hardly scrape the surface of true
arithmetic. [Cooper 07]
In fact, the following theorem shows the degree of True(PA) and its distance from PA
contained in 01m.
Theorem 16 (Cooper 07). The degree of True(PA) is 0ω.
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Therefore, the distance between theoremhood of PA and truths which PA attempts to
capture is huge. Furthermore, we might suppose that there are many other truths which
our axiomatic theories are not capable of capturing.
1.6. Gödel’s sentences undecidable within PA. At this point, we can come back
to our original issue and we can construct Gödel sentence. Before of that, we must introduce
Gödel numerical coding. By adopting this method, syntactic properties will become simple
numerical properties. Then it will be easy to show that these numerical properties are
primitive recursive. Thanks to Gödel coding, we can define a numerical property Bew(m,n)
which holds just when m is the code number in our scheme of a PA-derivation of the
sentence with number n. By adopting Gödel coding, we create a new language where all
syntactic properties such as being an axiom, being a sentence and being a sentence derived
by modus ponens, become numerical propreties. We have a numerical language which,
unlike natural languages, is precise and does not have problem of denotation. The self
referential Gödel sentence which says of itself to be unprovable, becomes a Gödel number
and it is self referential only when we translate it back from Gödel numbering. So, it recalls
the liar paradox only after a procedure of decoding, in fact, before it is simply a number
(very large). Now we can get an idea of Gödel numbering by associating odd numbers to
function symbols, costants, quantifiers, separating symbols and even numbers to variables



















Now we can use the fundamental theorem of arithmetic (factorization in prime factors) to
obtain Gödelian numbering. Let the expression T be the sequence of κ + 1 symbols and
variables s0, s1, s2, s3, ........, sκ. Then T’s Gödel number is calculated by taking the basic
code-number ci for each si in turn, using ci as an exponent for the i+ 1-th prime number










Now we can give some examples of Gödel numbering taken from Peter Smith’s book:
The single symbol ”S”(the successor function) has the Gödel number: 223.
The standard numeral SS0 has the Gödel number: 223 × 323 × 521.
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the sentence ∃y(S0+y) = SS0 has the Gödel number: 213×34×517×723×
1121 × 1325 × 174 × 1919 × 2315 × 2923 × 3123 × 3721. [Smith 07]
If we adopt a Hilbert style axiomatic system of logic, proof-arrays are simply linear se-
quences of sentences. A good way of coding these is by what we call super Gödel numbers
[Smith 07]. Given a sequence of sentences or other expressions
T0, T1, T2, ......, Tn
we first code each Ti by a regular Gödel number gi to produce a sequence of numbers
g0, g1, g2, ......, gn
Now we encode this sequence of regular Gödel numbers using a single super Gödel number,
by multiplying powers of primes to get:
2g0 × 3g1 × 5g2 × 7g3 × .........× πgnn
At this point, we can define the proof relation Bew(m, n): Bew(m,n) holds just if m
is the super Gödel number of a sequence of sentences that is a PA-proof of the closed
sentence with regular Gödel number n. Now we have to introduce the following important
definitions and theorems:
Definition 11. A one place numerical function f is expressed by φ(x, y) in a arith-
metical language, just if, for any m, n:
if f(m)=n, then φ(m̃, ñ) is true.
if f(m) 6= n, then¬φ(m̃, ñ)is true.
Definition 12. A one-place function f is captured by φ(x, y) in the theory like PA just
if, for any m, n:
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if f(m) = n, then PA ` φ(m̃, ñ)
If f(m) 6= n, then PA ` ¬φ(m̃, ñ)
Definition 13. A theory like Q (Robinson arithmetic) or PA (Peano arithmetic) is
sufficiently strong if for every primitive recursive function f, there is a corresponding φ in
Q or PA that captures it
Theorem 17. Q and so also PA can capture all Σ1 functions.
Theorem 18. Every primitive recursive function is Σ1.
Theorem 19. Q (Robinson arithmetic) and PA (Peano arithmetic) are sufficiently
strong (they can capture all primitive recursive functions).
Gödel’s construction aims at taking an open sentence G(y) which contains y free.
This sentence has as Gödel number|G| and Gödel substitutes the Gödel number for G for
the free variable in G. So Gödel forms the sentenceG(|G|). This is another example of
diagonalization. At this point we can introduce the following theorem:
Theorem 20. There is a primitive recursive function diag(n) which, when applied to a
number n which is the Gödel number of some sentence, produces the Gödel number of that
sentence’s diagonalization.
Now we can deepen our analysis about the numerical relation Bew(m,n). We have
already said that this relation holds when m is the super Gödel number of a PA proof of
the sentence with Gödel number n. We can state a fundamental theorem which renders Q
and PA able to capture this numerical relation:
Theorem 21. Bew(m,n) is primitive recursive.
From this relation we can obtain the following predicate: Prov(n) = ∃vBew(v, n) which
holds when the sentence with Gödel number n is provable. However, we cannot define the
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provability property by some bounded quantification such as (∃v ≤ B)Bew(v, n). If we
could, then the provability property would be primitive recursive, but it is not. The
predicate Prov(n) is not even µ− recursive. In fact, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 22. No open formula in the theory Q and in the theory PA can capture the
corresponding numerical property ProvT .
So Q and PA are not recusively decidable because they cannot capture the property
ProvT which is not recursive. From this fact, we obtain a theorem which gives a negative
solution to the Entscheidungsproblem:
Theorem 23. (Church) The property of being a theorem of first-order logic is recur-
sively undecidable.
Proof. Suppose first-order theoremhood is recursively decidable. In other words,
suppose that the property of numbering a logical theorem is µ− recursive. Let Q∗ be the
conjunction of the seven non-logical axioms of Q (Robinson arithmetic), and let φ be any
sentence of the first-order language. By our supposition, there is a µ− recursive function
which decides whether (Q∗ −→ φ) is a logical theorem. But (Q∗ −→ φ) is a logical theorem
just if φ is a Q-theorem. So our supposition implies that there is a µ− recursive function
which decides what is a theorem of Q. But we have just seen that there cannot be such
function, given Q’s consistency. So the supposition must be false. [Smith 07] 
Therefore, on one side we have Gödel completeness theorem for first-order logic and on
the other side we have Church’s result about the undecidability of first-order logic. Thus,
we should ask ourselves how we can combine these opposite results. If a first-order formula
is valid for Gödel completeness theorem we are sure that we can find a proof of the formula
itself. However, if the first-logic formula is invalid, for Church’s result, we will enter an
everlasting loop in searching for a proof which does not ever terminate. Now we can come
back to Gödel theorem, we start with the following definition:
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Definition 14. The relation Bew∗(m,n) which holds just when m is the super Gödel
number for a PA proof of the diagonalization of the formula with Gödel number n is also
primitive recursive.
Now we can construct Gödel sentence:
G(y) = ∀x¬Bew∗(x, y)
Finally we diagonalise G itself to give :
G1 = ∃y(y = |G| ∧G(y))
. This is our Gödel sentence for PA and it is a Π01 sentence. G
1 is equivalent to G(|G|) or
to ∀x¬Bew∗(x, |G|). It follows that G1 is true if and only if it is unprovable in PA.
Theorem 24. (Gödel) If PA is consistent, G1 is true if and only if it is unprovable in
PA.
Proof. G1 is true if and only if there is no number m such that Bew∗(m, |G|). There-
fore, G1 is true if and only if there is no number m such that m is the code number for a
PA proof of G1 itself (for the diagonalization). But, if G1 is provable, some number would
be the code number of a proof of it. Hence G1 is true if and only if it is unprovable in
PA. 
Now to complete the proof we need the following definition from which we can obtain
the concept of ω − consistency:
Definition 15. An arithmetic theory T is ω−inconsistent if, for some open sentences
φ(x), T can prove each φ(m̃) and T can also prove ¬∀xφ(x).
So now we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 25. (Gödel) [Smith 06] If PA is ω − consistent, PA 6` ¬G1.
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Proof. Suppose that PA is ω−consistent but ¬G1 is provable in PA. That’s equivalent
to assuming (1) PA ` ∃xBew∗(x, |G|). But if PA is ω − consistent, it is consistent. So
if ¬G1 is provable, G1 is not provable. Hence for any m, m cannot code for a proof for
G1. But G1 is the formula you get by diagonalizing G. Therefore, by the definition of
Bew∗, our assumptions imply that Bew∗(m, |G|) is false, for each m. So we have (2)
PA ` ¬Bew∗(m̃, |G|) for each m. But (1) and (2) together make PA ω − inconsistent
after all, contrary to hypothesis. Hence, if PA is ω− consistent, ¬G1 is unprovable [Smith
07] 
At this point, we should ask ourselves if we can avoid the condition of ω− consistency
and adopt simply the condition of consistency. Before doing that, we have to introduce
the important theorem called the fixed point theorem:
Theorem 26. (Kleene) If a theory like PA is consistent and φ(x) is any formula of
its language with one free variable, then there is a sentence κ of PA’s language such that
PA ` κ↔ φ(|κ|).7
It does not matter what condition we take, so long as it can be expressed in PA’s
language. There will be a sentence which PA shows is true if and only if satisfies that con-
dition. Thanks to the fixed point theorem, we can formally prove Gödel first incompleteness
theorem within PA.8 In fact, we can form the following biconditional:
PA ` G↔ ¬Prov(|G|).
To avoid the condition of ω−consistency we have to introduce Rosser provability predicate
which informally says that if i am provable there is already a proof of my negation. To
construct Rosser predicate we have to introduce the numerical relation ˜Bew(m,n) which
holds when m is the super Gödel number of a PA proof of the negation of the sentence
7I remind to the reader that the symbol |κ| means the Gödel number of κ.
8We have proved Gödel theorem informally by looking at the formal system PA from the outside.
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with Gödel number n. This numerical relation is primitive recursive. Now we can introduce
Rosser provability predicate:
Definition 16. (Rosser)
RProvePA = ∃v(Bew(v, x) ∧ (∀w ≤ v)¬ ˜Bew(w, x)).
Thus, if it has a proof, there is not smaller proof of its negation. Now we can apply
the fixed point theorem in the following manner:
PA ` RPA ↔ ¬RprovePA(|RPA|)
In other words, RPA is true just if, if it is provable, there is already a proof of its nega-
tion. Rosser sentence is another undecidable sentence and it avoids the condition of
ω − consistency. To show that Rosser sentence is independent from PA, it is enough
to assume the condition of consistency.
We have proved the first incompleteness theorem that can be represented by the following
sentence:
if PA is consistent, then G is not provable in PA.
We can formalize what we have written by adopting the following sentence:
Con −→ ¬Prov(|G|).
Thus, we can formalize half of the first incompleteness theorem inside PA in the following
manner:
(A) PA ` Con −→ ¬Prov(|G|).
We have reasoned about the first incompleteness theorem by looking informally at PA
from the outside, but now by adopting the precedent sentence and constructing the Gödel
sentence formally, we are working inside PA. As we have seen before we can construct
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Gödel sentence by using the fixed point theorem in the following manner:
(B) PA ` G↔ ¬Prov(|G|).
Now suppose (for reductio) that :
(1) PA ` Con.
Then given the formalised First theorem, Modus Ponens yields:
(2) PA ` ¬Prov(|G|).
But (B) tells us that ¬Prov(|G|) and G are provably equivalent in PA. Therefore:
PA ` G.
But, this contradicts the First theorem. So supposition (1) is false, unless PA is incon-
sistent. Thus, assuming the formalized First incompleteness theorem, we can state the
Second incompleteness theorem:
Theorem 27. (Gödel-Von neumann) If PA is consistent, PA 6` ConPA.9
Con is another true but unprovable Π01 sentence, independent from PA. The theorem
tells us that even PA is not enough to deduce the consistency of PA, secondly that no
weaker theory than PA can deduce the consistency of PA, thirdly that we cannot use PA
to prove the consitency of a stronger theory such as ZFC (Hilbert’s program fails) and
finally that if we are going to produce a consistency proof PA, we should adopt a theory
which is weaker in some respects and stronger in others than PA (Gentzen Proof by using
the theory PRA0 + ε0-transfinite induction, as we have seen before).
9A story tells us that this theorem was discovered firstly by Von neumann. The Hungurian mathematician
was in train, after that he had listened to Gödel’s conference about the first incompleteness theorem, and
he was able to deduce the Second incompleteness theorem from the First. At the same time, also Gödel
himself was able to prove his theorem
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So we have seen that for the First incompleteness theorem the dream of having a complete
theory of first-order arithmetic fails. Furthermore, we have seen that for the Second incom-
pleteness theorem, Hilbert’s program was demolished. However, while Hilbert’s program
is doomed to fail, we should ask ourselves whether the dream of having a complete theory
of first-order arithmetic can be rescued. Thus, this aspect will be the topic of the next
section. Alan Turing in his doctoral dissertation in 1939 under the supervision of Alonzo
Church attempted to answer positively to this question by going through the transfinite.
2. Transfinite Progressions
2.1. Preliminaries to this section. In section 2.2 I will introduce Fregean definite
descriptions and I will connect Fregean senses to the issue of completeness. I will show
that proving propositions or conjectures in mathematics fixes new Fregean senses (definite
descriptions) to objects in mathematics. In this section I will explain some issues connected
with the philosophy of language and I will discuss the problem of denotation caused by im-
proper definite descriptions. I will introduce the solution for improper definite descriptions
conceived by Russell. In section 2.3 I will discuss Turing’s attempt to obtain a complete
theory by going through the transfinite. I will introduce Turing’s completeness theorem
for Π01-statements. I will explain the problem with transfinite progressions. In fact I will
highlight the problem connected with ordinal notation. Finally, I will introduce Feferman’s
completeness theorem for Π02-statements. This result faces the same problems as Turing’s
result. In fact, we have the problem of finding a unique ordinal notation. In this part, I will
classify some mathematical conjectures or propositions such as the twin prime conjecture
and Riemann hypothesis in terms of hierarchy of formulas. I will conclude by asserting
that Turing’s dream of obtaining a complete theory for first-order arithmetical statement
unproved within PA, by going through the transfinite, is doomed to fail because of the
problems represented by ordinal notation.
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2.2. Gottlob Frege’s definite descriptions and completeness. Before speaking
about transfinite progressions, I want to address an issue represented by the Goldbach
conjecture since it can be expressed by a Π01 sentence, as the consistency statement. Gold-
bach’s conjecture is one of the oldest and renown unsolved problems in arithmetic. It
states:
Definition 17. (Goldbach) Every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the
sum of two primes.
It has been proven that the conjecture holds until 4×1018 but it remains unproved. In
fact it is another statement that we do not know whether it is true or false. The conjecture
was originally formulated by the Christian mathematician Goldbach at the end of the
eighteenth century. In June 1742, Goldbach wrote a letter to the mathematician Euler in
which he conceived the following conjecture:
Definition 18. Every integer which can be written as the sum of two primes, can also
be written as the sum of as many primes as one wishes, until all terms are units.
He then proposed a second conjecture in the margin of his letter:
Definition 19. Every integer greater than 2 can be written as the sum of three primes.
All these three definitions are equivalent but the Goldbach conjecture remains un-
proved.
The number two is denoted by the two following definite descriptions: (1) the number that
is the smallest prime and (2) the number that is the cube root of eight. So, even if these two
different definite descriptions are two different Fregean senses of number two, they denote
the same referement. But if the Goldbach conjecture were true, the two definite descrip-
tions namely (1) The number that is even and greater than two and (2) The number that
is even and the sum of two primes, would be two different Fregean senses that denote the
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same set of numbers. However, we do not know whether the Goldbach conjecture is true.
Now I want to address and explain the following thesis: Proving the truth of conjectures
or propositions fixes new Fregean senses to objects in mathematics.
If we could prove Goldbach conjecture, we would have two different definite descriptions
(two different Fregean senses) which denote the same set.
The distinction between sense and meaning (referement) was very important for Frege
who was able to explain it in his article Über Sinn und Bedeutung. In order to clarify this
distinction, we have to depart from singular terms which are constituted by proper names
and definite descriptions. Proper names are usual names such us Plato, Kant, Gödel and
Cantor. Definite descriptions are singular terms characterised by the fact that they begin
with determinative article such as The teacher of Aristotle, The author of critique of pure
reason, The discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic and The creator of the paradise
of transfinite numbers. The meaning or referement of a Proper name is the object to which
the Proper name is referring. While the meaning or referement of a definite description is
the object which the definite description is describing. The notion of Sense (Sinn) is elusive,
but we can say that it is the way in which the referement is given. In the case of proper
names, the notion of Fregean Sense is obscure, while in the case of definite descriptions
is clear since they characterise, describe and show the object to which they are referring.
However, Saul Kripke affirms that for the Fregean theory each Proper name is synonymous
of a definite description. Even if Frege has never identified the Sense (Sinn) of a name
with a definite description, he gave examples in which he was always identifying the Sense
of a name with a definite description. Bertrand Russell said that each proper name such
as Socrates, is an abbreviation of a definite description such as The teacher of Plato. So,
we can assert that definite descriptions are the Fregean senses of singular terms since they
characterise the object (meaning or referement) which they are denoting. It is not true to
say that each Fregean sense determines the meaning or referement. In fact, if we say The
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biggest odd number, this definite description is not denoting any number. Furthermore, For
the Fregean semantics, each Fregean sense is connected only to one meaning or referement,
but different Fregean senses might have the same referement. Gottlob Frege was able to
explain this aspect with the following example:
1) Hesperus (the night star) = Hesperus (the night star).
2) Hesperus (the night star) = Phosphorus (the morning star).
Hesperus and Phosphorus are two names of Venus. The sentence (2) has got more in-
formative value. Even if Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same meaning or referement
(Venus), they have two different Fregean senses. The Sense of Hesperus characterises Venus
as The star that you can see in the night in that part of the sky and the Sense of Phosphorus
characterises Venus as The star that you can see in the morning in that part of the sky.
The fact that Hesperus and Phosphorus are two Fregean senses of the same referement,
namely Venus, cannot be established apriori, but only after that we have obtained empiri-
cal evidence.
Now the Fregean sense of a sentence is the thought (Gedanke) expressed by the sentence
itself. While the meaning or referement of sentence is its truth value. For Frege, sentences
can be only true or false. Moreover, truth and falsity are two objects denoted by sentences.
The Fregean thoughts, which are the senses (Sinnen) of sentences, belong to an atemporal
and anti-psychological third reign.
The Fregean meaning or referement of predicates are concepts which Frege consider as func-
tions to be completed. being a prime number or being even are predicates which denote two
concepts, namely two functions, and when they are completed by two arguments (singular
terms such as the number 2 or 3) give, as values of the functions (concepts), the value of
truth or falsity, because they form sentences. Frege called improper definite descriptions
those descriptions which lack of a meaning or referement and for the German philosopher
sentences which contain improper definite descriptions are neither true neither false. In
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1905 Bertrand Russell in his article On denoting tried to argue against this Fregean thesis.
For the Nobel prize, also improper definite descriptions have a truth value. So we have to
examine the following sentence:
(1) The actual king of France is bald.
The problem of this sentence is that France does not have any actual king, it is a republic.
Russell wants to eliminate definite descriptions by preferring the logical form of a sentence
to its grammatical form. For Russell, the logical form of (1) is the following:
∃x(Actual King of France(x) ∧ ∀y(Actual King of France(y) −→ y = x) ∧Bald(x)).
For Frege the sentence is neither true or false. Instead if we continue the analysis of Russell,
we will discover that it has got a truth value. Russell asks himself what is the negation
of (1). Russell says that we have two different interpretations of the negation symbol. We
start with the first one:
∃x(Actual King of France(x) ∧ ∀y(Actual King of France(y) −→ y = x) ∧ ¬Bald(x)).
According to Russell, this is a wrong interpretation of the logical form, since France does
not have any King whether bald or not. So Russell introduces the right logical form of (1)
¬∃x(Actual King of France(x) ∧ ∀y(Actual King of France(y) −→ y = x) ∧Bald(x)).
Hence, this sentence is true since the actual King of France does not exist whereas (1)
is false. So, by changing the scope of the negation symbol, Russell was able to give a
convincing answer to the problem of improper definite descriptions.
Now if the Goldbach conjecture were true, we could form the Goldbach set, namely all even
numbers greater than two and sum of two primes. We could fix two different Fregean senses
to the Goldbach set, namely The set containing all even numbers greater than two and The
set containing all even numbers sum of two primes. Proving conjecture or propositions fix
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Fregean senses to objects in mathematics such as the Goldbach set. Furthermore, we can
relativise all Fregean senses of the Goldbach set to each element of the Goldbach set. For
instance, the Fregean senses, namely The number that is even and greater than two and The
number that is even and the sum of 3 and 5, will denote the number 8 which would belong
to the Goldbach set. We can see also definite descriptions (Fregean senses) extensionally.
They might express properties which define a set and we can see these definite descriptions
extensionally. Since definite descriptions might define a set, we can see, in this case, a
connection between Fregean senses and Gödelian definitions in the constructible universe,
namely L, when Fregean semantics is relativised to the language of mathematics. If the
continuum hypothesis is proved to be true, we could fix to the set of real numbers the
following Fregean sense, namely The set is large as the first aleph, namely ℵ1. Whereas if
we prove that the cardinality of the continuum is a precise aleph different from the first
aleph, we disprove the continuum hypothesis but we could fix to the set of real numbers the
following Fregean sense The set is large as the second or the third or the forth..... aleph.
if we are thinking about it, we could say that when we are taming the infinite, we are
using finite fregean senses, namely finite string of symbols, which denote, as referement,
the infinite. We are calculating and discovering properties about the infinite by using finite
Fregean senses that denote the infinite. 10
2.3. Transfinite progressions. At this point we can come back to our original issue,
namely transfinite progressions. Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem makes us able to
see the phenomenon of inexhaustibility of mathematics. The sentence that formalises the
consistency of PA, namely Con(PA), is independent from PA, even if it is true. However
if a theory is sound (it does not prove false propositions), also a theory PA1, obtained
by adding to PA the sentence Con(PA) as new axiom, will be sound and will be strictly
stronger than PA because it will prove Con(PA). However, also PA1 will be incomplete
10Also in Religion, we could say that all different religions adopt all different Fregean senses ( different Holy
books, different theories..etc) that denote the same referement, namely God.
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and so, we cannot prove Con(PA1) within PA1, but we can form a new and stronger
theory PA2 which proves more things than PA1 such as Con(PA1) by adding to PA2
the true sentence Con(PA1) and so on through the infinite. In his phd dissertation in
1937, Alan Turing formalised this intuition by introducing ordinal logic and a surprising
idea to overcome the phenomenon of incompleteness by iterating through the transfinite
the procedure of adding undecidable sentences to a theory, such as reflection sentences or
consistency statements, hoping to obtain at certain point a complete theory. Thus, Alan
Turing was dreaming a complete theory by traveling through the transfinite.
We will have a sequence of theories where, for example, Ti+1 = Ti + Con(Ti) and Tω+1 =
Tω + Con(Tω). At limit passages γ we accomplish the following operation:
⋃
β<γ Tβ. If
Ti is sound, then, since Con(Ti) is true, also Ti+1 is sound. So we can associate ordinals
to theories. First of all we need a Σ1 formula which defines the axioms of theories that
constitute the sequence. Then we need an ordinal notation.
We must think of a limit ordinal as a sequence of ordinals which tend to it, enumerated
by a function φe(x), so that for the definition of axioms of a theory indexed by a limit
ordinal it satisfies the following condition: ρlim(e)(y) if and only if there exists an n such
that ρφe(n)(y). By an ordinal logic we mean a sequence of theories Tα1 , Tα2 , Tα3 ....... where
each α is a name for an ordinal, namely a number of the Kleene’s class O. However, a
Limit ordinal can have different notations. For instance, ω is the limit of computable,
strictly increasing, sequences of natural numbers. Furthermore, it may happen that even
if αi and αj denote the same ordinal, the theories Tαi and Tαj prove different theorems.
When theories with different ordinal notations prove the same theorems, we say that the
ordinal logic is invariant. Turing proved the following dichotomy: an ordinal logic can be
either invariant or complete for Π01 statements, but not both at the same time.
An ordinal is said to be computable if it is isomorphic to a recursive well-order. It is
well-known that there is at least a countable ordinal, but not computable and the least
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countable ordinal but not computable is denoted by ωCK1 .
In 1936 Church and Kleene introduced the notion of constructive ordinals. The class O
of constructive ordinals overlaps perfectly the set of computable ordinals. The class O is
a system of notation, namely a system of codes for countable ordinals. If we write α̃i for
the ordinal denoted by αi, then we can assert that ω
CK
1 is the least ordinal that does not
belong to the class O.
At this point, we can define inductively the class O and a partial order <o on it.
Definition 20. (1) 0 has notation 1.
(2) Suppose that you have already defined <o on ordinals smaller than α and that you have
assigned a notation to them:
(a) If α = β + 1 and β has the notation b, assign the notation 2b to α and add the pairs
(z, 2b) to the relation <o, for each z ≤o b;
(b) If α is a limit ordinal, it can be interpreted as a sequence of ordinals that tend to
it. Suppose that this sequence can be enumerated by a function φe such that for each n,
φe(n) <o φe(n + 1), where φe(n) = an and the increasing sequence ã1, ã2, ã3, ...... has got
as limit ordinal α. Then 3 × 5e is a notation for α; add each pair (z, 3 × 5e) such that
z ≤o φe(n) for some n, to the relation <o.
<o is not a linear order but it is a tree. In fact, each limit ordinal smaller than ω
CK
1 can
receive infinite different notations. At each point which corresponds to a limit ordinal, this
order splits in infinite branches. Whereas natural numbers have a fixed notation, ordinals
can receive different notations. Alan Turing was able to obtain a completeness result.
Theorem 28. (Turing) [Franzen 04] For each progression, for every Π1 true statement,
exists a notation a ∈ O such that ã = ω + 1 and ∀xψ(x) can be proved in Ta.
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Proof. we denote with S(a) the successor code 2a and with lim(a) the code for limit
ordinal 3× 5e. We define by recursion the following function:
(1)φe(n) = n if for every κ ≤ n, ψ(ñ) is true
(2)φe(n) = S(lim(e)) if exists κ ≤ n such that ψ(ñ) is false.
where ψ(x) is decidable. For hypothesis, ∀(x)ψ(x) is a true Π1 statement, then for every
n, we have φe(n) = n and so the sequence of values φe(0), φe(1), φe(2), is the sequence 0,
1, 2 and lim(e) is an element of O which denotes ω. Now we can reason within TS(Lim(e)),
checking in this theory that if TLim(e) is consistent, then the statement ∀(x)ψ(x) is true:
we suppose that the statement ∀(x)ψ(x) is false; then we have for some number n that
the satement ψ(ñ) is false. Then the theory TLim(e) for some n and for each κ ≥ n (from
a certain point ) will determine that φ(κ̃) = S(lim(e)); So from a certain point, TS(lim(e))
and TLim(e) will be the same, and so TLim(e) will prove its own consistency; then for Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem follows that TLim(e) is inconsistent. But TS(Lim(e) proves
the consistency of TLim(e). Therefore, TS(Lim(e)) proves ∀(x)ψ(x). We have to notice that
S(Lim(e)) denotes ω + 1. 
Now, we can continue our discussion by looking at Solomon Feferman’s completeness
result. Before of that, we must introduce two fundamental aspects of Feferman’s concep-
tion. Alan Turing did not consider his completeness result valuable. He was thinking that
his result was useless from a mathematical perspective. In fact, Turing’s approach shifts
the question if a Π1-sentence true to the question if a number a belongs to O and this last
problem is a far more complex computable issue.
Solomon Feferman introduced the concept of autonomous progressions namely, collections
of theories Tα, where α can be proved to belong to O within a system Tβ already accepted.
Instead of iterating the consistency statement, Solomon Feferman was adding to theories
the unlimited uniform reflection principle. This principle states: every sentence provable
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in T is true. We can, while staying within the language of arithmetic, add the principle of
uniform Σn-reflection for every n:
∀(x)(Theorem(x) ∧ Σnsentence(x) −→ TrueΣn(x)).
In 1962 Feferman proved a completeness theorem for progressions based on unlimited
uniform reflection:
Theorem 29. (Feferman) [Franzen 04] For any uniform reflection progression, there
is a branch in O such that there is, for any true arithmetical sentence φ, an a in B with
|a| < ωωω+1 for which φ is provable in Ta.
Therefore, there is a reflection sequence of length ωω
ω+1
based on PA where every true
arithmetical sentence is provable. However, there is no hint in the proof of the theorem
of any way in which arithmetical truths in general can be formally derived from axioms
that we recognize as valid. Unfortunately, also in the case of Feferman’s completeness
theorem, many problems remain for the ordinal notation at the limit passage. Feferman
completeness theorem strengthens Turing’s result, because it refers to Π02 sentences. At
this point, we can state Feferman completeness theorem for Π02 sentences:
Theorem 30. (Feferman) For any progressions based on the uniform reflection prin-
ciple and every true Π02 -sentence φ, there is an a with |a| = ω2 + ω + 1 such that φ is
provable in Ta.
At this point, i want to adopt Torkel Franzen’s words to explain the importance that
primitive recursive functions might have had in Feferman’s completeness proof:
Primitive recursive functions play a large role in the proof of the Π02-
completeness theorem, for reasons shown by the following argument. Sup-
pose ∀x∃yψ(x, y) is a true Π02-sentence. Then for every n there is a smallest
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proof f(n) in T0 of ∃ψ(ñ, y), by the Σ1-completeness theorem. f is com-
putable, but may or may not be primitive recursive. Suppose f is primitive
recursive. Then the formaliztion φ for every n, f(n) is a proof in T0 of
∃yψ(ñ, y) is equivalent in T0 to a Π-formula, and we can apply Turing’s
completeness theorem to conclude that φ is provable in some Ta, where
|a| = ω + 1. We can then use the uniform reflection principle for T0 to
prove ∀x∃yψ(x, y) in Ta. Unfortunately such a proof cannot be carried
out in general, because f , although computable, is not in general primitive
recursive...........[Franzen 04]
What Alan Turing really hoped to obtain was a completeness theorem for Π02-statements
in ∀∃ (for all, there exists)-form. He called these statements number-theoretical problems.
These problems which can be expressed by a Π02-statement include the twin prime conjec-
ture. Now we can introduce the twin prime conjecture. First of all, we have to say that a
twin prime is a prime number that has a prime gap of two. In other words, it differs from
another prime number by two, for example the twin prime pair (41, 43). Sometimes the
term twin prime is used for a pair of twin primes; an alternative name for this is prime
twin or prime pair. At this point we can introduce the twin prime conjecture which does
not have a solution:
Definition 21. (Twin prime conjecture)There are infinitely many primes p such that
p + 2 is also prime.
Furthermore, Alan Turing pointed out that the question whether a given program for
one of his machine computes a total function is in ∀∃-form (it can be expressed by a
Π02-statement). In a note of his dissertation, Alan Turing pointed out that also Riemann
Hypothesis can be expressed by a Π02-statement. Years later, Georg Kreisel showed that
Riemann Hypothesis can also be expressed by a Π01-statement. However, Turing’s class of
number-theoretical problems does not include such statements as finiteness of the number
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of solutions of diophantine equation which can be expressed by a Σ02-statement (∃∀-form,
Hilbert’s tenth problem that we have seen in the precedent section) or the Waring’s prob-
lem 11 which can be expressed by a Π03-statement (∀∃∀-form). In dealing with Π02-number
theoretical problems, Alan Turing introduced a new kind a computation, namely a compu-
tation relative to an oracle (o-machines). We can conclude this section by saying that both
Turing and Feferman were dreaming complete theories by going through the transfinite.
The main problem of their solutions was based essentially on the impossibility of giving
a unique notation to the ordinals at the limit passages. In fact, the problem of ordinal
notation has a greater computational complexity than the problem of proving arithmetical
truths.
3. Set theory
3.1. Preliminaries to this section. This section is devoted to set theory. We will see
how the phenomenon of incompleteness characterizes second-order and third-order arith-
metic. We will examine also the solution adopted by mathematicians to prove undecidable
statements. We will focus our attention on Luzin’s problem, which characterises second-
order arithmetic, and the Continuum Hypothesis, that characterizes third-order arithmetic.
While Luzin’s problem has been solved positively, the Continuum Hypothesis remains un-
decidable for many mathematicians. However, from my philosophical perspective, I will
argue that the Continuum Hypothesis has been settled. In section 3.2 (Prerequisites) I
will introduce the basic concepts of set theory necessary for the following sections. I will
explain the ZFC axioms. Then I will introduce the concepts of ordinals and cardinals. In
section 3.3 I will show how to reduce all different systems of numbers to sets. This section
is important because it highlights the fact that we define all mathematical objects in terms
of sets. Set theory represents the foundation of mathematics. In fact ZFC Universe shaped
11In number theory, Waring’s problem asks whether each natural number κ has an associated positive
integer s such that every natural number is the sum of at most s κth powers of natural numbers. For
example, every natural number is the sum of at most 4 squares, 9 cubes, or 19 fourth powers.
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by Zermelo-Frankel axioms system can be seen as the universe of mathematics. Algebra
and Analysis can be accomplished within ZFC Universe. Mathematics can be accomplished
by adopting the language of set theory and the ZFC axioms. In section 3.4 I will introduce
two kinds of large cardinal numbers. In this section, I will explain Gödel’s constructible
universe, the minimal inner model. It is interesting to say that the precedent two large
cardinal notions are consistent with the axiom of constructibility, namely V=L. In section
3.5 I will introduce the concepts related to descriptive set theory. We will see in this section
that Luzin’s problem, a mathematical statement undecided by ZFC axioms, is settled by
a large cardinal axiom. In this section, I will introduce the axiom of determinacy and the
axioms of definable determinacy. This section is important because I will highlight how
an undecided mathematical statement, formulated in second-order arithmetic, was settled
by a large cardinal assumption. In section 3.6 I will explain the method of forcing. In this
section I will show Paul Cohen’s independence proof by which he was able to construct
a meta-mathematical model within which assuming the consistency of ZFC, the axioms
of ZFC are consistent with ¬CH. This section is important because we will see that the
Continuum Hypothesis is an undecided mathematical statement from ZFC axioms and, so
third-order arithmetic is doomed to be incomplete. The ZFC axioms do not settle the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis. In section 3.7 I will introduce Forcing Axioms. We will see that these
axioms do settle the Continuum Hypothesis. In this section I will argue that the Bounded
Proper Forcing Axiom may represent a phenomenal solution to the Continuum Hypoth-
esis. In fact, the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom does settle the Continuum Hypothesis.
For this axiom, the cardinality of the Continuum is ℵ2 as Kurt Gödel was thinking. At
the end of this section, I will introduce a Kantian distinction between phenomenal and
noumenal reality applied to set theory. According to this distinction, meta-mathematical
models of set theory belong to the phenomenal reality of set theory. In section 4.8 I will
explain Woodin’s program. I will discuss the Ω-logic and I will introduce the Ω-conjecture.
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This section is important because if we assume the existence of a proper class of Woodin
cardinals and that the Ω Conjecture holds, we have an Ω-complete picture of the structure
H(ω2) reducing the phenomenon of incompleteness for third-order arithmetic. Then I will
introduce Woodin’s Maximum and I will highlight the importance of this axiom. I will
conclude this section by comparing Turing’s Conjecture with the Ω Conjecture. Then, I
will compare the Ω Conjecture with Church’s thesis and the consistency of ZFC.
3.2. Prerequisites: ZFC axioms, ordinal and cardinal numbers. In set theory,
not every property can define a set, by Russell’s paradox. Thus, we have to make a
distinction between sets and classes. So we can define a class:
Definition 22. A class is a collection of the form {x: x is a collection with property
P }.
In order to construct new sets from old ones, we must introduce Zermelo’s axioms.
Ernest Zermelo in 1905 was motivated to formulate the axioms in order to reach an impor-
tant mathematical result, namely the Well-ordering theorem. Paradoxes, such as Russell’s
paradox or Burali-Forti’s paradox, were not the main concern for the German mathemati-
cian. In order to construct a well-order on the set of real numbers, Zermelo introduced the
axiom of choice. At this point, we can introduce ZFC axioms:
(1) Axiom of extensionality:
∀x∀y(x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y))
Two sets are equal if and only if they contain the same elements.
(2) The empty set axiom:
∃x∀y y 6∈ x
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There is a set with no elements.
(3) The axiom of pairs:
∀x∀y∃z∀w(w ∈ z ↔ (w = x ∨ w = y))
For any two sets, there is a set whose elements are exactly these sets.
(4) The axiom of separation:
∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ (z ∈ x ∧ φ(z)))
where φ(z) is any condition expressed in the first order language of set theory with free
variable z (φ(z) may contain other free variables). For any set x there is a set consisting of
all z in x for which φ(z) holds. So, this axiom avoids Russell’s paradox, since the property
applies to an already given set, namely x. Since we are speaking about definability, we can
say that the axiom of separation mirrors the successor stage which Gödel adopted in the
creation of the constructible universe, namely L.
(5) The Power set axiom:
∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ⊆ x)
For any set x there is a set consisting of all subsets of x, called the power set of x and
denoted by P (x).
(6) The Union axiom:
∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ ∃w(z ∈ w ∧ w ∈ x))
For any set x there is a set which is the union of all the elements of x.
(7) The axiom of infinity:
∃x(∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x −→ y ∪ {y} ∈ x))
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There is an inductive set.
(8) The axiom of foundation:
∀x∃y((x 6= ∅) −→ y ∈ x ∧ x ∩ y = ∅)
Every set is well-founded, it contains an ∈-minimal element.
(9) The axiom of replacement:
∀x∃y∀y1(y1 ∈ y ↔ ∃x1(x1 ∈ x ∧ φ(x1, y1)))
where φ(s, t) is a formula such that
∀s∃t(φ(s, t) ∧ ∀t1(φ(s, t1) −→ t1 = t))
If φ(s, t) (φ(s, t) may have other free variables) is a class function, then when its domain is
restricted to a set x, the resulting images form a set y. The axiom of replacement (9) was
not included by Zermelo in the original formulation of the axioms. It was added in order
to prove the existence of sets like
{N, P (N), P (P (N)), P (P (P (N))), ........}
By the axiom of replacement, we can define functions on N and also, we can define functions
on the ordinals. Furthermore, we can prove that the axioms of large cardinals are general-
izations of the axiom of replacement plus the axiom of infinity. Now, we can introduce the
last axiom, namely the axiom of choice:
Suppose that F is a family of non empty sets. Then, there is a function
h : F −→
⋃
F such that for each A ∈ F , h(A) ∈ A. h is said to be a choice
function for F .
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Zermelo formulated the axiom of choice in order to prove that every set can be well-ordered.
The axiom of choice is equivalent to Zorn’s lemma which we can define in the following
way:
Definition 23. (Zorn’s lemma) Let P be a non-empty set partially ordered by R with
the property that every chain C in P has an upper bound in P . Then P contains at least
one maximal element.
At this point, we can introduce the concept of ordinals. A set is transitive iff it contains
all elements of its elements.
Definition 24. An ordinal number is a transitive set that is well-ordered by ∈.
Furthermore, if α and β are ordinals, then α ∈ β if and only if α ⊂ β. Therefore,
α ∈ β if and only if α is a proper initial segment of β. From this , it is implied that α
is exactly the set of all its ∈-predecessors, which are themselves ordinals. Thus, for all
ordinal numbers α and β, either α < β or β < α or α = β.
The successor of an ordinal α is the ordinal α ∪ {α}, usually denoted by α + 1. A limit
ordinal is an ordinal which is neither empty nor a successor. The natural numbers are
finite ordinals. The set N is identified with the first infinite ordinal, which is a limit
ordinal, and it is denoted by ω. We can add that an ordinal is countable if it is either finite
or bijectable with ω. The set of all countable ordinals is not countable and is, therefore,
the first uncountable ordinal denoted by ω1. The set of all ordinals bijectable with some
α ≤ ω1 is an ordinal not bijectable with any α ≤ ω1 and it is denoted by ω2. We can
continue in this way. A limit ordinal α is called regular if there is no function: F : β −→ α
with β < α and range(F ) unbounded in α. Otherwise, α is called singular. The cofinality
of α is the least β ≤ α for which there exists F : β −→ α with range unbounded in α.
Thus, α is regular if and only if cof(α) = α.
Now we can introduce cardinal numbers by the following definition:
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Definition 25. A cardinal number is an ordinal that is not bijectable with any smaller
ordinal.
Every infinite cardinal is a limit ordinal. Given an infinite cardinal κ, the set of all
ordinals which are bijectable with some λ ≤ κ is a cardinal. It is the least cardinal greater
than κ and it is denoted by κ+. The transfinite sequence of all infinite cardinals is denoted,
according to Cantor, by the Hebrew letter ℵ indexed by ordinals. Thus,
ℵ0,ℵ1,ℵ2, ............,ℵω,ℵω+1, .............,ℵα, ...........
The Well-ordering Principle implies that every set has a cardinality.
In ZFC one can prove that the universe of all sets V forms a comulative hierarchy. Every
set belongs to some Vα, for some ordinal where the Vα are defined as follows:
(1) V0 = ∅
(2)Vα+1 = P (Vα), the power set of Vα
(3)Vλ =
⋃
α<λ Vα, if λ is a limit ordinal.
(4)V =
⋃
α∈On Vα is the universe of all sets.
We can prove that all Vα are transitive sets.
3.3. Reduction of all systems of numbers to the notion of set. The first prob-
lem of Hilbert’s list was the continuum problem, namely the cardinality of R (the set of real
numbers). The main problem [Goldrei 96] with the real numbers was to explain irrational
numbers. Dedekind and Cantor define irrational numbers in terms of rational numbers. If
r is irrational, each rational number lies either to the left or to the right of r. So r cuts
Q into two subsets L and R, where L consists of all the rationals to the left of r and R
consists of rationals to its right. L and R are both non-empty, disjoint, any rational in L
is less than any rational in R and both L and R contain rationals arbitrarily close to r.
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Dedekind defined a real number to be a partition of Q in two non-empty subsets, L and R,
with the property that every element of L is less than every element of R. This partition
is called a Dedekind cut and R is defined to be the set of all such partitions. We shall
use in the following definition only the left side, namely L:
Definition 26. A Dedekind left cut (or Dedekind left set) is a subset r of Q with the
following properties:
(1) r is proper, non-empty subset of Q, so that ∅ 6= r 6= Q.
(2) r is closed to the left, if q ∈ r and p <Q q, then p ∈ r.
(3) r has no maximum element, for any p ∈ r there is some q ∈ r with q <Q p.
A real number is a Dedekind left set and R is the set of all such real numbers.
Surely, real numbers include rational numbers. But a rational number is not a Dedekind
left set, namely a Dedekind left set is a set of rational numbers. So we have to specify
which real numbers are going to correspond to the rationals.
Definition 27. Let q ∈ Q. Then the real number corresponding to q is
q = {p ∈ Q : p <Q q}.
As an alternative construction, Cantor used Cauchy sequences of rationals. Cantor’s
idea was based on the idea that any irrational number could be regarded as the limit of a
Cauchy sequence of rationals. Cantor defined a real number as the set of all sequences of
rationals whose terms get arbitrarily close to the terms of this sequence (real numbers).
Definition 28. The sequence [qn] of rationals is a Cauchy sequence if for each ε >Q 0
where (ε ∈ Q) there is an N ∈ N such that
|qi − qj | <Q ε, for all i, j ≥N .N
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Now we have to capture the idea of two such sequences getting arbitrarily close to each
other, and so that they are in some sense equivalent.
Definition 29. Let [an] and [bn] be Cauchy sequences of rationals. We shall say that
they are equivalent and write [an] =Ca [bn] if for each ε >Q 0 there is an N ∈ N such that
|an − bn| <Q ε, for all n ≥ N
.
Therefore we can introduce the following definition:
Definition 30. A real number in Cantor’s definition is any equivalence class under
the relation =Ca, namely any set of the form {[bn] : [bn] =Ca [an], where [an] is a Cauchy
sequence}. We write such a class as [[an]]. We use Rc to stand for the set of all Cantor real
numbers. Given a rational number q, the corresponding Cantor real number, qC is defined
by
qC = [[qn]]
where [[qn]] is an equivalence class of sequences of rational numbers.
Walking along this way of reduction, we might explain rational numbers in terms of
integers [Goldrei 96]. A rational number could be described by an ordered pair (a, b) with
b positive corresponding to the fraction ab . This would create the problem of representing a







in Z, ab =
c
d can be interpreted as
a× d = b× c
Thus, we can introduce the following definition:
Definition 31. For any a, b, c, d ∈ Z with b, d > 0, we shall write (a, b) =Z (c, d) when
a× d = b× c.
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At this point we can define rational numbers in terms of integers:
Definition 32. Let [[a, b]] be the equivalence class of the ordered pair (a, b) of integers
under the equivalence relation =Z, i.e., the set
{(c, d) ∈ Z× Z+ : (a, b) =Z (c, d)}.
A rational number is such an equivalence class and Q is the set of all these equivalence
classes.
Now we can try to define integers in terms of natural numbers N. The problem is
how to represent the negative integers without using subtraction, which is not a closed
operation on N. We can represent the integer n by a pair (a, b) of natural numbers such
that in Z, a− b = n. So for instance −3 could be represented by (1, 4) or (7, 10). However,
we have the problem of representing the integer by a single object. We can accomplish
that by observing that a− b = c− d can be written in equivalent way as a+ d = b+ c. So
we can introduce the following definition:
Definition 33. For any a, b, c, d ∈ N we shall write (a, b) =N (c, d) if a+ d = b+ c.
Thus, we can define integers in terms of natural numbers:
Definition 34. Let [[(a, b)]] be the equivalence class of the ordered pair (a, b) of natural
numbers under the equivalence relation =N, i.e, the set
{(c, d) ∈ N× N : (a, b) =N (c, d)}.
An integer is such an equivalence class and Z is the set of all these equivalence classes.
So from a philosophical point of view, since we can define R in terms of Q, Q in
terms of Z and Z in terms of N, we can affirm that natural numbers are ontologically
the foundation of all other numbers. We can construct all other numbers departing form
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natural numbers. Furthermore, concerning the foundation of mathematical knowledge,
since to the set N − {0, 1} we can apply the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, namely
the factorization in prime factors, we can affirm that prime numbers are the atoms of
arithmetic. Each positive integer can be represented as a product of prime factors. We
can continue this process of reduction and we can try to define natural numbers in terms
of sets. If we can express natural numbers in terms of sets, we have a single foundation
for mathematics. The basic property of sets would be the membership relation, namely ∈.
Now we can introduce the following definition:
Definition 35. Given a set x,the successor of x, written x+, is the set x+ = x ∪ {x}.
At this point, we can follow von Neumann idea and represent natural numbers by sets
in the following manner:
0 = ∅.
1 = ∅+ = ∅ ∪ {∅}.
2= ∅++ = (∅+)+ = {∅} ∪ {{∅}} = {∅, {∅}}.
3= ∅+++ = (∅++)+ = {∅, {∅, }} ∪ {{∅, {∅}}} = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}. Now we can introduce
the following definition:
Definition 36. The set y is inductive if ∅ ∈ y and x+ ∈ y whenever x ∈ y.
We are going to define N as the intersection of all inductive sets, so that it will be the
smallest inductive set.
Definition 37. The set of natural numbers N is the intersection of all inductive subsets
of any inductive set y,
N =
⋂
{z : z is an inductive subset of y}
= {x : x ∈ z for all inductive z ⊆ y}.
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A natural number is a member of N.
Thus we can introduce the following theorem :
Theorem 31. The set N is inductive.
3.4. The first large cardinal numbers and the Constructible universe L. At
this point we can introduce inaccessible cardinals which are the smallest large cardinals in
the large-cardinal hierarchy:
Definition 38. A cardinal κ is (strongly) inaccessible if it is uncountable, regular, and
a strong limit, namely for every cardinal λ < κ, 2λ < κ.
One can prove in ZFC that κ is inaccessible if and only if it is regular and Vκ is a model
of ZFC. Therefore, for Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, it is impossible to prove
in ZFC the existence of inaccessible cardinals. An inaccessible cardinal is a model of ZFC
because it represents a closure point for ZFC axioms and, more precisely, for the axiom
of replacement. We might highlight that all large cardinals numbers are generalizations of
the axiom of replacement plus the axiom of infinity. If κ is inaccessible, then the set C
of all strong limit cardinals smaller than κ is a closed unbounded subset of κ. So if κ is
the least inaccessible cardinal, then all cardinals in C must be singular, for otherwise there
would be an inaccessible cardinal below κ. At this point, we can introduce the notion of
Mahlo cardinal:
Definition 39. An inaccessible cardinal is called Mahlo if the set of inaccessible car-
dinals smaller than κ is stationary. Thus, κ is Mahlo if and only if it is inaccessible and
every closed unbounded subset of κ contains an inaccessible cardinal. Therefore, the first
Mahlo cardinal, if it exists, is much greater than the first inaccessible cardinal.
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At this point, I want to introduce Gödel constructible universe. In 1938, Kurt Gödel
published an article where he introduced the model L which is based on the idea of con-
structible set. Ernest Zermelo did not characterize arbitrary sets, instead Gödel introduced
the concept of constructible set which implies the use of first order logical formulas. Gödel’s
sets are constructible thanks to first order formulas which define a set itself. By shaping the
constructible universe, Gödel gave a relative consistency proof of the generalized continuum
hypothesis. Within model L, ZFC axioms are consistent with the generalized continuum
hypothesis. Surely we have a relative consistency proof. Infact, we have firstly to assume
that ZF is consistent and then we have to prove that a stronger theory has a model. F.
Drake [Drake 74] argues that ZFC axioms, since do not characterize the power set operation
as Gödel does with the definable power set, cannot solve the continuum hypothesis. There
is a strong connection between the concept of constructible set and the axiom of separa-
tion. The class L of all constructible sets is a transitive model of ZFC and it is the smallest
transitive model which contains all ordinals. A set X is definable in a model (M,∈) if
there is a formula φ ∈ FORM (the set of all well-formed first order logical formulas) and
some a1, .......an ∈M such that:
X = {x ∈M : (M,∈) |= φ(x, a1, .....an}
and
Def(M) = {X ⊂M : X is definable in (M,∈)}.
Now we can define by transfinite induction the class L:
(1)L0 = ∅.
(2) Lα+1 = Def(Lα).
(3) Lα =
⋃




The definable class L is the class of all constructible sets. The statement V = L, namely
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every set is constructible, is the axiom of constructibility. Gödel, in 1938, believed that
this axiom was true, but, then, he changed his mind by accepting also arbitrary sets. First
of all, by the forcing method (Cohen’s model), the negation of the axiom of constructibil-
ity, namely ¬V = L, is consistent with the axioms ZF and so, the axiom V = L is an
undecidable statement for the ZF axioms. ZF axioms do not decide whether all sets are
constructible. Secondly, the axiom which asserts the existence of a measurable cardinal
implies the negation of the axiom of constructibility. According to Drake [Drake 74], we
should speak of hypothesis of constructibility. Now we can introduce the following theorem:
Theorem 32 (Kunen 06). For every α, α ⊂ Lα(Lα ∩ Ord = α).
The following Lemma is fundamental:
Lemma 4. Ord ⊂ L.
The class L of all constructible sets, since it contains the proper class of all ordinals,
is itself a proper class. L is the minimal transitive model of ZF. At this point, we can
introduce the structural properties of L:
Theorem 33. (Gödel) The following properties characterize constructible sets:
(A) Def(Lα) ⊆ P (Lα).
(B) (α ≤ β) −→ (Lα ⊆ Lβ.
(C) (x ∈ y ∈ Lα) −→ (x ∈ Lα).
(D) ∀α,Lα ⊆ Vα .
(E) (α ≤ ω) −→ (Lα = Vα).
(F) (α ≥ ω) −→ (|Lα| = |α|).
(G) (α < β) −→ (α,Lα ∈ Lβ).
At this point, we can compare the class of all constructible sets with Von neumann’s
hierarchy which we can define again:
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Definition 40. We can define Von neumann’s hierarchy again in the following way:
V0 = ∅.
Vα+1 = P (Vα).
Vα =
⋃
β<α Vβ if α lim.
By assuming that L satisfies the axiom of foundation, we can say that L, as Von
neumann’s hierarchy, is a comulative hierarchy for structural properties (B) and (C). For
the structural property (E), we can say that in the finite and at ω, L and V are the same.
L and V start to be different at the level ω + 1 . In fact,, whereas |Vω+1| = P (Vω) > ℵ0,
for the structural property (F) |Lω+1| = |Def(Lω)| = |ω + 1| = ℵ0. Within V, the power
set operation increases cardinality at each successor stage for Cantor’s theorem. Within
L, instead, the definable power set does not increase cardinality, but cardinality increases
at the level of uncountable ordinals. In few words, |Lω| = |Lω+2| = |Lω+ω| = |Lωω | = ℵ0,
whereas |Lω1 | = |ω1| > ℵ0. If we represent graphically L and V by adopting an enlarging
cone, we can say that the cone of L is thinner and higher than the cone of V. The cone
of V enlarges at each successor stage, while the cone of L enlarges only at the level Lω1 .
The cone of L does not enlarge for the definable power set operation but it enlarges for
the intrinsic property of uncountable ordinals. Thus, for this fact, we might assert that
|PL(ω) ≤ |Lω1 |. V and L are very different. While Vω+1 contains all arbitrary subsets of
Vω, Lω+1 contains only some definable subsets of Lω. For instance, at the level Lω+3, Lω+7
and Lω+ω there might be some definable subsets of Lω.
Thus, L grows gradually (this justifies the height of L) and for the structural property (F)
is not enough to prove the consistency of the continuum hypothesis, since there might be
some definable subsets of Lω at the level Lω1 , Lω2 , Lω7 , etc. Thus to prove that P
L ⊂ Lω1 ,
it is necessary to set an upper bound to the gradual growth of definable subsets of Lω within
L. This can be accomplished by combining the Mostowsky’s transitive collapse theorem and
the downward Löwenheim-Skolem’s theorem.
80 1. THE DREAM OF COMPLETENESS
If we take the generalized continuum hypothesis, Gödel proved that if X is a constructible
subset of ωα then we have a γ < ωα+1 such that X ∈ Lγ . Therefore, PL(ωα) ⊂ Lωα+1
and since we have that |Lωα+1 | = ℵα+1, we have that |PL(ωα)| ≤ ℵα+1. Gödel connected
constructible sets with countable first-order language and so, the cardinality does not
increase for the operation of the definable power set. Within L, cardinality increases for
the intrinsic characteristic of uncountable ordinals.
At this point, we can examine the notion of absoluteness.
Definition 41. Take a formula φ with x1, ....., xn free.
(1) If M ⊂ N , φ is absolute for M and N if
∀x1.....xn ∈M(φM (x1......xn)↔ φN (x1.......xn)).
(2) φ is absolute for M if and only if φ is absolute for M and V:
∀x1......xn ∈M(φM (x1.......xn)↔ φ(x1, ......xn)).
In (1) if φ is absolute, then φ is true in M and in N. In (2) the notion of absoluteness
refers to the whole universe of sets, namely V. So, if φ is true in M, then φ is true in every
metamathematical model or set-theoretic interpretation. The notion of being an ordinal
number or the operation of union are absolute. So, ordinal numbers are the same for every
metamathematical model of set theory. On the contrary, the notion of being a cardinal
number and the power set operation are not absolute. If we take two metamathematical
models X and Y, an uncountable cardinal within X might be countable within Y. The
independence of the continuum hypothesis is based on the fact that the power set operation
is not absolute. Now we can introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 5. If M is a transitive model and φ is ∆0 formula, then for all x1, ....., xn,
φM ↔ φ(x1, ......., xn). The formula φ is absolute for the transitive model M.
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At this point, the following lemma is fundamental:
Lemma 6. The following formulas are formalized by ∆0 formulas and so, are absolute
for transitive models:
(1) x = {u, z}.
(2) x =< u, z >.
(3) x = ∅.
(4) x ⊂ y.
(5) x is transitive.
(6) x is an ordinal.
(7) x is a limit ordinal.
(8) x is a natural number.
(9) x = ω.
(10) Z = X × Y .
(11) Z = X − Y .




(14) Z = Dom(X).
(15) Z = Ran(X).
(16) X is a relation.
(17) f is a function.
(18) y = f(x).
Now we can introduce the concepts of upward absoluteness and downward absoluteness.
If M is a transitive model, we can assert that φ(x̃) is downward absolute if and only if
(∀x̃ ∈M)(φ(x̃) −→ φM (x̃)).
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On the other side, we can assert that φ(x̃) is upward absolute if and only if
(∀x̃ ∈M)(φM (x̃) −→ φ(x̃)).
Now we can reintroduce Levy’s hierarchy. A formula φ is Σ0 or Π0 (∆0) if and only if it
does not contain unbounded quantificators. For n ≥ 1, by recursion, we assert that φ is
Σn if and only if has the form ∃x̃ψ(x̃) where ψ(x̃) is Πn−1. and that φ is Πn if and only
if it has the following form ∀x̃ψ(x̃) where ψ(x̃) is Σn−1. Therefore, when we assert that
a formula is Σn, we want to say, first of all, that it consists of a ∆0 formula which has
n blocks of existential quantificators in front . Secondly, this formula starts with a block
of existential quantificators. Thirdly, This formula is characterized by an alternation of
blocks of universal quantificators and blocks of existential quantificators. A formula is ∆1
if it is both Σ1 and Π1. Now we can introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 7. (1) In a transitive model M, if φ is Σ1, then φ is upward absolute.
(2) In a transitive model M, if φ is Π1, then φ is downward absolute.
(3) In a transitive model M, if φ is ∆1, then φ is absolute.
Now we can examine the power set operation. We can formalize this operation in the
following way:
y = P (x)↔ ∀x(z ∈ y −→ z ⊆ x) ∧ ∀z(z ⊆ x −→ z ∈ y).
Since the second conjunct contains an unbounded universal quantificator, this formula is
Π1. So, the power set operation is downward absolute. This operation cannot be also Σ1.
In fact, in this case, it would be ∆1 and so it would be absolute and this is impossible. Now
we can examine the notion of being a cardinal number. First of all, we can formalize the fact
that a set is bigger than another set . In a transitive model M, |X| ≤ |Y | ↔ ∃fφ(f,X, Y )
where φ is ∆0. This formula implies that there is an injective function from X into Y. At
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this point we can formalize the notion of being a cardinal number:
α is a cardinal ↔ ¬∃f(∃β ∈ α)φ(α, β, f)
where φ is ∆0. This formula implies that if α is a cardinal, then there cannot be a bijective
function from α to its proper part, namely β. This formula is Π1 and it is downward
absolute. In fact, if α ∈ M , and if α is a cardinal, then M |= α is a cardinal. The fact
that the notion of being a cardinal is downward absolute mirrors some difficulties that we
encounter when we use forcing methods. In fact to show that a regular cardinal in M [G]
(Cohen extended model) is a regular cardinal also in M (countable transitive model) is not
problematic. On the contrary to prove that a regular cardinal in M (countable transitive
model) is also a regular cardinal in M [G] (Cohen extended model), is problematic because
that cardinal can be collapsed. In fact, it is necessary to add that the poset P satisfies the
countable chain condition (c.c.c.) to avoid the collapse of cardinals as we will see in the
following section. Now, we can introduce the concept of extensional relation:
Definition 42. R is extensional on A if and only if ∀x, y ∈ A(∀x ∈ A(∀z ∈ A(zRx↔
zRy) −→ z = y).
So, if ∈ is interpreted as R, we are asserting that the axiom of extensionality is true
in A. If M is a transitive model, then ∈ is extensional on M. An inner model of ZF is a
transitive class, which contains all ordinals and satisfies ZF axioms. L is an inner model of
ZF axioms and it is the smallest inner model.
Theorem 34. (Gödel) L is a model of ZF.
L satisfies also the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis. These
proofs are based on the fact that L is a model of the axiom of constructibility, namely V=L,
and this axiom implies the axiom of choice (AC) and the generalized continuum hypothesis
(GCH). However, it is clear that V=L implies the axiom of choice since it is easy to define
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a well-order of L. It might seem a banal fact that L is a model of V=L. However, in order
to satisfy V=L within L, we have to prove that the property every set is constructible is
absolute for L, namely for every x ∈ L, we have that (x = constructible set)L. At this
point, we can show that the property x is a constructible set is absolute for inner models
of ZF.
Lemma 8. The function α −→ Lα is ∆1.
This lemma establishes that the function, which has as domain ordinals and as range
constructible sets, is absolute for transitive models.
Lemma 9. The property x is constructible is absolute for inner models of ZF.
Now we can introduce the following fundamental theorem:
Theorem 35. (Gödel) L satisfies the axiom of constructibility, namely V=L, and L is
the smallest inner model of ZF.
Now, we can see that L satisfies AC.
Theorem 36. (Gödel) AC holds in L
We end this section with the following fundamental theorem:
Theorem 37. (Gödel) L |= GCH.
We have to say that the last theorem characterizes all inner models. In fact, GCH holds
in all inner models including the Ultimate L if the ultimate L conjecture is true, since all
these inner models satisfy the condensation principle.
3.5. Descriptive set theory, the axioms of determinacy and Luzin’s prob-
lem formulated in second-order arithmetic. Surely, the Continuum Hypothesis (CH)
(first problem in Hilbert’s list) is the most famous unsolvable problem. We can state the
Continuum Hypothesis in the following manner:
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Definition 43. (The Continuum Hypothesis) Suppose that X ⊆ R is an uncountable
set. Then there exists a bijection j : X −→ R.
The Continuum Hypothesis is independent from the axioms ZFC. If σ is an independent
arithmetical statement from the axioms ZFC and ZFC is consistent, ZFC does not prove σ
and ZFC does not prove ¬σ. In 1938, Kurt Gödel by creating the constructible universe,
namely L, was able to prove the consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis:
Theorem 38. (Gödel) Assume ZFC is consistent. Then so is ZFC + CH.
In 1963, Paul Cohen by introducing the method of forcing, was able to prove the
consistency of the negation of the continuum hypothesis:
Theorem 39. (Cohen) Assume ZFC is consistent. Then so is ZFC + ¬CH .
The Continuum Hypothesis is formulated in third-order arithmetic and it can be ex-
pressed by a Σ21-statement. Large-cardinal assumptions do not settle the continuum hy-
pothesis. We will see that Woodin’s program based on Ω-logic does settle the continuum
hypothesis but there are many issues to be considered in order to accept Woodin’s result.
Therefore, third-order arithmetic seems to stand beyond human ability to prove theorems.
So we should ask ourselves if we can have a complete theory for third-order arithmetic or we
can only dream this bind of completeness. Maybe, we can depart from second-order arith-
metic and see if in the realm of second-order arithmetic there are undecidable arithmetical
statements. So, we can ask ourselves if we can have a complete theory for second-order
arithmetic. In order to examine second-order arithmetic, we have to explain descriptive set
theory. First of all, we have to introduce some topological notions. A continuous function
with a continuous inverse function is called an Homeomorphism in topology. Homeomor-
phisms are isomorphisms in the category of topological spaces. They are the mappings
that preserve all the topological properties of a given space. In topology, a metric space
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is a set for which distances of the set are defined. The real line is a metric space with
the metric d(a, b) = |a − b|. A metric space is separable if it has a countable dense set.
It is complete if every Cauchy-sequence converges. Now we can introduce a fundamental
topological space, namely Polish space.
Definition 44. (Polish space) A Polish space is a topological space that is homeomor-
phic to a separable, complete, metric space.
R, Baire space (N), Cantor space and the unit interval [0, 1] are examples of Polish
space. In descriptive set theory, it is fundamental the notion of Baire space (N). Before
giving the definition of this important topological space, it is necessary to introduce other
notions fundamental for descriptive set theory. Firstly, we can introduce the concept of
algebra of sets and, then, we can define Borel sets.
Definition 45. (algebra of sets) An algebra of sets is a collection C of subsets of a
given set S such that:
(1) S ∈ C,
(2) if X ∈ C and Y ∈ C then X ∪ Y ∈ C,
(3) if X ∈ C then S −X ∈ C.
A σ-algebra is additionally closed under countable unions (and intersections):




For any collection A of subsets of S there is a smallest algebra (σ-algebra) C such that
A ⊂ C. At this point, we can define Borel sets:
Definition 46. A set of reals B is Borel if it belongs to the smallest σ-algebra C of
sets of reals that contains all open sets.
Now we can introduce Baire space (N):
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Definition 47. (Baire space) the Baire space is the space N = ωω of all infinite
sequences of natural numbers, (an : n ∈ N), with the following topology:
O(s) = {f ∈ N : s ⊂ f} = {(cκ : κ ∈ N) : (∀κ < n)cκ = aκ}.
The sets O(s) form a basis for the topology of N. Each O(s) is closed.
Now we can start by highlighting some regularity properties which definable subset of reals
should have. The idea of measure of a subset of Rn clarified intuitions about the length of
an interval of R or a curve in R2 and the volume of a solid in R3. In Lebesgue theory, a
measure is a function µ from some set Y of subsets of Rn to R ∪ {∞} with the following
properties:
(1) µ(X) ≥ 0, for any subset X in Y;
(2) If X and Y are congruent subsets of Rn, then µ(X) = µ(Y );
(3) µ is countably additive: if X0, X1, X2.......Xn........ are countably many pairwise disjoint







We should ask ourselves if there is a measure on all subsets of Rn. Using the axiom of
choice the answer is no. In fact, we can state the following theorem that is seen as a
paradox:
Theorem 40. (Banach-Tarski) Let S be the unit ball in R3, namely the set of all points
within a sphere of radius 1. Then S can be partitioned into finitely many subsets which can
be moved, using translations and rotations, to produce two unit balls.
The proof uses AC and is non-constructive. Most pieces of the ball are non-measurable
sets. Banach-Tarski theorem belongs to second-order arithmetic. Now, we must say that
Lebesgue measurable sets form a σ-algebra and contain all open intervals. Thus, all Borel
sets are Lebesgue measurable.
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Now we can continue to list other properties that feature definable subsets of reals, such
as the following:
Definition 48. (Perfect set property) A set of reals is perfect iff it is nonempty, closed
and contains no isolated points. A set of reals is said to have the perfect set property if it
is either countable or contains a perfect subset
The perfect set property is linked with the Continuum Hypothesis. In fact, sets of
reals with the perfect set property satisfy the continuum hypothesis. In 1883, Cantor and
Bendixson proved that all closed sets have the perfect set property.
The third regularity property of sets of reals, we will consider, is the property of Baire. A
set of reals is nowhere dense iff its closure contains no open sets. Equivalently, a nowhere
dense set is a set that is not dense in any nonempty open sets. A set of reals is meager iff
it is the countable union of nowhere dense sets.
Definition 49. (Property of Baire) A set of reals A has the property of Baire iff it is
almost open in the sense that there is an open set O such that the region where O and A
do not overlap (symmetric difference: O4A) is meager.
We shall consider next another structural property of definable sets of reals, namely
uniformization.
Definition 50. (Uniformization) Let A and B be subsets of the plane (ωω)2 (Baire
space N). A uniformizes B iff A ⊆ B and for all x ∈ ωω, there exists y such that (x, y) ∈ B
iff there is a unique y such that (x, y) ∈ A.
To sum up, A produces a choice function for the set of fibers of B. If we adopt AC,
every set B has a uniformizing set A.
At this point, we can introduce definable subsets of reals. Borel sets of reals are obtained
by starting with the closed subsets of ωω (or (ωω)κ for some κ < ω) and closing under the
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operation of countable union and complements. This can be accomplished level by level
in the following manner: Let κ < ω. Let Σ01 consist of the open subsets of (ω
ω)κ and
let Π01 be the set of closed subsets of (ω
ω)κ. For each ordinal α such that 0 < α < ω1,
recursively define Σ0α to be the set of sets that are countable unions of sets belonging to
some Π0β, for β < α, and define Π
0
α to be the set of sets that are countable intersections of
sets appearing in some Σ0β, for β < α. All these sets form the Borel hierarchy. By using
Cantor’s diagonalization procedure, Lebesgue, in 1905, proved that the Borel hierarchy
constitutes a proper hierarchy.
The projective sets of reals are obtained by beginning with closed subsets of (ωω)κ and iter-
ating the operations of complementation and projection. For A ⊆ (ωω)κ, the complement
of A is simply (ωω)κ −A. For A ⊆ (ωω)κ+1, the projection of A is:
p[A] = {(x1, ......., xκ) ∈ (ωω)κ|∃y(x1, ......., xκ, y) ∈ A}.
The projective hierarchy is defined in the following way: Let Σ10 = Σ
0





For each n such that 0 < n < ω, recursively define Π1n to be the set of the complements of
sets in Σ1n, and define Σ
1
n+1 to be the set of the projections of sets in Π
1
n. The projective
sets form an hierarchy. A set of reals is ∆1n iff it is both in Σ
1
n and in Π
1
n. In 1917, Suslin
proved that the Borel sets are precisely the ∆11 sets. Thus, the projective hierarchy extends
the Borel hierarchy.
At this point, we can introduce a different hierarchy based on the concept of definability
and iterated into the transfinite: For a set X, let Def(X) consist of the subsets of X that
are definable over X using parameters from X. This is the definable power-set operation.
We can form the hierarchy L(R) by starting with R and iterating the definable power set
operation along the ordinals. Thus,
(1) L0(R) = Vω+1.
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(2) Lα+1(R) = Def(Lα(R)).
(3) Lλ(R) =
⋃




For more details see [Koellner 11]. At this point, we can introduce a fundamental the-
orem in descriprive set theory discovered in 1917:
Theorem 41. (Luzin, Suslin) All Σ11 sets have the perfect set property, the property of
Baire, and are Lebesgue measurable.
Thus, in particular, Borel sets have all the claimed regularity properties of definable
subsets of reals. So, we can ask ourselves whether all projective sets have these regularity
properties. For example: are all projective sets Lebesgue measurable (PM)? This problem,
which belongs to second-order arithmetic, cannot be settled by ZFC. In 1925, Luzin was
already thinking about the negative answer to PM when he declared:
One does not know and one will never know of the projective sets whether
or not they are each Lebesgue measurable [Luzin 1925].
Now we can introduce two results which establish that PM is an undecidable statement
for the axioms of ZFC. The first result was established by Kurt Gödel by introducing the
constructible universe, known as L:
Theorem 42. (Gödel) Assume ZFC + V=L. Then there are Σ12 sets that do not have
the property of Baire, are not Lebesgue measurable, and there are Π11 sets that do not have
the perfect set property.
The second result was obtained by Robert Solovay in 1965:
Theorem 43. (Solovay) Assume ZFC and there is a strongly inaccessible cardinal.
Then there is a forcing extension in which all projective sets have the perfect set property,
the property of Baire and are Lesbegue measurable.
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Peter Koellner explains the undecidability regarding projective sets in the following
way:
If ZFC is consistent, then ZFC cannot determine whether all Σ12 sets have
the property of Baire and are Lesbegue measurable. If ZFC + there is
a strongly inaccessible cardinal is consistent, then ZFC cannot determine
whether all Π11 sets have the perfect set property [Koellner 11].
Now we shall introduce the concepts of infinite games, winning strategy and determinacy,
namely having a winning strategy. Let X be a non-empty set. For A ⊆ Xω, GX(A)
points out to the following infinite two-person game with perfect information: There are
two players, player 1 and player 2. Player 1 initially selects an x(0) ∈ X; then player 2
selects an x(1) ∈ X; then player 1 selects an x(2) ∈ X; then player 2 selects an x(3) ∈ X;
and so forth. Each selection is a move of the game, and each player before making each of
his moves is informed about all the precedent moves (perfect information). The resulting
x ∈ Xω is a play of the game, an initial segment of a x a partial play, and player 1 wins if
x ∈ A, and otherwise player 2 wins. A, which is the payoff for the game GX(A). GX(A),
is determined if a player has a winning strategy. At this point, we can define a winning
strategy:
Definition 51. A strategy for player (1) is a function σ :
⋃
n∈ωX
2n −→ X that tells
him what move to make given the previous moves, so that a (partial) play according to σ
is a (partial) play of the form:
Player (1) σ(∅), Player (2) y(0), Player (1) σ((σ(∅), y(0))), Player (2) y(1).....,
Player (1) σ((σ(∅), y(0), σ((σ(∅), y(0))), y(1)))....
Player (2)’s moves are enumerated by y ∈ Xω, and this play is denoted by
σ ∗ y
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σ is a winning strategy for Player (1) iff
{σ ∗ y|y ∈ Xω} ⊆ A
i.e no matter what moves Player (2) makes, plays according to σ always result in a member
of A. [Kanamori 09]
Now, we can introduce the axiom of determinacy:
Definition 52. (Mycielsky, Steinhaus) (AD) every set of reals is determined.
Peter Koellner lists the following examples of determined sets:
If A is the set of all reals, then clearly player 1 has a winning strategy; if A is
empty, clearly player 2 has a winning strategy; if A is countable, then player
2 has a winning strategy by diagonalising. This might lead one to expect
that all sets of reals are determined. However, it is straightforward to use
the axiom of choice (AC) to construct a non-determined set (by listing all
winning strategies and diagonalising across them). For this reason AD was
never really considered as a serious candidate for a new axiom. [Koellner
11]
However, the axioms of definable determinacy are consistent with the axiom of choice. Now
we can introduce ∆11-determinacy (Borel determinacy):
Definition 53. ∆11-determinacy is the statement that all Borel sets are determined.
In 1974, Donald A. Martin proved the following theorem:
Theorem 44. (Martin) ∆11-determinacy is provable in ZFC.
We can consider the axioms of definable determinacy which fall outside the scope of
ZFC.
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Definition 54. (PD) All projective sets are determined.
Furthermore, we can relativise the full axiom of determinacy to L(R) in the following
way:
Definition 55. (ADL(R)) All sets of reals in L(R) are determined.
It is interesting to notice that Solovay and Takeuti pointed out that there is a natural
subuniverse, namely L(R), in which AD could hold, consistently with assuming AC in the
full universe.
At this point we can state something very important: If one assumes PD then all projective
sets have the regularity properties and, furthermore, if one assumes ADL(R) then all of the
sets of reals in L(R) have the regularity properties.
At this point we can introduce the central large cardinal hypothesis for the completeness
of second-order arithmetic:
Definition 56. (Woodin) A strongly inaccessible cardinal δ is a Woodin cardinal if for
each function f : δ −→ δ there exists an elementary embedding j : V −→ M with critical
point γ < δ such that f [γ] ⊂ γ and Vj(f)(γ) ⊂M .
If δ is the least Woodin cardinal then δ itself is not a very large cardinal in the usual
sense. For example it is not weakly compact. We can assert that sets witnessing that a
Woodin cardinal δ is Woodin exist in Vδ, which shows in particular that if δ is a measurable
Woodin cardinal then there are other Woodin cardinal below δ. Moreover, we can add
that supecompact cardinals are Woodin cardinals. So, if we have to justify philosophically
Woodin cardinals, we can adopt Bagaria’s structural reflection. In fact, Bagaria’s structural
reflection produces, as we will see in the next section, a proper class of supercompact
cardinals. Therefore, in this case, Woodin’s Ω-logic (that we will examine in the following
sections) would be justified intrinsically depending on the concept of set since reflection
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is an essential property shared by sets and the universe of sets itself. Surely, Woodin
cardinals are justified also extrinsically, since, thanks to this large cardinal hypothesis, we
can have a complete second-order arithmetic and PM, which ZFC cannot decide, is settled.
So, Woodin cardinals have fruitful consequences. Now we can introduce two fundamental
theorems:
Theorem 45. (Shelah-Woodin) Assume there exist infinitely-many Woodin cardinals.
Then every projective set is Lebesgue measurable.
Thus, infinetely many Woodin cardinals settle PM, an undecidable statement of second-
order arithmetic. By introducing the following theorem, we can see the strong link between
large-cardinal hypotheses and the axioms of definable determinacy:
Theorem 46. (Martin-Steel) Assume there exist infinitely-many Woodin cardinals.
Then every projective set is determined.
So infinitely-many Woodin cardinals imply the axiom of projective determinacy. If we
assume infinitely-many Woodin cardinals, projective sets have the regularity properties of
definable subsets of reals. The following theorem establishes a link between inner model
theory and projective determinacy:
Theorem 47. (Woodin) The following are equivalent:
(1) PD (schematic).
(2) For every n < ω, there is a fine-structural, countably iterable inner model M such that
M |= There are n Woodin cardinals.
Infinitely-many Woodin cardinals are sufficient to prove projective determinacy and
inner models of Woodin cardinals are necessary to prove projective determinacy. I believe
that the philosophical justification of the axiom of projective determinacy stems from
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a philosophical justification of large cardinal axioms such as the existence of infinitely-
many Woodin cardinals. We can assert that the dream of having a complete second-order
arithmetic was accomplished thanks to the large cardinal axiom that asserts the existence of
infinitely-many Woodin cardinals. Luzin had negative feelings towards the solution of PM,
but then, Woodin and Shelah gave a positive solution to PM. Now, I want to conclude this
section devoted to second-order arithmetic with the following beautiful words expressed by
Hugh Woodin:
The fact that from infinitely-many Woodin cardinals one can prove that pro-
jective sets are Lesbegue measurable is a strong evidence that from the same
assumption one should be able to prove Projective Determinacy. In 1985,
using techniques developed in the inner model program, Martin-Steel suc-
ceeded in doing this. Surprisingly, the combinatorial properties of Woodin
cardinals responsible for their discovery, for example, those aspects yielding
the measurability of all projective sets, play no role in this determinacy
proof (theorem 47) [Woodin 01] .
3.6. The method of forcing and Paul Cohen’s independence proof. Before
speaking about Woodin’s program on Ω-logic and how he attempted to extend the com-
pleteness of second-order arithmetic to third-order arithmetic, I want to talk about the
method of forcing based on boolean valued models since Ω-logic is essentially featured by
boolean models of the universe.
The method of forcing was conceived by Paul Cohen (in 1963) in his proof of independence
of the Continuum hypothesis and of the axiom of choice. The basic idea of forcing is to
extend a transitive model M of set theory (the ground model) by adding a new set G (a
generic set) in order to have a larger transitive model of set theory M [G] called a generic
extension. The generic set is approximated by forcing conditions in the ground model, and
a particular choice of forcing conditions determines what is true in the generic extension.
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Cohen’s idea was to begin with a countable transitive model M of ZFC (with a particular
set of forcing conditions in M). He established that a generic set G exists and M [G] is a
model of ZFC and CH fails in M [G].
It is also possible to take as the ground model the universe V itself and consider a generic
imaginary extension of the universe, namely V [G].
Let M (I will focus for the forcing construction on the countable transitive model M) be a
transitive model of ZFC, called the ground model. In M, we can consider a partially or-
dered set (P, <), or poset, and the elements of P are called forcing conditions. We say that
p is stronger than q if p ≤ q. If p and q are conditions and there exists an r such that both
r ≤ p and r ≤ q, then p and q are said to be compatible; otherwise they are incompatible.
We say that a set A ⊂ P is an antichain if its elements are pairwise incompatible. We say
that a set S ⊆ P is dense in P if for every p ∈ P there is a q ∈ D such that q ≤ p.
Definition 57. A set F ⊂ P is a filter on P if (1) F is non empty, (2) if p ≤ q and
p ∈ F , then q ∈ F , (3) if q, p,∈ F , then there exists r ∈ F such that r ≤ p and r ≤ q.
Now we can introduce the second fundamental definition:
Definition 58. A set of conditions G ⊂ P is generic over M if (1) G is a filter on P,
(2) If D is dense in P and D ∈M , then G ∩D 6= ∅.
We can see how forcing works with the following example:
Let P be the following notion of forcing: The elements of P are finite 0-1
sequences (p(0), ......., p(n− 1)) and a condition p is stronger than q (p < q)
if p extends q. Clearly, p and q are compatible if either p ⊂ q or q ⊂ p. Let
M be the ground model and let G ⊂ P be generic over M. Let f =
⋃
G.
Since G is a filter, f is a function. For every n ∈ ω, the set Dn = {p ∈
P : n ∈ dom(p)} is dense in P. Thus, it meets G, and so dom(f) = ω.The
0-1 function f is the characteristic function of a set A ⊂ ω. We claim that
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the function f (or the set A) is not in the ground model. For every 0 − 1
function g in M, let Dg = {p ∈ P : p 6⊂ g}. The set Dg is dense, hence it
meets G, and it follows that f 6= g. [Jech 06]
This example highlights in which way we can adjoin a new set of natural numbers to the
ground model. A set A ⊂ ω, which we obtain in this way, is called a Cohen generic real. We
have to add that a generic set over a transitive model need not exist in general. However,
if the grounded model is countable, then generic sets do exist. At this point we can see
how forcing works, by taking an example from Kunen’s book [Kunen 06]. Before quoting
Kunen, we have to say that while the notion of ordinal is absolute between transitive
models, the notion of cardinal is not absolute.
A simple application of this kind of partial order is that the notion of car-
dinal need not be absolute for M,M [G]. Thus, let κ be an uncountable
cardinal of M; i.e, κ ∈ M and (κ is an uncountable cardinal)M . Let
P = {p : |p| < ω ∧ p is a function ∧ dom(p) ⊂ ω ∧ ran(p) ⊂ κ}, and let G
be P-generic over M. Then
⋃
G ∈ M [G] by absoluteness of
⋃
, and G is a
function from ω onto κ, so in M [G], κ is a countable cardinal. We say that
P collapses κ. [Kunen 06]
At this point, I want to quote again Kunen’s words that explain in a beautiful manner the
concept of forcing:
People living in M cannot construct a G which is P-generic over M. They
may believe on faith that there exists a being to whom their universe, M,
is countable. Such a being will have a generic G and an fG =
⋃
G. The
people in M do not know what G and fG are but they have names for them,
Γ and Φ. [Kunen 06]
Now we can introduce a fundamental theorem about generic models:
98 1. THE DREAM OF COMPLETENESS
Theorem 48. (Cohen) Let M be a transitive model of ZFC and let (P, <) be a notion
of forcing in M. If G ⊂ P is generic over P, then there is a transitive model M [G] such
that:
(1) M [G] is a model of ZFC.
(2) M ⊂M [G] and G ∈M [G].
(3) OnM [G] = OnM .
(4) If N is a transitive model of ZF such that M ⊂ N and G ∈ N , then M [G] ⊂ N .
Each element of M [G] has a name in M which describes how it was constructed. In
fact, M [G] can be described in the ground model M. We can define a forcing language and
introduce a forcing relation `f which are defined in the ground model. People, who live
in M, will be able to comprehend a name,τ , for an object in M [G], but they will not in
general be able to decide the object, τG, that τ names, since it will be necessary knowledge
of G.
Definition 59. τ is a P-name iff τ is a relation and
∀(σ, p) ∈ τ(σ is a P− name ∧ p ∈ P).
[Kunen 06]
One can define the characteristic function of P-names, namely H(P, τ).
Definition 60. H(P, τ) = 1 iff τ is a relation ∧ ∀(σ, p) ∈ τ(H(P, σ) = 1 ∧ p ∈ P)
H(P, τ) = 0 otherwise. [Kunen 06]
The concept τ is a P-name is absolute for transitive models of ZF− power set.
Definition 61. V P is the class of P-names. If M is a transitive model of ZFC and
P ∈M . MP = V P ∩M . Or by absoluteness,
MP = {τ ∈M : (τ is a P− name)M}.
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[Kunen 06]
If we force over M, we use only P-names in MP, which we may think that are defined
within M .
Definition 62. val(τ,G) = {val(σ,G) : ∃p ∈ G((σ, p) ∈ τ}.
We write also τG for val(τ,G).
Definition 63. If M is a transitive model of ZFC, P ∈M , and G ⊂ P, then
M [G] = {τG : τ ∈MP}.
[Kunen 06]
The key point is given by the forcing theorem:
Theorem 49. (forcing theorem) Let (P, <) be a poset in the ground model M. If φ is
a sentence of the forcing language, then for every G ⊂ P generic over M,
M [G] |= φ if and only if (∃p ∈ G)p `f φ .
We can establish also properties of forcing as in the following examples:
If p forces φ and q ≤ p then q `f φ.
No p forces both φ and ¬φ.
p `f ¬φ if and only if no q ≤ p forces φ, etc.
At this point, we may introduce Boolean-valued models. We begin with the following
definition:
Definition 64. A poset or a partially ordered set (P, <) is separative if for all p, q ∈ P,
if p 6≤ q then there exists an r ≤ p that is incompatible with q.
The forcing notions that we have already seen are separative. If B is a Boolean algebra,
then (B,<) is a separative partial order P. The forcing relation can be defined for P and,
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we can link a Boolean algebra to P. Let B be a complete Boolean algebra. A Boolean
valued model V B consists of the universe V and functions of two variables with values in
B:
||x = y|| and ||x ∈ y|| (the Boolean values of = and ∈), which satisfy the following:
||x = x|| = 1
||x = y|| = ||x = y||
||x = y|| × ||y = z|| ≤ ||x = z||
||x ∈ y|| × ||u = x|| × ||w = y|| ≤ ||u ∈ w||.
For every formula φ(x1, .......xn) we define the Boolean value of φ:
||φ(a1, ....an)|| where(a1, ......an) ∈ A (a set)
as follows: For atomic formulas we have the precedent definitions. If the formulas are built
with connectives, define the Boolean values as follows:
||¬φ(a1, .......an)|| = −||φ(a1, ......., an)||
||(φ ∧ ψ)(a1, ........, an)|| = ||φ(a1, ....., an)|| × ||ψ(a1, .......an)||
||(φ ∨ ψ)|| = ||φ(a1, .......an)||+ ||ψ(a1, ......an)||
||(φ −→ ψ)|| = ||(¬φ ∨ ψ)(a1, .....an)||
||(φ↔ ψ)|| = ||((φ −→ ψ) ∧ (ψ −→ φ))(a1, ......, an)||
If φ is of the form such as ∃xψ or ∀xψ, then:
||∃xψ(x, a1, ......., an)|| = Σa∈A||ψ(a, a1, ........, an)||
||∀xψ(x, a1, ......, an)|| = Πa∈A||ψ(a, a1, ......., an)||
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If B is the trivial algebra{0, 1}, then a Boolean-valued model is just a two valued model.
The Boolean value of φ is just a generalization of the satisfaction predicate, namely |=.
We assert that φ(a1, .....an) is valid in V
B if ||φ(a1, .....an)|| = 1 [Jech 06]. All axioms of
first-order logic are valid in Boolean valued models. Boolean-valued models can be used
in consistency proofs. Let V B be a Boolean-valued model (if it exists) such that all the
axioms of ZFC are valid in V B. Let φ be a set-theoretical statement and assume ||φ 6= 0||.
Then we can conclude that φ is consistent relative to ZFC, and, so, it cannot be disproved.
Each Boolean-valued model can be transformed into a two valued model. At this point we
can introduce the Boolean-valued model V B. Let B be a complete Boolean algebra. We
consider Boolean-valued sets, i.e., functions that assign Boolean-values to its elements. We
define Boolean-valued sets by recursion on the ordinals in the following way:
(1) V B0 = ∅,
(2) V Bα+1 = the set of all functions x with dom(x) ⊂ V Bα and values in B,




β if α is a limit ordinal,





Each x ∈ V B is assigned the rank in V B,
ρ(x) = the least α such that x ∈ V Bα+1
Now we can introduce the following theorem:
Theorem 50 (Jech 06). Every axiom of ZFC is valid in V B.
Now, coming back to our original forcing construction (the countable transitive model
M), we can think of this in the following way: Suppose that there is a countable transitive
model of ZFC. Using the poset P ∈ M , there exists a P-generic filter over M, and M [G]
is a transitive model that satisfies ¬CH. Thus, ¬CH is consistent relative to ZFC and it
cannot be disproved by these axioms. We could have supposed that the axioms of ZFC held
in the universe V itself and we could have constructed a filter G over V, forming the model
102 1. THE DREAM OF COMPLETENESS
V [G], that can be considered as an imaginary-virtual forcing extension of the universe.
At this point, we can see how the proof of Paul Cohen for the independence of CH works:
Theorem 51. (Cohen) There is a generic extension V [G] that satisfies 2ℵ0 > ℵ1.
Proof. We feature the poset that produces a generic extension with the desired prop-
erty. Let P be the set of all functions p such that: (1) dom(p) is a finite subset of ω2 × ω,
(2) ran(p) ⊂ {0, 1}, and let p be stronger than q if and only if q ⊂ p. If G is a generic filter
of conditions, we let f =
⋃
G. We assert that:
(1) f is a function
(2) dom(f) = ω2 × ω
We can say that ω2 means ω2 in the ground model. (1) holds because G is a filter. For
(2), the sets Dα,n = {p ∈ P : (α, n) ∈ dom(p)} are dense in P, hence G meets each of them,
and so (α, n) ∈ dom(f) for all (α, n) ∈ ω2 × ω.
Now, for each α < ω2, let fα(n) = ω −→ {0, 1} be the function defined as follows: fα(n) =
f(α, n). If α 6= β, then fα 6= fβ; this is because the set D = {p ∈ P : p(α, n) 6=
p(β, n) for some n} is dense in P and hence G ∩ D 6= ∅. Thus, in V [G] we have a
one-to-one mapping α −→ fα of ω2 into {0, 1}ω. [Jech 06] 
Each fα is the characteristic function of a set aα ⊂ ω. We call these sets Cohen generic
reals. Hence P adds ℵ2 Cohen generic reals to the ground model. However, we need to
introduce a theorem that establishes that P preserves cardinals, namely the cardinal κV2 is
the cardinal ℵ2 in V [G]. We start with the following definition:
Definition 65. A Poset P satisfies the countable chain condition (c.c.c.) if every
antichain in P is at most countable.
Theorem 52. (Cohen) If P satisfies the countable chain condition, then V and V [G]
have the same cardinals and cofinalities.
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We can shape the poset P as we want. We can use the combinatorial properties of P to
force the cardinality of the continuum to be in V [G] any alephs of uncountable cofinality.
In fact in the theorem of Cohen if we put
dom(f) = ωωω1 × ω .
we have that
2ℵ0 = ℵωω1 .
in V [G].
3.7. Forcing Axioms, BPFA assumed as a phenomenal solution to the con-
tinuum hypothesis and a Kantian metaphysical distinction. Before speaking about
Woodin’s program, we must introduce forcing axioms since these axioms do settle the con-
tinuum hypothesis. Another fundamental aspect that forces me to introduce these axioms
is represented by the fact that Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom (BPFA) may represent a
phenomenal solution to the Continuum Hypothesis .
Forcing axioms were conceived in order to saturate the universe of all sets by considering
the forcing method. We have to introduce a different hierarchy represented by H(κ) sets.
Definition 66. A set X is transitive if each element of X is also a subset of X. The
transitive closure of a set X is the set ∩{Y |Y is transitive and X ⊆ Y }
Definition 67. Suppose κ is an infinite cardinal. H(κ) denotes the set of all sets X
whose transitive closure has cardinality less than κ.
For strongly inaccessible cardinal, this hierarchy and Von Neuman hierarchy are the
same. For example Vω = Hω. Now suppose that D is a collection of dense subsets of a
partial order P. If we can show, in V, the existence of a generic filter G ⊆ P which meets
every element of D, then we do not need to go to a generic extension V [G] to have a generic
filter for D. Now we can introduce the axiom of forcing:
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Definition 68. FA(Γ, κ) holds if for every partial order P with the property Γ and
every collection D = {Dα ⊆ P : α ≤ κ} of dense subsets of P, there exists a filter G ⊆ P
that meets every Dα, α ≤ κ.
The axiom of forcing says that by forcing method it is possible to construct a generic
extension in which G exists. The most studied classes of forcing (Γ) are the following:
Countable chain condition (c.c.c.), proper, and stationary set preserving (SSP).
Definition 69. we say that P has the c.c.c. if, for every maximal antichain A (i.e,
A ⊆ P is such that ∀p, q ∈ A,¬∃r(r ≤ p∧ r ≤ q) and is maximal for this property) we have
that |A| ≤ ℵ0.
Definition 70. A partial order P is proper if for every uncountable regular cardinal
κ > 2|P|, and for every M ≺ H(κ), with P ∈M , every condition p ∈ P∩M has an extension
q ≤ p which is (M,P)-generic. Where q is called (M,P)-generic if for every D ⊆ P dense
and in M and for every r ≤ q exists a condition d ∈ D ∩M compatible with r, i.e, D ∩M
is predense below q.
Definition 71. A partial order P is SSP, if every S ⊆ ω1 stationary, remains station-
ary in every generic extension. By P-Stationary set means that S ∩C 6= ∅ for every closed
unbounded set C ⊆ ω1.
All these notions of forcing (i.e, c.c.c, Proper, SSP) preserve ω1 in the generic extension.
By defining PΓ = {P: forcing with the property Γ} we have the following theorem:
Theorem 53. We have the following chain of inclusions:
Pc.c.c. ⊆ Pproper ⊆ PSSP .
The first (historically) introduced forcing axiom was Martin Axiom (MA):
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Definition 72. MA(κ): if P is a partial ordering or poset with c.c.c. and D is a
family of ≤ κ-many dense subsets of P, then there is a filter G ⊆ P such that G ∩D 6= ∅,
for every D ∈ D. MA is the statement: ∀κ < 2ℵ0MA(κ).
Now we can introduce the following theorem:
Theorem 54. MA(2ℵ0) is contradictory.
Proof. Let
P = {p : ω −→ 2 ∧ |p| < ω}
with ordering relation p ≤ q if q ⊆ p. P has c.c.c.
Now we set
H = {hα : α ∈ 2ℵ0}
a list of all functions from ω into {0, 1}. If we define for every n ∈ ω:
Dn = {p : n ∈ dom(p)}
and for every α ∈ 2ℵ0
Eα = {p : ∃ n ∈ dom(p) such that p(n) 6= hα(n)}
then these sets are all dense sets in P. Therefore, since
|{Dn : n ∈ ω} ∪ {Eα : α ∈ 2ℵ0}| = |2ℵ0 |
there exists by MA(2ℵ0), a filter G ⊆ P which meets all these dense sets. Then
⋃
G would
be a total function from ω into {0, 1} which does not belong to H. A contradiction. 
Thus, MA(ℵ1) disproves CH, the Continuum Hypothesis.
Baumgartner formulated the Proper Forcing Axiom (PFA). This axiom can be considered
as generalization of MA applied to the class of proper posets with the necessary restriction
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that the family D of dense open subsets of the poset P be of cardinality at most ℵ1.
Without this restriction this axiom (PFA) would be inconsistent with ZFC. Baumgartner
also proved that PFA is consistent with ZFC, assuming the consistency of ZFC with the
existence of a supercompact cardinal. At the beginning Baumgartner conceived Axiom A,
a property of partial orderings or posets weaker than the c.c.c. condition. Properness is
even weaker than the axiom A property. Now we can introduce the Proper Forcing Axiom:
Definition 73. Proper Forcing Axiom, PFA, is the statement FA(Pproper,ℵ1) .
A strenghtening of the Proper Forcing Axiom is Martin’s Maximum (MM).
Definition 74. Martin Maximum, MM, is the statement FA(PSSP ,ℵ1) .
Lemma 10. We have the following chain of implications:
MM −→ PFA −→MA(ℵ1)
Martin’s Maximum is the strongest forcing axiom. However, recently, Matteo Viale
[Viale 15] introduces MM++ and MM+++ which strenghten Martin’s Maximum. See also
Asperó for a different kind of strenghtening [Aspero 12]. As for the consistency strenght
of Martin Maximum (MM) and the Proper Forcing Axiom (PFA), we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 55. (Foreman, Magidor, Shelah) Assuming the existence of a supercompact
cardinal, there is a generic extension which satifies MM, hence also PFA .
Thus, Martin’s Maximum and the Proper Forcing Axiom are consistent relative to the
consistency of the axiom which asserts the existence of a supercompact cardinal. Martin’s
Maximum does settle the cardinality of the continuum. In fact, we have the following two
theorems:
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Theorem 56. (Foreman, Magidor, Shelah) For every regular cardinal κ ≥ ℵ2, MM
implies that κℵ1 = κ.
Theorem 57. (Foreman, Magidor, Shelah) MM implies that 2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
Proof. For theorem 57 we have that 2ℵ0 ≤ 2ℵ1 ≤ ℵℵ12 = ℵ2, but MM implies MA(ℵ1),
then ℵ1 < 2ℵ0 , so 2ℵ0 = ℵ2 
Also, the Proper Forcing Axiom (PFA) does settle the cardinality of the continuum.
Theorem 58. (Todorcevic, Velickovic) PFA implies 2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
We cannot strenghten the axioms MM and PFA by increasing the cardinality of D,
namely the family of dense sets which meet with the generic filter G. In fact, we have the
following:
Theorem 59. FA(Pproper,ℵ2) and FA(PSSP ,ℵ2) are inconsistent.
Proof. Since FA(PSSP ,ℵ2) implies FA(Pproper,ℵ2) , we show this fact for FA(Pproper,ℵ2).
FA(Pproper,ℵ2) implies FA(Pproper,ℵ1) = PFA, which implies 2ℵ0 = ℵ2. Thus FA(Pproper,ℵ2)
= FA(Pproper, 2ℵ0) which implies FA(Pc.c.c., 2ℵ0) = MA(2ℵ0). However we have seen that
MA(2ℵ0) is contradictory. 
At this point we shall introduce bounded forcing axioms, FA(Γ, κ, λ), where Γ is a
property of partial orders and κ, λ are cardinals:
Definition 75. (Bounded Forcing Axioms) FA(Γ, κ, λ): for every partial order or
poset P with the property Γ and for every collection I of κ-many maximal antichains of P
such that |I| ≤ λ, for every I ∈ I, there exists a filter G which meets every I ∈ I.
MA(ℵ1) can be seen as the first bounded forcing axiom. We are interested in bounded
forcing axioms such as FA(Γ, ω1, ω1) where Γ is proper or stationary preserving. So,
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we have BPFA (Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom) and BMM (Bounded Martin’s Maxi-
mum). We have that BMM −→ BPFA −→ MA(ℵ1). Bounded Forcing Axioms can be
formulated as principles of generic absoluteness. For the absoluteness theorem of Levy-
Shoenfiled, a Σ1-formula, which has parameters in H(ω2), is absolute, namely is true in
all transitive models only if it is true in one such model containing the parameters. We
have H(ω2,∈) ≺1 (V,∈). So we have the following equivalence between forcing axioms and
principles of generic absoluteness:
Theorem 60. (Bagaria) Let Γ be a class of partial orderings and let κ be an infinite
cardinal with uncountable cofinality, then the following two statements are equivalent:
(1)FA(Γ, κ, κ)
(2)(H(κ+),∈)) ≺1 (V P,∈) for every P ∈ Γ.
This theorem is valid also for MA, since MA can be seen as a bounded forcing axiom.
MA says that every Σ1-formula with parameters in H(κ), where κ < 2
ℵ0 , forced with Pc.c.c.
is valid in V. Bounded forcing axioms do settle the continuum hypothesis. In fact, we have
the following two theorems:
Theorem 61. (Todorcevic) BMM implies 2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
Theorem 62. (Moore) BPFA implies 2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
Woodin proved the consistency of BMM relative to the consistency of ω + 1-many
Woodin cardinals. Goldstern and Shelah prove that BPFA is consistent relative to the
consistency of the axiom asserting the existence of a Σ2-reflecting cardinal (I will define
this notion immediately). If κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal, we have Vκ ≺Σ1 V . Vκ
reflects all Σ1-sentences with parameters. Now we can consider Σ2-sentences. Suppose that
κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal such that Vκ ≺Σ2 V , i.e, it reflects all Σ2 sentences
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with parameters. We can conclude that κ is an inaccessible cardinal, a limit of inaccessible
cardinals and much more. We can consider for every n the existence of a regular cardinal
such that Vκ ≺Σn V . Such a cardinal is called an n-reflecting cardinal. For n < m, if κ is
an m-reflecting cardinal then it is also an n-reflecting cardinal. However, by Tarski’s the-
orem about the undefinability of truth, there cannot be a definable κ such that Vκ reflects
all sentences. A Mahlo cardinal κ is inaccessible and in Vκ there is a stationary class of
Σω-reflecting cardinals, namely Σn-reflecting for every n. BPFA is consistent relative to
the consistency of the axiom asserting the existence of Σ2-reflecting cardinal. This is a very
weak large cardinal axiom between the axiom asserting the existence of a strongly inac-
cessible cardinal and the axiom asserting the existence of a Mahlo cardinal. Since Martin
Maximum (MM) and the Proper Forcing Axiom are consistent relative to the existence of
a supecompact cardinal and we do not have yet an inner model for supercompact cardinal,
even if these axioms do settle the continuum hypothesis, we cannot consider their answer
to the first problem in Hilbert’s list as decisive in the case that the Ultimate L conjecture
were false. Instead, since BPFA is consistent relative to the existence of a Σ2-reflecting
cardinal and we have an inner model of this large cardinal notion, namely L, which forces
us to trust this cardinal notion, we can state that BPFA may represent a phenomenal
solution to the continuum hypothesis if the ultimate L conjecture were false and the car-
dinality of R is ℵ2 as Gödel was thinking, although this would be a phenomenal truth
according to my philosophical beliefs. Now to express my philosophical position, I have
to apply a Kantian distinction between phenomenal reality and noumenal reality to set
theory. Kantian noumenon is a posited object or reality that is known (if at all) without
the use of physical senses. The term noumenon is used in relation with phenomenon which
refers to an object apprehended by physical senses. The noumenal world may exist but it is
completely unknowable to humans. The noumenal reality is the reality in itself or thing-in-
itself . As expressed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason [Kant 781], Human understanding
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is structured by innate categories of understanding that mind uses in order to make sense
of raw unstructured experience (the phenomenal interpretation of reality). For Kant, when
we employ a concept to categorize noumena (the things-in-themselves) we are categorizing
phenomena (the observational manifestations of noumena). For Kant, we can categorize
phenomena, but we can never directly know noumena. Even if noumena are unknowable,
they are still needed as a limiting concept. The existence of the noumenal world limits
reason to what he perceives to be its proper bounds, making many metaphysical questions
unaswerable by reason. For Kant, the phenomenal reality based on physical senses’ appre-
hension structured, then, by categories of understanding is the realm of appearance and it
is not what it is really (the reality in itself). While the noumenal reality is what it is really.
According to my philosophy, in set theory the phenomenal reality is constructed by human
mind and is represented by metamathematical models such that L[U ], HOD, V [G], etc, in
which we interpret arbitrary sets and we have different set-theoretic concepts. While the
noumenal reality is the immutable, eternal world of sets itself independent from human
mind. We have truths relative to the models (the phenomenal reality). Within canonical
inner models with the notion of definable subsets or within outer models with the notion of
generic filter, we interpret sets and we obtain truths specific or relative to the models. We
construct metamathematical models (the phenomenal reality). Contrary to what Kant was
thinking about the sensible world, I believe that we can know the noumenal reality of sets
(the world of sets in it self) if the Ultimate L conjecture were true. In this case, the inner
model for a supercompact cardinal, although a phenomenal model, would be very close to
the universe of sets V and its structural content would be equivalent to the universe of sets
V. Thus, we can consider the Ultimate L as the true, noumenal universe of sets where CH
is settled. If the Ultimate L conjecture were false, we would have a plurality of phenomenal
metamathematical models and among these models, within some of them, we would prove
specific, phenomenal truths. If the Ultimate L conjecture were false, all metamathematical
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phenomenal models would be characterized by possible truths. However, some of them
would represent a phenomenal solution of phenomenal truths and so I would argue that a
specific phenomenal metamathematical model would prove a specific, phenomenal truths
(BPFA for CH). So, in this case (the ultimate L conjecture is false), I would agree with
Hamkins but I would argue that some mathematical statements, such as CH, have a phe-
nomenal truth value within a phenomenal model. We would have phenomenal pluralism.
In this case the noumenal, set theoretic reality would be inaccessible to us. If the ultimate
L conjecture were false, the set theoretic noumenon would be inaccessible. However, as I
will argue, if the Ultimate L conjecture were true, the true, noumenal universe of mathe-
matics is represented by the ultimate L, a phenomenal reality constructed by human mind
that would coincide with the noumenal universe V. Furthermore, I do not think that the
notion of arbitrary set and the notion of full power set of arbitrary sets are precise math-
ematical concepts. In fact, they are subjected to the phenomenon of vagueness. Instead,
I prefer the notion of definable set and definable power set. We should prefer a universe
of mathematics totally constructible where all sets are definable making the notion of set
precise and avoiding impredicative mathematical objects (predicativism). So if the Ulti-
mate L conjecture were true, the true, noumenal universe of mathematics would be the
Ultimate L (a phenomenal reality created by human mind), namely the inner model of a
supercompact cardinal (phenomenal reality) which contains all large cardinals, where the
generalised continuum hypothesis is true and where all mathematical notions are precise.
3.8. Woodin’s program applied to third-order arithmetic, Woodin’s Max-
imum and a comparison between Turing’s completeness and Woodin’s com-
pleteness. At this point, we can explain briefly Woodin’s program. Woodin wants to
add axioms to ZFC in order to have a solution to problems formulated in H(ω2), namely
third-order arithmetic. We have seen that infinitely-many Woodin cardinals and the axiom
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of Projective Determinacy do settle many problems in H(ω1), namely second-order arith-
metic. So, Woodin wants to find an axiom (Woodin’s Maximum) which decides the whole
theory of H(ω2). We can quote Woodin’s words in order to understand his program:
The answer to the continuum problem lies in understanding H(ω2), where
ω2 is the smallest cardinal greater than ω1. This suggest an incremental
approach. One attempts to understand in turn the structures H(ω), H(ω1),
and then H(ω2). A little, more precisely, one seeks to find the relevant
axioms for these structures. Since the Continuum Hypothesis concerns the
structure of H(ω2), any reasonably complete collection of axioms for H(ω2)
will resolve the Continuum Hypothesis. [Woodin 01]
Woodin is dreaming a complete theory for third-order arithmetic. This dream, as we will
see, is not so far from reality. The first step towards a complete theory is the theorem of
Shoenfield which we have already seen:
Theorem 63. (Shoenfield) If φ is Σ12-formula then every transitive model of ZFC sat-
isfies φ or every transitive model of ZFC satisfies ¬φ.
Woodin wants to obtain a similar result for the structure H(ω2). Now we can introduce
the semantic relation which features Ω-logic.
Definition 76. Suppose that T is a countable theory in the language of set theory and
φ a sentence. then
T |=Ω φ
if for all complete boolean algebras B and for all ordinals α,
if V Bα |= T then V Bα |= φ
This semantic notion is strong since large cardinal axioms imply an important absolute
result:
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Theorem 64. (Woodin) Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardi-
nals. Suppose that T is a countable theory and φ a sentence. then for all complete Boolean
algebras B,
T |=Ω φ iff V B |= T |=Ω φ
To explain this result, which implies that by assuming the existence of a proper class of
Woodin cardinals we cannot alter the truth of φ by going to a forcing extension, we quote
Koellner words:
It follows immediately from the above that Ω-satisfiability is also generically
invariant. To underscore just how remarkable this is we note the following
consequence: Suppose that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and
let φ be a Σ2-sentence. The statement that φ holds in a generic extension
is generically absolute. For example, suppose that φ is the Σ2-statement
asserting that there is a Huge cardinal. Let V B be a generic extension where
the huge cardinal is collapsed. It follows from the above that it is possible
to further force to resurrect the huge cardinal. [Koellner 09]
At this point in order to introduce a quasi-syntactic proof theoretic relation in Ω-logic, we
need to define the notion of universally Baire set:
Definition 77. Suppose A ⊆ ωω and δ is a cardinal. The set A is δ-universally Baire
if for all posets or partial orders P of cardinality δ there exist trees S and T in ω × κ for
some κ such that
(1) A = p[T ].
(2) If G ⊆ P is V-generic then in V [G],
p[T ] = ωω/p[S].
The set A is universally Baire if it is δ-universally Baire for all δ.
114 1. THE DREAM OF COMPLETENESS
Universally Baire sets have an absolute interpretation in generic extensions V [G]. With
the following condition, universally Baire sets are totally preserved in generic extensions
only if the model M is robust enough.
Definition 78. Suppose that A ⊆ ωω is universally Baire and that M is a countable
transitive model of ZFC. Then M is a strongly A-closed if for all set generic extensions
M [G] of M,
A ∩M [G] ∈M [G]
The notion of proof in Ω-logic is not really syntactic, but model-theoretic (as we have
seen). There is no proof calculus and no proof rules. The crucial notion for this quasi-
syntactic proof theoretic relation is that of an A-closed model, where A is a universally
Baire set. Asking for the model to be A-closed means that the model is robust enough
with respect to A. It interprets absolutely A in all its generic extensions. A is preserved in
all generic extensions, M [G], of M.
Definition 79. Suppose there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, T is a countable
theory in the language of set theory and φ is a sentence, then T `Ω φ iff there exists a set
A ⊆ ωω such that
(1) A is universally Baire,
(2) For all countable transitive models M, if M is strongly A-closed and T ∈ M , then
M |= T |=Ω φ
Like the semantic notion we have a quasi-syntactic notion linked to large cardinals:
Definition 80. (Woodin) Assume there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Suppose
T is a countable theory in the language of set theory, φ is a sentence, and B is a complete
Boolean algebra. Then
T `Ω φ iff V B `Ω φ.
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While the soundness theorem is known to hold (Woodin) for Ω-logic, it is an open-
problem if the completeness theorem holds. So we can state the Ω-conjecture:
Definition 81. (Ω-conjecture). Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of
Woodin cardinals. Then for each sentence φ,
∅ |=Ω φ iff ∅ `Ω φ.
We can say that a theory T is Ω-complete if it decides all questions, since for a collection
of sentences to which φ belongs, we have that T |=Ω φ or T |=Ω ¬φ. Now we have to state
a fundamental aspect of Ω-logic.
Definition 82. A theory T is Ω-complete for a collection of sentences Γ if for each
φ ∈ Γ, T |=Ω φ or T |=Ω ¬φ.
We state the result on generic absoluteness of L(R)
Theorem 65. (Woodin) Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin car-
dinals. Then ZFC is Ω-complete for the collection of sentences of the form L(R) |= φ.
We have the completeness at the level of L(R). Unfortunately, that the acutal large
cardinals axioms are not Ω-complete at the level of third-order arithmetic where the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis is formulated.
Theorem 66. Assume A is a standard large cardinal axiom. Then ZFC + A is not
Ω-complete for Σ21 statements.
However, by assuming CH (the Continuum Hypothesis), one can attain such Ω-complete
picture for Σ21 statements.
Theorem 67 (Woodin 10b). Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of measurable
Woodin cardinals. Then ZFC + CH is Ω-complete for Σ21 statements.
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Furthermore, up to Ω-equivalence, CH is the unique Σ21 statement that is Ω-complete
for Σ21 statements.
Lemma 11. Suppose A is a Σ21 sentence, ZFC + A is Ω-satisfiable, and ZFC + A is
Ω-complete for Σ21. Then
(1) ZFC + CH |=Ω A and
(2) ZFC +A |=Ω CH.
If one changes perspective from Σ21 to H(ω2) there is a companion result for ¬CH,
assuming the Strong Ω-conjecture.
Theorem 68 (Woodin 10b). Assume that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals
and that the Strong Ω-conjecture holds. (1) There is an axiom A such that
(1)ZFC +A is Ω− satisfiable
(2)ZFC +A is Ω− complete for the structure H(ω2).
Any such axiom A has the feature that
ZFC +A |=Ω H(ω2) |= ¬CH.
Thus, assuming that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and that the Strong
Ω Conjecture holds, we have an Ω-complete picture of H(ω2) and within this picture CH
fails. For the precedent two theorems, we have an apparent bifurcation at the level of CH.
In fact, if our point of view is H(ω2), every Ω-complete theory states that CH fails. If our
point of view is Vω+1 (second-order arithmetic), by assuming CH we have Ω-completeness
for Σ21 statements. However, there is a limitative result established by Hugh Woodin. In
fact, if there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and the Strong Ω Conjecture holds then
one cannot have an Ω-complete picture of third-order arithmetic.
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Theorem 69. (Woodin) Assume that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and
that the Strong Ω Conjecture holds. Then there is no recursive theory A such that ZFC+A
is Ω-complete for Σ23 statements.
It is an open question if there is a recursively enumerable theory that is Ω-complete for
Σ22 statements. It is established that CH will not be sufficient:
Theorem 70. (Jensen, Shelah) ZFC + CH is not Ω-complete for Σ22 statements.
At the level of third-order arithmetic, we might not have a unique Ω-complete picture,
but if there is one such Ω-complete picture then there must be another, incompatible Ω-
complete picture. At this point, I want to conclude this section devoted to Ω-logic by
quoting Koellner [Koellner 09] about the status of Ω-conjecture:
There is evidence that the Ω-conjecture holds. There are two key points.
First, many of the meta-mathematical consequences of the Ω-conjecture fol-
low from the non-trivial Ω-satisfiability of the Ω-conjecture. This later state-
ment is a Σ2 statement and there are no known examples of Σ2-statements
that are provably absolute and not settled by large cardinals. So it is rea-
sonable to expect this statement to be settled by large cardinal axioms.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Ω Conjecture be false while its non-
trivial Ω-satisfiability be true. Second, recent results have shown that if
inner model can reach one supercompact cardinal then it can reach all the
traditional large cardinal axioms and, moreover, the Ω Conjecture holds in
all these models. This provides evidence that no traditional large cardinal
can refute the Ω-satisfiability of the Ω-conjecture and (by the first point)
this is evidence that the Ω conjecture is true. Thus there is evidence that
the above form of bifurcation will not occur. In fact, there is evidence that
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the Strong Ω Conjecture holds and thus there is evidence that bifurcation
cannot even occur at the level of third-order arithmetic [Koellner 09]
Now I want to introduce briefly Woodin’s Maximum. In order to highlight the importance
of this axiom, i am going to quote Bagaria’s words:
Woodin has isolated an axiom we may call Woodin’s Maximum (WM),
that brings together the power of large cardinals and the Bounded Forcing
Axioms. WM has the astonishing property that decides in Ω-logic the whole
theory of H(ω2). WM asserts the following: (1) There exists a proper class
of Woodin cardinals, and (2) A strong form of BMM holds in every inner
model M of ZFC that contains H(ω2) and thinks that there is a proper class
of Woodin cardinals. [Bagaria 04]
Now we can introduce briefly Woodin’s Maximum (WM). Recall that the dual of the closed
unbounded filter is the ideal of non-stationary sets, the non-stationary ideal INS . INS is
κ-complete and it is closed under diagonal unions. At this point, we need to introduce
briefly the forcing notion Pmax. I focus on Pmax because if NSω1 is saturated then every
member of H(ω2) is in the iteration of a countable model of a fragment of ZFC. Since these
countable models are elements of L(R), their iterations induce a partial order in L(P). This
partial order, Pmax, produces an extension of L(R) where H(ω2) is the direct limit of the
structures H(ω2) of models satisfying every forceable theory. The structure H(ω2) in the
Pmax extension of L(R) by assuming ADL(R) satisfies every Π2 sentence. Pmax is based
on iterated generic elementary embeddings. Suppose that I is a normal, uniform, proper
ideal on ω1. Thus, I is a proper subset of P (ω1) containing all the countable subsets,
and such that whenever A is an I positive set (i.e, in P (ω1/I)) and f : A −→ ω1 is a
regressive function, f is constant on a I positive set. Then forcing with the Boolean algebra
P (ω1/I produces a V-normal ultrafilter on ω
V
1 . So, we generate the ultrapower construction
Ult(V,U). The corresponding elementary embedding j : V −→ Ult(V,U) has critical point
3. SET THEORY 119
ωV1 , and since I is normal for each A ∈ P (ω1)V , A ∈ U if and only if ωV1 ∈ j(A). Now take
ZFC∗ to be ZFC - Power set - Replacement + P (P (ω1)) exists.
Definition 83. Let M be a model of ZFC∗ and let I be an ideal on ωM1 which is
normal in M. Let γ be an ordinal less than or equal to ω1. An iteration of (M, I) of length
γ consists of models Mα(α ≤ γ), sets Gα(α < γ) and a commuting family of elementary
embeddings jαβ : Mα −→Mβ(α ≤ β ≤ γ) such that:
M0 = M .
Each Gα is an Mα- generic filter for (P (ω1/j
Mα
0α(I))).
Each jαα is the identity map.
Each jα(α+1) is the utrapower embedding induced by Gα.
For each limit ordinal β ≤ γ, Mβ is the direct limit of the system {Mα, jαδ : α ≤ δ < β},
jαβ is the induced embedding.
We can prove that there is a unique iteration and each model in the iteration is well-
founded. The forcing construction Pmax was invented by Hugh Woodin in 1990. An
important result of this construction is the Π2-maximality of the Pmax extension which is
stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 71 (Woodin 10b). Suppose that there exists a proper class of Woodin cardi-
nals, A ⊆ R, A ∈ L(R), φ is Π2 in the extended language containing two additional unary
predicates, and in some set forcing extension
(H(ω2),∈, INSω1 , A
∗) |= φ
(where A∗ is the reinterpretation of A in this extension). Then
L(R)Pmax |= (H(ω2),∈, INSω1 , A) |= φ.
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Forcing with Pmax does not add reals, so there is no need to reinterpret A in the last
line of the theorem. The theorem says that any such Π2-statement that we can force in
any extension must hold in the Pmax extension of L(R), so H(ω2) of L(R)Pmax is maximal,
or complete, in a certain sense, among other things. We define the theory T0:
Definition 84. T0 is ZFC −Replacement− Powerset plus P (P (ω1)) exists plus the
scheme that definable trees of height ω1 have maximal branches.
We define Pmax:
Definition 85. The partial order Pmax is the set of pairs ((M,I, a)) such that
(1) M is a countable transitive model of T0 +MAℵ1.
(2) (M,I) is an iterable pair (all iterations, ultrapower iterations, are well-founded).
(3) a ∈ P (ω1)M and ∃x ∈ P (ω)M such that ωL[x,a]1 = ωM1 .
The order on Pmax is as follows: ((M, I), a) < ((N, J)b) if N ∈ H(ω1)M and there
exists an iteration j : (N, J) −→ (N∗, J∗) such that:
j(b) = a.
j,N∗ ∈M .
I ∩N∗ = J∗.
We assert that a pair (M, I) is a Pmax- precondition if there exists an a such that (M, I), a)
is in Pmax. At this point we state the following fundamental definition:
Definition 86. Let A be a set of reals. If M is a transitive model of ZFC∗ and I is
an ideal on ωM1 which is normal and precipitous (all ultrapowers are well-founded) in M,
then the pair (M, I) is A-iterable if
(M,I) is iterable,
A ∩M ∈M ,
j(A ∩M) = A ∩M∗ whenever j : (M, I) −→ (M∗, I∗) is an iteration of (M,I).
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We reach the full effect of Pmax over a given model such as L(R) because it has been
proved that for each A ⊆ R in the model there exists a Pmax precondition (M,I) such that:
(M, I) is A-iterable.
(H(ω1)
M , A ∩M) ≺ (H(ω1), A).
With the existence of A-iterable conditions (for all sets A in L(R)) we can see that Pmax
is an extension of L(R). With δ12 we point out to the supremum of the lenghts of the ∆12-
definable prewellorderings of the reals. Now we can state a fundamental theorem:
Theorem 72. (Woodin) [Woodin 10b] (ZF). Assume that for every A ⊆ R there exists
a Pmax condition ((M, I)a) such that (M, I) is a A-iterable and
(H(ω1)
M , A ∩M) ≺ (H(ω1), A)
Suppose that G ⊆ Pmax is a V-generic filter. Then in V[G] the following hold:




So, in Pmax, we have the failure of CH. It has been proved that the Pmax extension of
L(R) satisfies the axiom of choice (AC). In particular, it satisfies an equivalent form of the
axiom of choice called ψAC . Now we can state a fundamental theorem:
Theorem 73. (Woodin) [Woodin 10b] Suppose that δ is a limit of Woodin cardinals,
and κ > δ is measurable. Let A be a set of reals in L(R). Suppose that φ is a Π2 sentence
in the expanded language with two additional unary predicates, and that P is a partial order
in Vδ forcing that φ holds in the structure (H(ω2),∈, A(G)). Then φ holds in the structure
(H(ω2),∈ A) in the Pmax extension of L(R).
Now we can define Woodin Maximum:
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Definition 87. (WM) The axiom of determinacy (AD) holds in L(R) and L(P (ω1))
is a Pmax-extension of L(R), namely there is some G which is P-generic over L(R) and
L(P (ω1)) = L(R)[G].
If we assume Woodin Maximum, we can prove that a second axiom calledWoodinMaximum∗∗
holds in L(P (ω1)). Recently, David Asperó and Ralf Shindler [Aspero 12] have isolated an
axiom which implies Woodin’s Maximum. This axiom is calledA−BoundedMartin′s Maximum++
where A points out to a universally Baire set.
Definition 88. Given a universally Baire set A ⊂ R, the axiom (A−BMM++) says
that for every stationary set preserving poset P and every P-generic filter G over V, we
have that:
(HVω2 ,∈, (INSω1 )
V , A) ≺Σ1 (HV [G]ω2 ,∈, (INSω1 )
V [G], A∗)
where A∗ is the V [G] version of A.
At this point we can connect Pmax, Ω logic and Woodin Maximum. A sentence φ is
ΩZFC consistent if ZFC 6`Ω ¬φ. So, we can state:
Theorem 74 (Woodin 10b). Suppose that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals
and that there is an inaccessible cardinal which is a limit of Woodin cardinals. Then the
theory
ZFC + Woodin Maximum
is ΩZFC consistent.
Then:
Theorem 75 (Woodin 10b). If there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then for
every set of reals A in L(R), every ΩZFC consistent Π2 sentence for (H(ω2), NSω1 , A,∈)
holds in the Pmax extension of L(R).
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We conclude with the following decidability result concerning Ω logic.
Theorem 76. (Woodin) [Woodin 10b] Suppose that there is a proper class of Woodin
cardinals. Then for every sentence φ, either
ZFC + Woodin Maximum `Ω L(P (ω1) |= φ
or
ZFC + Woodin Maximum `Ω L(P (ω1) 6|= φ.
If we could prove the Ω-conjecture, we would have a complete theory respect to |=Ω. In
fact, thanks to Woodin’s Maximum, |=Ω would be a natural notion of logical consequence
to adopt in order to decide every problem in H(ω2). We shall now compare the result
of completeness of Turing for transfinite progressions, that we have seen in section 2.3,
and Woodin’s result for Ω-logic. Firstly, both Turing’s and Woodin’s approaches share
a weak similarity. In fact, both approaches imply a maximality principle. In transfinite
progressions (that we have seen in section 2.3), we take all theories until ω + 1 and in
Ω-logic we take all forcing extensions. To compare these two approaches by abstracting
from their particular formulation and by accomplishing a sort of phenomenology, we have
to evaluate their success in deciding undecidable mathematical statements. Surely, in the
case of Turing’s completeness theorem, we attempt to prove Π01 statements or, in the
case of Feferman Π02 statements while in Ω-logic we attempt to have a complete theory
of the structure H(ω2) and decide statements such as the Continuum Hypothesis which
has the complexity of Σ21 statement. The success of Ω-logic is based on the fact that the
Ω-conjecture holds. Thus, in order to compare Turing’s approach and Woodin’s approach,
we must introduce and formulate Turing’s Conjecture. This Conjecture may be formulated
in the following way:
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Definition 89. (Turing’s Conjecture) There exists a unique ordinal notation in order
to index theories univocally.
As we have seen in section 2.3, this is the main problem for transfinite progressions.
Unlike proved theorems that are atemporal truths, Conjectures are unproved mathematical
statements which do not possess the criteria of atemporality. In mathematics a proved,
atemporal theorem cannot be dismissed, while a Conjecture may be disproved. We might
assert that we believe that a specific Conjecture is true and it is probable that it is true, but
we cannot assert that is an atemporal truth (Recall that we have examined the notion of
atemporal truth in section 1.3 relating this notion to Intutionism). So, now we can compare
Turing’s Conjecture and the Ω Conjecture by asking ourselves which Conjecture is more
probable to be true and which Conjecture can be believed to be true with more certainty.
Church’s thesis and the consistency of ZFC are other two conjectures very probable to be
true. In fact, it is almost impossible to think of an informal algorithm which cannot be
formalized as a partial recursive function and thanks to relative consistency proofs, it is
very improbable that a contradiction will be discovered within ZFC. So, we can believe in
Church’s thesis and in the consistency of ZFC with the possible, highest degree of certainty.
On the contrary, Turing’s Conjecture, on which is based Turing’s completeness theorem,
is less probable to be true. We can believe in Turing’s Conjecture with a lower degree of
certainty. In fact establishing that we have a unique ordinal notation is a mathematical
problem that has a greater computational complexity than the problem of establishing if a
truth is a theorem (theoremhood). So, now we can ask ourselves what is the status of the Ω
conjecture. Firstly, the Ω-satisfiability of the Ω-conjecture is a Σ2 statement and there are
no known examples of Σ2-statements that are provably absolute and not settled by large
cardinals. So it is reasonable to expect this statement to be settled by large cardinal axioms.
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Ω Conjecture be false while its non-trivial Ω-
satisfiability be true. Secondly, if an inner model of a supercompact cardinal (the Ultimate
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L) will be constructed, then this model can reach all the traditional large cardinal axioms
and, moreover, the Ω Conjecture holds in all these models. So, there is a strong evidence
that the Ω-conjecture is true and it reasonable that the Ω-conjecture will be proved to be
true, becoming a theorem and so, an atemporal truth. Thus, there is a strong evidence in
favor of the Ω-Conjecture. We might add that if there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals
and that for everyA ⊆ R, if A is OD then A is universally Baire thenHOD |= Ω conjecture.
So we may assert that the satisfaction of the Ω conjecture rests on the satisfaction of other
conjectures such as the HOD conjecture and the Strong (ω1 + 1) Iteration Hypothesis or
the Strong Unique Branch Hypothesis. We can conclude this section by saying that the Ω
conjecture is more probable to be true than Turing’s Conjecture. We can believe in the Ω-
Conjecture with an higher degree of certainty than Turing’s Conjecture degree of certainty.
Now we may compare the Ω-Conjecture with Church’s thesis and the consistency of ZFC.
In fact, we can ask ourselves if it is possible for all these Conjectures becoming proved,
atemporal truths, or simply mathematical theorems. We can say that Church’s thesis is
impossible to become a theorem. In fact, we should be able to collect all possible informal
algorithms and then formalized them as partial recursive functions. It is impossible to
collect all possible algorithms. Also it is impossible that we will have a direct proof of
the consistency of ZFC, but we can have only relative consistency proofs. In this case, we
have a theorem, namely Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, that makes impossible to
have a direct proof of the consistency of ZFC. So, while even if it is almost impossible,
it might be possible to collect all algorithms and prove Church’s thesis, to prove directly
the consistency of ZFC is impossible because of another atemporal truth, namely Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem. On the contrary, it is very probable that the Ω Conjecture
will become an atemporal, proved truth as all other theorems of mathematics. In fact, it is
very probable that a large cardinal axiom will settle the Ω conjecture or that the Ultimate
L will be constructed implying the truth of the Ω Conjecture.
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Therefore, we have seen that at the beginning of the last century, the fact of having
complete theories for first, second, third-order arithmetic was a dream. Even if Gödel
sentences doom theories to be incomplete, we can say that all problems in second-order
arithmetic are settled and the continuum hypothesis may have a noumenal solution if the
ultimate L conjecture is true and a phenomenal solution, thanks to BPFA, if the ultimate
L conjecture is false. So, the dream of proving undecidable truths, is not anymore only a
dream, but it has become an important result of mathematics. I want to conclude this long
section with the words of Hugh Woodin who explains that we are only at the beginning
for the study of the infinite:
What about the general continuum problem; what aboutH(ω3), H(ω4), H(ωω+2010),
etc? The view that progress towards resolving the Continuum Hypothesis
must come with progress on resolving all instances of the generailised Con-
tinuum Hypothesis seems too strong. The understanding of H(ω) did not
come in concert with an understanding of H(ω1), and the understanding of
H(ω1) failed to resolve even the basic mysteries of H(ω2). The universe of




0.1. Preliminaries to this chapter. In this chapter, we will discuss the Reflection
Principle and higher-order linguistic principles. I will conclude this chapter by examining
Welch’s Global Reflection principle, a kind of reflection, which implies embeddings and
the use of proper classes. This chapter is important because I will highlight that the
phenomenon of reflection characterises essentially the universe of sets. In fact, Reflection
principles can be used as intrinsic philosophical justification for new axioms in set theory.
On the contrary, extrinsic philosophical justifications are based on the success of accepting
new axioms. Intrinsic justification are characterised by a conceptual analysis of the notion
of set. If we imagine a counter-mathematical possible world where we have two axioms
of set theory and we have to choose one of them, we should prefer intrinsic justification
because this kind of justification involves the concept of set itself. The iterative conception
of set is a kind of intrinsic justification. In fact, the operation set of (the power set
operation) iterated characterizes essentially the universe of sets and characterizes the first
large cardinals in the hierarchy of large cardinals (inaccessible and Mahlo) by taking fixed
points of aleph function. Also the Reflection Principle is an essential feature of the universe
of sets and it is not simply an epiphenomenon. In fact, in section 1 I will discuss Levy-
Montague theorem about reflection principle. The axioms ZF prove that the Reflection
Principle holds in the universe of sets. Furthermore, if we assume the Reflection Principle
as an axiom together with the remaining axioms of ZFC, we can derive the axiom of
infinity and the axiom of replacement. We have to notice that the large-cardinal axioms
can be seen as generalizations of the axiom of infinity plus the axiom of replacement. Thus,
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the Reflection Principle characterises essentially ZFC universe and beyond. So, if we can
interpret large-cardinal axioms as principles of reflection, they will be intrinsically justified.
ZFC axioms determine a universe and it is like a partition of the Human thought. In fact,
only sets, which we can construct from the axioms, belong to this universe that i have called
ZFC universe. It is a partition because no all sets belong to this universe. For example, the
Russell’s class and ill-founded sets are excluded, respectively by the separation axiom and
by well-founded axiom, from the ontology of ZFC universe. Axioms determine a partition
of Human thought and sets, that are outside this partition, do not belong to the universe
shaped by the axioms (in our case ZFC axioms). If we eliminate the well-founded axiom
and we add the anti-foundation axiom, we have a new partition of Human thought and we
have a new universe shaped by this new axiom, where ill-founded sets are admitted. As
we have seen in the precedent chapter, ∆11-determinacy is proved by the axioms of ZFC
(Martin). So, Borel determinacy is an essential feature of ZFC universe. From the axioms
of ZFC, evident truths about sets, it is possible to derive Borel determinacy. Thus, Borel
determinacy is a truth that characterises sets within ZFC universe. Surely, the Reflection
Principle characterises ZFC universe in a stronger sense since by assuming this principle
together with the other remaining ZFC axioms is possible to derive the axiom of infinity and
the axiom of replacement. We should say that the reflection principle is an essential feature
of ZFC universe and it can assume the status of an evident truth regarding sets. However,
even if Borel determinacy characterises ZFC universe in a weaker sense (in comparison
with the Reflection Principle), it is still a derivable truth from evident truths (axioms)
regarding sets, and so it is a truth concerning sets. As we will see in the next chapter,
also Σ1-structural reflection is provable from ZFC axioms. So, as in the case of Borel
determinacy, we can say that Σ1-structural reflection is another truth that is an essential
feature of ZFC universe.
In order to justify intrinsically Projective Determinacy, we must firstly justify the axiom
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that asserts the existence of infinitely-many Woodin cardinals. In fact, this axiom implies
Projective Determinacy. So, we must interpret Woodin cardinals as principles of reflection.
At this point, I want to stress the following aspect. If we assume the existence of the
universe of the totality of mathematical abstract concepts, ZFC axioms partition this
universe and create a sub-universe. ZFC axioms are evident truths that imply the existence
of simple sets. The ontology of ZFC universe is determined by sets whose existence is
implied by the axioms or sets whose existence is derivable from these axioms. Surely, we
can extend ZFC ontology by introducing large-cardinal axioms. Large cardinals may exist
within ZFC universe but their existence cannot be proved within ZFC. Contradictions
limit ZFC ontology. For instance, the Fregean full axiom of comprehension cannot be
accepted as a evident truth regarding sets because of Russell’s Paradox. In fact, we must
introduce the axiom of separation in order to avoid Russell’s paradox. Russell’s class does
not belong to ZFC ontology. It is the same also for the class of all ordinals or the class of
all cardinals. In fact, we must introduce in ZFC, the distinction between sets and proper
classes. Proper classes do not belong to the ZFC ontology. By introducing large-cardinal
axioms we extend the ZFC ontology since the existence of these large cardinals cannot be
proved within ZFC. So, we create new universes (ZFC + Large cardinal axiom) with
a different ontology. However, contradictions determine also if these new and different
universes may exist. Ackermann [Ackermann 56] declared that the notion of set (Menge)
is not a well-defined notion and also the distinction between sets and classes is not well-
defined. On the contrary, I believe that the notion of set is well defined. In fact, I believe
that sets are mathematical objects that belong to ZFC ontology that determines which set
exist. Existent sets are those whose existence is implied by ZFC axioms or it is derivable
from ZFC axioms. The same reasoning is valid for different universes when we assume
the existence of a large cardinal. Only contradictions limit ZFC ontology or the existence
of different universes such as ZFC + Reinhardt cardinal exists universe. Classes are
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mathematical objects that cause contradictions and so they do not belong to ZFC ontology.
The act of creating new and different universes from ZFC universe by introducing large-
cardinal axioms is essentially determined by Godel’s second incompleteness theorem. In
fact, by this theorem, we cannot prove the existence of large cardinals within ZFC because
they would be metamathematical models of ZFC axioms and they would be direct proof of
the consistency of ZFC axioms. In section 2 I will introduce the concept of indescribability.
In this section, we will see how higher-order reflection can be used to interpret the first
large cardinal axioms. We will see that weakly compact cardinals are Π11 indescribable. In
section 3 I will discuss Koellner’s limitative result concerning linguistic reflection principles.
In this section, I will introduce briefly combinatorial set theory in order to understand ηω-
Erdös cardinal barrier. In fact, we will see that by Koellner’s theorem, linguistic reflection
principle cannot overcome this barrier. I must highlight that the axiom asserting the
existence of ηω-Erdös cardinal is consistent with V = L. Therefore, to interpret the axiom
asserting the existence of measurable Woodin cardinals as a principle of reflection, we must
conceive a different kind of principles of reflection. In section 4 I will introduce Welch’s
Global Reflection principle. Welch’s approach is based on an embedding of a substructure
into a superstructure. This aspect is shared also by Bagaria’s structural reflection as we
will see in the next chapter. Welch by assuming Global Reflection Principle is able to
produce a proper class of measurable Woodin cardinals, fundamental for Ω-logic. Thus,
Welch is able to justify intrinsically measurable Woodin cardinals. However, we must say
that Welch’s principle implies the use of proper classes. In this section, I will express my
philosophical doubts about the use of proper classes within mathematical discourse.
1. The Reflection Principle
Levy and Montague proved the Reflection Principle for ZF. This Principle is similar
to the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. While the latter theorem proves that every model
has an elementary submodel, the Reflection Principle asserts that for any finite number of
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formulas, a set Vκ is like an elementary submodel of the universe V with respect to the
given formulas. The Principle is proved without the axiom of choice.
Theorem 77. (Levy-Montague) [Jech 06] (The Reflection Principle) Let φ(x1, ........xn)
be a formula. For each M0 there exists a set M0 ⊂M such that
φM (x1, ....xn)↔ φ(x1, ....xn)
for every x0, ....., xn ∈ M . (We say that M reflects φ). Furthermore, M is transitive and
reflects φ. Moreover there is a limit ordinal α such that M0 ⊂ Vα and Vα reflects φ.
The proof works for any finite number of formulas and not just one. As a consequence
of the Reflection Principle and of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, it follows that
ZF is not finitely axiomatizable. Any finite number of theorems of ZF has a model by
the Reflection Principle, while the existence of a model of ZF is not provable by Gödel’s
theorem. Also no consistent extension of ZF is finitely axiomatizable. The axiom of infin-
ity and the axiom of replacement are provable from the Reflection Principle and the other
remaining axioms. Therefore, the Reflection Principle is not an epiphenomenon of set the-
ory, but it is an essential property of the universe of set theory (ZF). It features directly
the concept of set itself. So, Reflection can be used as an intrinsic justification based on a
conceptual analysis of large cardinals. If Woodin cardinals can be interpreted as principles
of reflection, then these large cardinal numbers are intrinsically justified. At the same time
Woodin cardinals are also extrinsically justified since as we have seen before, by assuming
these large cardinals, we can obtain important results in set theory. I believe that linguistic
reflection (indescribability, Tait-Koellner) and the iterative conception of set (the iteration
of the operation of set of and fixed points of aleph function) are fundamental to justify
philosophically and intrinsically large cardinals. However, for linguistic reflection we have
two barriers, namely Π1n-indescribability and ηω-Erdös cardinal that we cannot overcome.
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In fact, with linguistic reflection we are forced to stay within Gödel’s constructible uni-
verse because linguistic reflection is able to produce only large cardinals consistent with
L. We can adopt a Hilbert’s distinction between safe mathematical reasoning and less safe
mathematical reasoning. Hilbert asserted that finite arithmetic was a safe mathematical
reasoning while ideal mathematics (set theory) was unsafe. In my opinion, all notions
which are within Gödel’s constructible universe are safe because they can be intrinsically
justified while all notions which are beyond Gödel’s constructible universe are less safe. In
fact, linguistic reflection and the iterative conception of set are my preferred methods to
justify directly large cardinals. However, we can use different kinds of reflection (Welch’s
Global reflection and Bagaria’s structural reflection) and we can overcome ηω- Erdös car-
dinal barrier and we can interpret Woodin cardinals as principles of reflection. However,
I think that these kinds of reflection are less powerful methods from a philosophical point
of view than direct linguistic reflection or the iterative conception of set in order to justify
intrinsically large cardinals. We shall now examine linguistic reflection. For κ a regular
cardinal the following are equivalent:
(1)Vκ |= ZFC
(2)Vκ ≺Σ1 V.
Vκ reflects all Σ1 sentences with parameters, which means that for every a1, .......aκ ∈ Vκ
and every Σ1-formula φ(x1, ......., xκ),
Vκ |= φ(a1, ......an) iff φ(a1, .....aκ)
A regular cardinal satisfying (1) or (2) is inaccessible. As we have seen before, by consid-
ering Σ2-sentences, we obtain the notion of reflecting cardinal. More generally, for every n
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one may consider the existence of a regular cardinal κ such that
Vκ ≺n V
Such cardinal is called n-reflecting cardinal. A strengthening of the notion of inaccessible
cardinal, is the notion of Mahlo cardinal. κ is a Mahlo cardinal if it is regular and the set
of inaccessible cardinals below κ is stationary, namely every closed unbounded subset of κ
contains an inaccessible cardinal. A Mahlo cardinal κ is inaccessible and in Vκ there is a
stationary class of Σω-reflecting cardinals, namely Σn-reflecting for every n. κ is Mahlo iff
κ is regular, Vκ |= ZFC and the set of regular cardinals λ < κ such that Vλ |= ZFC is
stationary. Therefore, if we accept inaccessible and reflecting cardinals, we have to accept
also Mahlo cardinals because they are the next natural step in the process of extending
the linguistic reflection properties of the universe of all sets.
2. Indescribability
Before speaking about indescribability, I have to introduce a little combinatorial set
theory to understand the notions of weakly compact cardinals and Erdös cardinals. This
part about combinatorial set theory is also important in order to understand ηω-Erdös
cardinal barrier fundamental for Koellner’s limitative result about linguistic reflection.
A partition of a set S is a pairwise disjoint family P = (Xi : i ∈ I) such that
⋃
i∈I Xi = S.
With the partition P we can associate a function F : S −→ I such that F (x) = F (y) if and
only if x and y are in the same X ∈ P . [A]n := {X ⊂ A : |X| = n} is the set of all subsets
of A that have exactly n elements. If {Xi : i ∈ I} is a partition of [A]n, then a set H ⊂ A
is homogenous for the partition if for some i, [H]n is included in Xi, namely all n-element
subsets of H are in the same piece of partition. We can start with the following theorem:
Theorem 78. (Ramsey) ℵ0 −→ (ℵ0)nκ (n, κ ∈ ω).
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So, for the infinite Ramsey theorem, a partition of an infinite countable set gives as a
result an infinite homogenous set. Now we have to introduce two important lemmas:
Lemma 12. For all κ, 2κ 6−→ (ω)2κ
Lemma 13. For every κ, 2κ 6−→ (κ+)22
Therefore we have that ℵ1 6−→ (ℵ1)22. So, the natural generalization of Ramsey theorem
is false. Now we can define weakly compact cardinals:
Definition 90. A cardinal κ is weakly compact if it is uncountable and satisfies the
partition property κ −→ (κ)22.
We have the following Lemma:
Lemma 14. Every weakly compact cardinal is inaccessible.
We shall now introduce the concept of a tree, which is fundamental, in order to char-
acterise weakly compact cardinals.
Definition 91. A tree is a partially ordered set (T,<) with the property that for each
x ∈ T , the set {y : y < x} of all predecessors of x is well-ordered by <. The α-level of T
consists of all x ∈ T such that {y : y < x} has order-type α. The height of T is the least α
such that the α-level of T is empty. The α-level is the height of the well-founded relation
<. A branch in T is a maximal linearly ordered subset of T.
Now we can define two kinds of trees:
Definition 92. A tree is a Suslin tree if the height of T is ω1, every branch in T is at
most countable and every antichain in T is at most countable.
Definition 93. An Aronszajn tree is a tree of height ω1 all of whose levels are at most
countable and which has has no uncountable branches.
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The following is a fundamental property shared by weakly compact cardinals:
Definition 94. (The tree property) A regular uncountable cardinal κ has the tree prop-
erty if every tree of height κ whose levels have cardinality < κ has a branch of cardinality
κ.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 79 (Jech 06). If κ is weakly compact, then κ has the tree property and if κ
is inaccessible and has the tree property, then κ is weakly compact.
Now we can introduce Ramsey cardinals:
Definition 95. A cardinal κ is a Ramsey cardinals if κ −→ (κ)<ω2
Clearly, every Ramsey cardinal is weakly compact. At this point, we can introduce
Erdös cardinals:
Definition 96. For every limit ordinal α, the Erdös cardinal ηα is the least κ such
that κ −→ (α)<ω2 .
Notice that κ is a Ramsey cardinal if and only if κ = ηκ. Now we can introduce two
fundamental theorems concerning Erdös cardinals:
Theorem 80. If ηω exists then there exists a weakly compact cardinal below ηω.
The next theorem shows that ηω (Erdös cardinal) is consistent with V = L.
Theorem 81 (Jech 06). If κ −→ (ω)<ω then L |= ηω (it exists in L.)
In fact we have the following theorem:
Theorem 82. If there is a cardinal κ such that κ −→ (ω1)<ω2 then 0] exists. Therefore
ηω1 is consistent with V 6= L.
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As we will see later, the ηω-Erdös cardinal constitutes a barrier for linguistic reflection
principles. In fact, linguistic reflection principles are either below this barrier or are incon-
sistent by Koellner’s [Koellner 091] dichotomy theorem.
If we increase the order of the variables of the sentences reflected, we obtain the notion
of indescribable cardinals. The notion of indescribability implies a kind of higher-order
reflection. We can start with the following definition:
Definition 97. A cardinal κ is Πnm-indescribable if whenever R ⊂ Vκ and σ is a Πnm
sentence such that (Vκ,∈, R) |= σ, then for some α < κ, (Vα,∈, R ∩ Vα) |= σ.
The following theorem asserts that to be indescribable, a cardinal must be inaccessible:
Theorem 83. If κ is not inaccessible, then it is describable by a first-order sentence,
i.e., Π0m-describable for some m.
The following is a fundamental theorem which links the notion of indescribability with
the notion of weak compactness:
Theorem 84. (Hanf, Scott) [Jech 06] A cardinal κ is Π11-indescribable if and only if it
is weakly compact.
We have also the following lemma:
Lemma 15. Every weakly compact cardinal κ is Mahlo , and the set of Mahlo cardinals
below κ is stationary.
Unlike measurable cardinals, weakly compact cardinals and indescribable cardinals are
consistent with V = L. However, indescribability is consistent also with measurability. In
fact, we have with the following theorem:
Theorem 85. Every measurable cardinal is Π21-indescribable.
Surely, if V = L, a Π21-indescribable cardinal would not be measurable in L.
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3. Koellner’s limitative results about Tait’s reflection principles
Peter Koellner [Koellner 091] at the beginning of his article asserts that Reflection
Principles aim to articulate the informal idea that the height of the universe V is absolutely
infinite and hence cannot be characterized form below. Moreover, these principles assert
that any statement true in V is true in some smaller Vα. Towards V, the universe of all
sets, we can have two perspectives. The first is the actualist perspective which sustains
that totality of all sets is a completed totality. This perspective has not any problem
to justify Reflection Principles since we can articulate the idea that the totality of all sets
cannot characterized from below. However, the actualist perspective has problems to justify
higher-order reflection. In fact, according to the actualist perspective, there are no sets
beyond the totality of all sets, so for this perspective it is impossible to accept full higher-
order quantification over the universe of sets. Thus, assuming higher-order reflection, we
are considering full higher-order quantification over the universe of sets and so we are
taking as parameters of formulas in linguistic reflection also sub-classes of the universe V
itself. On the contrary, the potentialist perspective sustains that the totality of all sets does
not constitute a completed totality. Thus, the potentialist view has problems to justify
Reflection Principles but it does not have any problem to justify higher-order reflection
and so, full higher-order quantification over the universe of sets since the universe of sets
is not a completed totality. The actualist and the potentialist perspective face opposite
problems of philosophical justification. However, concerning reflection principles, we face
immediately Reinhardt limitative result about third-order and higher-order parameters.
Third-order parameter imply that they are sets and they have sets as elements. Now we
can see this limitative result in the following way: To see this let
A(3) = {(σ|σ < α)(2)|α ∈ Ω}(3)
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and let φ(A(3)) be the statement that each element of A(3) is bounded. This is true in
V but for each α ∈ Ω the reflected version of the statement, φα(A(3),α), is false since
(σ|σ < α)(2) ∈ A(3),α is unbounded. This result of Reinhardt suggests that we must forgo
statements where the order of the parameters is ≥ 2. Thus Tait introduces the following
definition:
Definition 98. (Tait) A formula in the language of finite orders is positive iff it is
build up by means of the operations ∨,∧, ∀, ∃, and from atoms of the form x = y, x 6= y, x ∈
y, x 6∈ y, x ∈ Y (2), x 6∈ Y (2) and Xm = Y m and Xm ∈ Y m+1, where m ≥ 2.
Referring to this restricted language, Tait introduces Γ
(2)
n class of formulas:
Definition 99. (Tait) For 0 < n < ω, Γ
(2)














(l1), ......, A(ln1 ))
where φ does not have quantifiers of second- or higher-order and κ1, ....., κn, l1, ....., ln1 are
natural numbers.
Then he introduces his Γ
(2)
n reflection principle:
Definition 100. For 0 < n < ω, Γ
(2)
n -reflection is the schema asserting that for each
sentence φ ∈ Γ(2)n , if V |= φ then there is a δ ∈ Ω such that Vδ |= φδ.
Now we have to introduce the notion of n-ineffable cardinal:
Definition 101. (Baumgartner) For 0 < n < ω, κ is n-ineffable iff for any (Ka1,......,an |α1 <
....... < αn < κ) with Ka1,......,an ⊆ α1 for α1 < ...... < αn < κ, there is an X ⊆ κ and an S
stationary in κ such that for β1 < ........ < βn, all in S, X ∩ β1 = Kβ1,....βn.
Theorem 86. (Tait) Suppose n < ω and Vκ |= Γ(2)n −reflection. Then κ is n-ineffable.
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Therefore we can ask ourselves how strong is Γ
(2)
n − reflection and if we can allow
universal quantifiers of order greater than 2. Peter Koellner answers to these questions
with the following two theorems:
Theorem 88 (Koellner 091). Assume ηω exists (Erdös cardinal). Then there is a
δ < ηω such that Vδ satisfies Γ
(2)
n − reflection for all n < ω.
The existence of the cardinal ηω produces an ω-sequence of indiscernibles for (Vκ,∈, R)
for any finitary relation R on Vκ. Each such indiscernible σ will determine that (Vσ,∈) ≺
(Vκ,∈) and will have unbounded reflection properties since it is indiscernible all the way
up to Vκ. Secondly, from such cardinal one can construct a countable transitive model
M of ZFC (namely the transitivisation of the Skolem Hull of such an indiscernible set)
and a non-trivial elementary embedding j with j : M −→ M. Now any internal reflection
principle provable in j : V −→ V would then be provable from such j : M −→ M and,
thus, will not break the ηω-barrier. At this point, we can introduce the second theorem of
Peter Koellner:
Theorem 89 (Koellner 091). Γ
(3)
1 − reflection is inconsistent.
So, according to Koellner, linguistic reflection principles can be divided into two classes:
(1) weak: Γ
(2)
n − reflection, for n < ω, (2) inconsistent: Γ(m)n − reflection, for m > 2 and
n ≥ 1. We conclude this section with Koellner words:
Since Γ
(3)




n , this classification is exhaustive
and we have a dichotomy theorem: Reflection principles are either weak or
inconsistent. [Koellner 091]
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4. Welch’s Global Reflection
Welch’s reflection [Welch 12] is very strong and it is able to produce a proper class
of measurable Woodin cardinals, fundamental for Ω-logic. So by examining this kind of
reflection, we are able to overcome the barrier represented by Gödel’s constructible universe.
Welch [Welch 12] uses proper classes (Cantor inconsistent multiplicities) such as ON or V or
Card which cause paradoxes in set theory and cannot be considered as sets. Welch collects
all these classes in C, he considers the global universe (V,∈, C) and he wants to reflect this
global universe down to some initial segments, namely Vα together with the collection of
all its parts (the classes over Vα) which we may identify as Vα+1. The elements of Vα+1
play the role of classes for Vα. Now we can introduce Welch’s Global Reflection:
Definition 102. (Global Reflection) (Welch) There is a κ ∈ ON and there is j 6= id
elementary, crit(j) = κ,
j : (Vκ,∈, Vκ+1) −→ (V,∈, C)
Crit(j) = κ ensures that j(β) = β for any β < κ but κ, as a member of Vκ+1, is sent to
On, as a member of C : j(κ) = On. The elementarity of the embedding ensures that the
embedding preserves the whole structure < κ. This principle of reflection can be applied to
any α. Now suppose that Global reflection principle holds as witnessed by a j with critical
point κ. Define a U on P (κ) by
X ∈ U ↔ κ ∈ j(X)
The strong inaccessibility of κ yields the δ-additivity of U for any δ < κ (all δ take measure
0). U is a non-principal ultrafilter. Thus U witnesses that κ is a measurable cardinal. But
then, as Welch proves assuming Global Reflection,
∀α < κ(V,∈) |= ∃κ > α(κ a measurable cardinal) −→
(Vκ,∈) |= ∀α∃λ > α(λ a measurable cardinal) −→
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(V,∈) |= There is proper class of measurable cardinals). Welch is able to prove the
following Lemma:
Lemma 16. (Global Reflection) (Welch) (V,∈) |= ∀α∃λ > α(λ a measurable Woodin cardinal).
Proof. Let f ∈ κκ ⊆ Vκ+1, be arbitrary and consider f̃ = j(f). Then f̃ = On −→ On;
Range(f̃) ⊆ κ. Take λ > κ a sufficiently large inaccessible, so that f̃ < λ, and consider
the λ-strong extender derived from j:
{a ∈ [λ]<ω : Ea = {z ∈ P ([κ]|a|) : a ∈ j(z)}}
This has the following properties:
Υ = (Ea : a ∈ [λ]<ω) is a (κ, λ)-extender with j(f)(κ) = jΥ(f)(κ) < λ, and such that
Ult((V,∈),Υ) is well-founded and if κ : V −→ N ≡ Ult((V,∈),Υ), is the unique transitivi-
sation collapse map, then Vλ = V
N
λ .
This may be formalised as a first-order property and we abbreviate it as Φ(κ, λ, j(f),Υ).
about the displyed objects. Then:
(V,∈, C) |= ∃α[∃λ∃Υ(Range(j(α)) ⊆ α ∧ Φ(α, λ, j(f),Υ)].
We can shorten this as
(V,∈ C) |= ∃αφ(j(f), α)
and this is a first-order statement about j(f). By Global Reflection Principle:
(Vκ,∈, Vκ+1) |= ∃αφ(f, α).
Thus, α witnesses that κ is a Woodin cardinal in the case of f . Let vary f over κκ and we
can see that κ is Woodin. Thus, we have
(V,∈) |= κ is Woodin cardinal and measurable
and such measurable Woodin cardinals are unbounded in both κ and On. 
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However I believe that we should limit the use of proper classes. In fact, a direct use
of proper classes or sub-classes of proper classes is not a precise mathematical operation.
Taking proper classes or subclasses does not seem a legitimate mathematical operation.
From one side, proper classes cause paradoxes. From the other, arbitrary subclasses of
proper classes are not precise mathematical objects. I think that if we want to take
subclasses of proper classes, we should take only definable subclasses of proper classes. In
chapter 5, I will explain the operation of taking definable subclasses of proper classes and
my attempt to extend the Universe avoiding Cantor’s paradox and Burali-Forti’s paradox.
I prefer to adopt, as we will see in the following chapter, an indirect use of proper classes.
In fact, I believe that we can use proper classes as indexes of iterated structural reflection
relativized to inner models. Surely, also this use can be seen as problematic since proper
classes as indexes can still cause paradoxes. However, in chapter 5, I will try to legitimate
proper classes by extending the universe and attempting to avoid paradoxes.
CHAPTER 3
Structural reflection
0.1. Preliminaries to this chapter. In section 1 I will introduce the notion of
structural reflection. I am going to state a theorem of Joan Bagaria which asserts that
structural reflection produces a proper class of supercompact cardinals and a proper class
of extendible cardinals. This fact is fundamental, since we can interpret a proper class of
supercompact cardinals as principles of reflection and so they can be intrinsically justified.
This aspect is important for second-order arithmetic and Ω-logic (as we have seen). We can
say that structural reflection is an essential feature of the ZFC universe, since Σ1 structural
reflection is provable from the axioms of ZFC. So, structural reflection is a characteristic
of the universe of sets. In this section I will introduce the philosophical concept of richness
which constitutes a justification for structural reflection. When we relativize a class of
structures, that is Π1 definable, to an inner model, we transcend this inner model and so
we have a richer universe. In section 2 I will introduce some well-known canonical inner
models and the concept of relative constructibility, as conceived by Levy. After that, I will
introduce the inner model of measurability and the technique of iterated ultrapowers. In
section 3 I will relativize structural reflection to L and I will show that we can transcend
this inner model by producing 0]. In this section I will explain how to iterate structural
reflection and apply structural reflection to the inner model containing 0], namely L[0]].
Obviously, this operation can be iterated again and the process does not have a bound.
Moreover, I will introduce the finite transcendental structural reflection hierarchy, which
forms a metamathematical sequence of inner models. In section 4 I will introduce briefly
the theory of 0† and I will relativize structural reflection to the model L[U ]. Also in this
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case, when we relativize structural reflection to L[U ], we transcend this inner model, thus
producing 0†. In section 5 I will describe a canonical inner model for a strong cardinal and
I will relativize structural reflection to this model, thus producing the sharp for this inner
model, namely 0¶. Also in this case, we transcend the inner model containing a strong
cardinal. In section 6 I will discuss Woodin’s HOD conjecture. Then, I will introduce the
Wholeness axioms [Corazza 00]. In section 7, I will introduce Woodin’s Ultimate L model.
I will conclude this chapter by discussing the philosophy of mathematics that I sustain
(section 8).
1. Structural reflection and the philosophical concept of richness
According to Gödel, the fundamental guiding principle in setting up new axioms of set
theory is the unknowability of the absolute, and so any new axiom should be based on
such principle [Wang 96]. Gödel’s program consisted, therefore, in formulating stronger
and stronger systems of set theory by adding to the base theory new principles. So the
question is how should one understand and formulate the idea of reflection embodied in
Ackermann’s principle [Bagaria 13]. Some light is provided by the following quote of Gödel
where he asserts that the indefinability of V should be the source of all axioms of infinity.
Generally, I believe that, in the last analysis, every axiom of infinity should
be derivable from the (extremely plausible) principle that V is indefinable,
where definability is to be taken in a more and more generalised and ide-
alised sense. [Wang 96]
One possible interpretation of Gödel’s principle of the indefinability of V is an unrestricted
version of the Levy-Montague reflection theorem. Namely, every formula, with parameters,
in any formal language with the membership relation, that holds in V, must also hold in
some Vα. This has been indeed the usual way to interpret Gödel’s view of reflection as
a justification for the axioms of large cardinals [Bagaria 13]. In a recent article, Peter
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Koellner, as we have already seen, actually identifies reflection principles with generalised
forms of the Levy-Montague reflection theorem:
Reflection principles aim at articulating the informal idea that the height of
the universe is absolutely infinite and hence cannot be characterised from
below. These principles assert that any statement true in V is true in some
smaller Vα. [Koellner 091]
Koellner explicitly interprets Gödel’s view of reflection as a source of large cardinals in this
way:
Since the most natural way to assert that V is undefinable is via reflec-
tion principles and since to assert this in a more and more generalised and
idealised sense is to move to languages of higher order with higher order pa-
rameters, Gödel is espousing the view that higher-order reflection principles
imply all large cardinals axioms. [Koellner 091]
The main problem of the program of finding an intrinsic justification of large cardinal
axioms via principles of reflection lies, we believe, on a too restrictive interpretation of
the notion of reflection according to which the reflection properties of V are exhausted by
generalised forms of Levy-Montague reflection theorem to higher order logics. Thus, we
should think about a different way to conceive reflection principles as Bagaria [Bagaria 10]
[Bagaria 13] and Welch [Welch 12] did (we have already seen the case of Welch’s global
reflection principle). Furthermore, we might interpret in a different way another claim of
Gödel:
The universe of sets cannot be uniquely characterised (i.e., distinguished
from all its initial segments) by any internal structural property of the mem-
bership relation in it which is expressible in any logic of finite or transfinite
type, including infinitary logics of any cardinal number. [Wang 96]
Bagaria interprets this Gödel’s quotation in the following sense:
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This does not immediately suggest that the uncharacterizability of V should
be interpreted in the sense of Levy-Montague kind of reflection. Rather,
what the quote seems to suggest is some sort of reflection, not (only) of
formulas, but of structural properties of the membership relation. Thus,
what one would like to reflect is not the theory of V, but rather the structural
content of V [Bagaria 13]
At this point, we can try to clarify what one may mean by reflecting an internal structural
property of the membership relation by following Bagaria’s thought. We could answer that
it is a property of some structure of the form (X,∈, (Ri)i∈I), where X is a set or a proper
class and (Ri)i∈I is a family of relations on X, and where I is a set that may be empty. So,
an internal structural property of ∈ would be formally given by a formula φ(x), possibly
with parameters, that defines a class of structures of the form (X,∈, (Ri)i∈I). We might
interpret this fact by saying that there exists an ordinal α that reflects φ and such that for
every structure A in the class (that is, for every structure A that satisfies φ) there exists
a structure B also in the class which belongs to Vα and is like A. Since, in general, A may
be much larger than any B in Vα, the closest resemblance of B to A will be attained in
the case that B can be elementarily embedded into A . Thus we can now formulate the
principle of structural reflection as follows:
Definition 103. (Bagaria) (Structural reflection) (SR) For every definable (in the
first order language of set theory, with parameters) class of structures C of the form (X,∈
, (Ri)i∈I), there exists α such that α reflects C, i.e. C
Vα = C ∩ Vα and for every A in C
there exists B in C ∩ Vα and an elementary embedding from B into A.
We must notice that if C is a set, then the principle becomes trivial. Thus, we should
assume that the SR principle is for proper classes of structures. Bagaria [Bagaria 13]
formulates the SR principle in the first-order language of set theory as an axiom schema,
to wit an axiom, for each natural number n.
1. STRUCTURAL REFLECTION AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF RICHNESS 147
Definition 104 (Bagaria 10). Σn structural reflection (Σn − SR) : for every Σn
definable, with parameters, class C of structures of the form (X,∈, ....), there exists and
ordinal α that reflects C.
Πn-SR is defined analogously. The first observation is that Σ1-SR is provable in ZFC.
Theorem 90 (Bagaria 10). Σ1-SR holds. In fact every uncountable cardinal κ with
Vκ = Hκ and such that Vκ contains the parameters of some Σ1 definition of a given class
C of structures reflects C.
But Π1-SR is already very strong. We have the following
Theorem 91 (Bagaria 10). the following are equivalent :
1) Π1-SR
2) Σ2-SR
3) There exists a proper class of supercompact cardinals.
For the next level of complexity we have the following:
Theorem 92 (Bagaria 10). the following are equivalent:
1) Π2-SR
2) Σ3-SR
3) There exists a proper class of extendible cardinals.
Now it is the moment to discuss an important issue concerning structural reflection.
If we apply structural reflection to classes of structures relativised to inner models like
L,L[0]], L[U ], L[0†],etc., we are able to obtain transcendence over inner models. At this
point I want to introduce a new concept, namely richness. Transcendence over inner
models points out to richness. If we have Π1-classes of structures definable in V, we may
relativise them to inner models such as L, inner models of iterated sharps, inner model of
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measurability, etc. By doing this we produce the specific sharp and we transcend these inner
models. This process can be ascribed to the philosophical concept of richness. Richness
can be seen as a kind of justification for structural reflection principles, since when we
transcend inner models, we obtain a richer and bigger universe. In fact, the philosophical
concept of richness may be seen as a justification of structural reflection principles since,
as Penelope Maddy [Maddy 97] argues, we should always prefer axioms or principles that
give us a richer picture of the universe of sets. Structural reflection seems to imply that
the universe of sets is essentially uniform. In fact, Bagaria’s structural reflection seems to
imply that structures, which are located lower in the hierarchy of the universe, resemble
structures which are higher in the universe. Since structural reflection applies to classes
of structures within inner models, instead of writing SR(C) we can write directly SR(M)
by meaning that we are applying structural reflection to classes of structures within the
inner model M. Later we will prove a theorem (general case) discovered by Joan Bagaria,
namely:
Theorem 93 (Bagaria 13). The following are equivalent for any set of ordinals X:
(1) SR(C), where C is the Π1 definable class of structures of the form (Lα[X],∈, β), where
α > β and are cardinals in (V)
(2) SR(C) for any definable (in V), with parameter X, class of structures C, C ⊆ L[X]
i.e., SR(L[X]).
(3) X] exists.
Following similar arguments, we may obtain the following:
(1) SR(L) if and only if 0] exists
(2) SR(L[0]]) if and only if 0]] exists
(3) SR(L[U]) if and only if 0† exists
(4) SR(L[U ][0†]) if and only if 0†† exists.
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I sustain weak metamathematical potentialism concerning the universe of sets. We may
introduce the following hypothesis: If we relativize Π1 structural reflection to any inner
model that contains no supercompact cardinal we get transcendence over this inner model.
In contrast, by the closure properties of a weak extender model for a supercompact cardi-
nal, if we relativize Π1 structural reflection to this inner model, we do not get transcendence
over it. This is a plausible conjecture that I will discuss in the section devoted to Woodin’s
Ultimate L. We will argue that by using a theorem of Woodin [Woodin 10b], when we
apply Π1 structural reflection to a weak extender model for a supercompact cardinal we do
not get transcendence over this model. This is a general hypothesis, since we do not know
if in the future we will discover new cardinals strictly less than a supercompact cardinal
whose inner models will have closure properties similar to a weak extender model for a
supercompact cardinal. We can speak of weak metamathematical potentialism concerning
Π1 structural reflection relativized to inner models. I said metamathematical potentialism
because when we relativize Π1 structural reflection to inner models containing cardinals
strictly less than a supercompact cardinal, we obtain transcendence over these inner mod-
els and we do not have a resting point. I said weak because when we reach the level of a
supercompact cardinal and we have a weak extender model N, for the closure properties of
this inner model we do not get transcendence over this inner model. In order to understand
these results regarding structural reflection applied to inner models which produces sharps,
in the Appendix I present the theory of Silver indiscernibles. In the next sections, I will
speak about inner models and then I will focus my attention on the theory of 0†.
2. Beginning inner model theory
The minimal inner model is L, and L ⊆ M for any inner model M since LM = L 1.
Andras Hajnal and Azriel Levy in their doctoral dissertations developed basic generaliza-
tions of L which are the basis for the construction of inner models beyond L. For a given
1see [Kanamori 09]
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set A the constructible closure L(A), i.e., the smallest inner model M such that A ⊆ M .
L(R) is an example of this kind of construction. More precisely: given A define
1) L0(A) = tc(A)
2) Lα+1(A) = Def(Lα(A))
3)Lγ(A) =
⋃




Although L(A) is indeed an inner model, unless tc(A) has a well-ordering in L(A), L(A)
does not satisfy the axiom of choice. |Lα(A)| = |tc(A)|. |α|, for α ≥ ω, a result established
by induction on α.
Levy introduced also for a given set A, the inner model L[A] of sets constructible relative
to A, i.e. the smallest inner model M such that for every x ∈ M , A ∩ x ∈ M . For the
inner model program, Levy’s construction is fundamental as we will see. The idea is to
define a relativised hierarchy where assertion about membership in A can be made of sets
defined so far, such as within Gödel’s constructible universe. This construction implies a
strict form of predicativism. Let:
DefA(x) = {y ⊆ x|y is definable over (x,∈, A ∩ x)}
making A ∩ x available as a unary relation for definitions. In analogy with L, one defines
the following hierarchy:
1)L0[A] = ∅
2) Lα+1[A] = Def
A(Lα[A])
3) Lγ [A] =
⋃




Unlike the case of L(A), in the case of L[A] what remains of A is only A∩L[A]. However,
L[A] is more constructive since knowledge of A is incorporated through the hierarchy of
definitions, and like L, L[A] satifies the axiom of choice. Here we have |Lα[A]| = |α| for
α ≥ ω, a result established by induction on α.
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One fundamental aspect of the theory of large cardinals was the investigation of the small-
est inner models in which they maintain their essential features. The first milestone of the
inner model program was the construction of inner models of measurability.
Gödel’s fundamental work on L is the beginning of the inner model program. For large
cardinals like inaccessible, reflecting, Mahlo, ηω-Erdös and weakly compact cardinals, the
corresponding inner model is L itself. Scott’s result that measurable cardinals contradict
V = L forced mathematicians to think about inner models for measurability, first consid-
ered by Solovay. Let U be a κ-complete, nonprincipal ultrafilter over κ > ω. Since the mea-
surability of κ implies the introduction of the set U (the ultrafilter), Solovay took in consid-
eration L[U ], Levy’s inner model of sets constructible relative to U . U∗ = U ∩L[U ] ∈ L[U ]
and so L[U∗] = L[U ], and the following hold:
Theorem 94. (Solovay) [Jech 06] L[U ] |= U∗ is a κ-complete ultrafilter over κ.
Theorem 95. (Solovay) [Jech 06] If U is normal, then L[U ] |= U∗is normal.
Thus, κ is measurable in L[U ], and like L with respect to ZF, it is consistent with κ
being measurable that V = L[U ], so that U could have been U∗ all along. Focusing on
these inner models of measurability, (L[U ],∈, U) is a κ-model iff (L[U ],∈, U) |= ”U is a
normal ultrafilter over κ”. Thus, U ∈ L[U ] is incorporated from the beginning as a unary
relation. Then U ∈ L[U ] implies L[U ]L[U ] = L[U ] and hence that L[U ] |= V = L[U ].
Theorem 96. (Solovay) [Kanamori 09] Suppose that (L[U ],∈, U) is a κ-model. Then
the following hold in L[U ]:
1) ∀γ ≥ κ(2γ = γ+)
2) κ is the only measurable cardinal.
Silver obtained the first substantial result on κ-models, namely:
Theorem 97. (Silver) [Kanamori 09] Suppose that (L[U ],∈, U) is a κ-model. then
L[U ] |= GCH.
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At this point, in order to understand Kunen’s result, we have to introduce the concept
of iterated ultrapowers2. Let κ be a measurable cardinal and let U be a κ-complete non-
principal ultrafilter on κ. Using U , we construct an ultrapower of V, modulo U; and since
the ultrapower is well-founded, we identify the ultrapower with its transitive collapse, a
transitive model M ∼= UltU (V ). Let us denote this transitive model by Ult1U (V ), or just
Ult1. Let j0 = jU be the canonical embedding of V in Ult
1, and let κ1 = j0(κ) and
U1 = j0(U).
In the model Ult1, the ordinal κ1 is a measurable ordinal and U1 is a κ1-complete ultrafilter
on κ1. Thus, working inside Ult1, we can construct an ultrapower mod U1: UltU1(Ult
1).
Let us denote this ultrapower Ult2, and let j1 be the canonical embedding of Ult1 in Ult2
given by this ultrapower. Let κ2 = j1(κ1) and U2 = j1(U1).
We can continue this procedure and obtain transitive models: Ult1, Ult2, ..........., Ult(n). (n <
ω).
Thus we get a sequence of models Ult(n), n < ω (where Ult(0) = V ). For any n < m, we
have an elementary embedding in,m : Ult
(n) −→ Ult(m) which is the composition of the
embeddings j(n), j(n+1)....., j(m−1):
in,m(x) = j
(m−1)j(m−2).....j(n)(x) (x ∈ Ult(n)).
These embeddings form a commutative system; that is :
im,κ × in,m = in,κ (m < n < κ).
We also let κ(n) = i0,n(κ), and U
(n) = i0,n(U). Note that κ
(0) < κ(1) < κ(2) < ......... <
κ(n).., and Ult(0) ⊃ Ult(1) ⊃ Ult(2) ⊃ ........ ⊃ Ult(n), .....
Theorem 98. (Kunen) [Jech 06] 1) If V = L[U ] and U is a normal measure on κ,
then κ is the only measurable cardinal and U is the only normal measure on κ.
2) For every ordinal κ, there is at most one U ⊂ P (κ) such that U ∈ L[U ] and L[U ] |=
”U is a normal measure on κ”.
2See [Jech 06]
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3) If κ1 < κ2 are ordinals and if U1, U2 are such that L[Ui] |= ”Ui is a normal measure




(L[U1]), and U2 = i0,α(U1).
There are three kinds of inner models that occur in inner model theory: coarse inner
models, fine-structural inner models, and core models. Historically, for a given large car-
dinal hypothesis, a coarse inner model was first discovered, and this served as a precursor
to the more involved fine-structural inner model, which in turn served to the even more
involved core model.
Since we have studied before coarse inner model with one measurable cardinal, the next
natural step is to construct a coarse inner model with more than one measurable cardinal.
Models of the form L[U ] are unsuited for this purpose since (as we have seen before, by
Kunen’s theorem) they can contain at most one measurable cardinal. Instead, the right
thing to do is replace U with a sequence W of normal measures U , each of which witnesses
the measurability of a different measurable cardinal in V. The next step is to ensure that
one can capture measurable cardinals of high-order and this requires allowing W to contain
many measures concentrating on a single cardinal. Mitchell developed this theory in 1974
and constructed the model L[W ] with many measures on a single cardinal.
3. Relativising structural reflection to inner models
Structural reflection produces a proper class of supercompact cardinals. Now we can
ask ourselves if structural reflection can produce other large cardinal notions. Since Π1−SR
implies already the existence of a proper class of supercompact cardinals, we must look for
particular Π1-definable classes (with parameters) of structures relativised to inner models.
So, we might consider the principle of structural reflection restricted to particular definable
classes of structures. Recall:
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Definition 105 (Bagaria 13). Structural reflection for C (SR(C)): There exists an
ordinal α that reflects C, where C is Π1 class of structures definable (with parameters) in
V. For every A in C relativized to the canonical inner model M, there exists B in C ∩Mα
and an elementary embedding j from B into A.
At this point we can apply structural reflection to L and 0]. Let C be the class of
structures of the form (Lβ,∈, γ), where γ and β are cardinals (in V) and γ < β. Clearly,
C is Π1 definable (without parameters).
Theorem 99 (Bagaria 13). 1) SR(C)3 if and only if 0]exists.
(2) 0] implies SR(D), for all classes D of structures of the same type that are definable in
L.
Proof. (1): Suppose first that α reflects C. Pick cardinals γ and β, with γ a cardinal
in V, such that α < γ < β. Then there are cardinals γ′ and β′, with γ′ a cardinal in V and
γ′ < β′ < α, and an elementary embedding :
j : (Lβ′ ,∈, γ′) −→ (Lβ,∈, γ)
Since j(γ′) = γ, j is not the identity. Let κ be the critical point of j. Thus, κ ≤ γ′ < β.
Hence by Kunen’s theorem (see [Kanamori 09], 21.1) 0] exists.
Now suppose that 0] exists. Let α be a limit cardinal in V. We claim that α reflects C. For
suppose (Lβ,∈, γ) ∈ C with α ≤ β. Let γ′ and β′ be cardinals in V such that γ′ < β′ < α
and γ′ ≤ γ. Let I denote the class of Silver indiscernibles. Let j : I ∩ [γ′, β′] −→ I ∩ [γ, β]
be order preserving such that j(γ′) = γ and J(β′) = β . Then J generates an elementary
embedding:
j : (Lβ′ ,∈, γ′) −→ (Lβ,∈, γ)
3For what we said before, we can write SR(L) implying that we are speaking of classes of structures
relativised to L.
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as required.
(2) Fix a D and a formula φ(x), possibly with ordinals α0 < ...... < αm as parameters, that
defines it in L. Let κ be a limit of Silver indiscernibles greater than αm and such that κ
is correct for D, that is, if A ∈ Vκ, then φ(A) holds if and only if Vκ |= φ(A). We claim
that κ reflects D. For suppose B ∈ D. Without loss of generality, B /∈ Lκ. Since 0] holds
there exists an increasing sequence of Silver indiscernibles i0, ......, in, in+1, with κ ≤ in and
a formula ψ(y, z0......zn), without parameters, such that
B = {y : Lin+1 |= ψ(y, i0......, in)}
Choose indiscernibles j0 < ....... < jn < jn+1 < κ with αm < j0 and let
A = {y : Ljn+1 |= ψ(y, j0, ....jn)}
Thus A ∈ Lκ . We have that L |= φ(B). That is
L |= ∀x(∀y(y ∈ x↔ Lin+1 |= ψ(y, i0, ...in)) −→ φ(x))
By indiscernibility,
L |= ∀x(∀y(y ∈ x↔ Ljn+1 |= ψ(y, j0, ...jn)) −→ φ(x))
which implies L |= φ(A), i.e A ∈ D.
Let j : L −→ L be an elementary embedding that sends iκ to jκ, all κ ≤ n + 1. Then by
indiscernibility, the map j|A : A −→ B is an elementary embedding. 
The following theorem gives a similar result, relativised to any set of ordinals.
Theorem 100 (Bagaria 13). SR(L[X]) iff X] exists (for any set X of ordinals).
Now we are in a position to apply structural reflection to L[0]], namely the inner model
containing 0]. Let C be the class of structures of the form (L[0]]β,∈, γ), where γ and β
are cardinals (in V) and γ < β.
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Lemma 17. SR(L[0]])) if and only if 0]]exists.
These arguments suggest that when we apply structural reflection to class of structures
relativised to inner models, we obtain always a transcendence over inner models. As ex-
amples, we have the following:
SR(L[0]]]) if and only if 0]]] exists.
SR(L[0]]]]) if and only if 0]]]] exists, etc.
It is possible to consider structural reflection as a transcendental successor function
with respect to inner models. When we apply structural reflection to an inner model, we
obtain a sharp that points out to the fact that we transcend the inner model and that the
inner model itself is not rigid (there is an embedding of the inner model into itself). For
example:
(1) SR (L) if and only if 0]1 = 0] exists
(2) SR(L[0]1]) if and only if 0]2 exists.
The simpler hierarchy of sharps mirrors this hierarchy in the following sense:
(1) 0]1 = 0]
(2) 0](α+1) = (0]α)]
(3) If α is a limit ordinal then 0]α represents (0]γ : γ < α)
Thinking about the partial hierarchy of structural reflection, we should ask ourselves what
all these sharps are. The answer is simple: these sharps are sets of ordinals. So when
we apply structural reflection to an inner model, we are adding a set of ordinals to the
metamathematical sequence of these inner models. In fact by transcending an inner model,
we are producing a sharp (a set of ordinals) that belongs to the sequence. Then we form
an inner model containing this sharp and by applying structural reflection to this inner
model, we transcend this inner model again and we produce another sharp. We have two
operations, namely transcending inner models by applying structural reflection to them
and then forming a new inner model by using the sharp produced by structural reflection
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in the precedent operation. But by applying structural reflection to inner models, we are
adding sets of ordinals to this sequence of inner models.
Now we are in a position to conceive the total transcendental hierarchy. We have to intro-
duce the following two operations: InnM,α which applied to a specific sharp, produces an
inner model containing this sharp and SR(structural reflection), which applied to an inner
model, produces a sharp and so a transcendence over this inner model (the successor stage).
Structural reflection can be seen as an analogous operation to the power set operation in
Von Neumann’s cumulative hierarchy. However, with structural reflection we are in the
realm of metamathematics.
The transcendental hierarchy is shaped in the following way:
(1) InnM,0(0],0) = L
(2) SR(0],0) = SR(L) if and only if 0]1 exists
(3) InnM,1(0],1) = L[0]1]
(4) SR (InnM,1(0],1)) = SR(L[0]1]) if and only if 0]2 exists.
(5) InnM,2(0],2) = L[0],2].
The precedent hierarchy highlights that in this sequence of inner models we have two fun-
damental operations, namely the application of structural reflection to inner models and
the operation of forming a new inner model containing the sharp produced by structural
reflection. These two operations mirror Cantor’s distinction.
4. The Core Model and Structural Reflection
The first core model was Dodd and Jensen’s construction, namely KDJ . This model
(the core model up to a measurable cardinal) is an inner model that contains much of the
large cardinals below a measurable cardinal. It is characterized by the following features:
(1) KDJ has a definable well-ordering, satisfies GCH and some combinatorial principles
such as . (2) There is a non-trivial elementary embedding j : KDJ −→ KDJ if and only
if L[U ] exists, (3) If L[U ] does not exist then the Covering theorem (we will see this later)
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holds for KDJ .





Let us define the notion of a mouse (mice are the building blocks of KDJ):
Definition 106. A mouse is a transitive model M = LUα such that:
(1) U is a normal κ-complete iterable M-ultrafilter on some κ < α.
(2) All iterated ultrapowers of LUα by U are well-founded.
(3) M = HM1 (γ ∪ ρ) for some γ < κ and some finite ρ ⊂ α.
Now we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 101 (Dodd Jensen 81). We have the following:
(1) KDJ is an inner model of ZFC and has a Σ2 well-ordering.
(2) KDJ satisfies GCH.
(3) RDJ has a Σ13 well-ordering.
(4) KK = K, and KV [G] = K for every generic extension.
(5) In KDJ , L[U ] does not exist.
(6) If 0] does not exist then K = L. If 0] exists then 0] ∈ KDJ . More generally, for every
x ∈ KDJ , if x] exists then x] ∈ KDJ .
Lemma 18 (Dodd Jensen 81). A mouse exists if and only if 0] exists.
Lemma 19 (Dodd Jensen 81). If mice exist then KDJ =
⋃
{M : is a mouse}.
The Covering theorem implies that if L[U ] does not exist (the sharp for KDJ), then
KDJ is very close to V.
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Theorem 102 (Dodd Jensen 81). The following are equivalent:
(1) L[U ] exists.
(2) There exists a non-trivial elementary embedding j : KDJ −→ KDJ .
Theorem 103. (The Covering theorem) [Dodd Jensen 81] If L[U ] does not exist, then
for every uncountable set X of ordinals there exists a set Y,withX ⊂ Y in KDJ such that
|Y | = |X|.
A mouse can be iterated. Furthermore, [Schimmerling 01] the theory of embeddings
L[0]] −→ L[0]](0]] exists) and the iterated mice M ]]0 run parallel. We may define the iter-
ated mice M ].....]0 . If 0
] exists then a mouse M ]0 exists for Dodd Jensen theorem. Moreover,
if 0]] exists then the iterated mouse M ]]0 exists and so on. At this point, let’s reintroduce
the structural reflection. Let’s consider the finite structural reflection hierarchy, namely
SR<ω. At this point, we can simplify and reformulate the finite structural reflection hier-
archy in the following way, for n < ω:
(A)SR0 = InnM,0 = L.
(B)
SRn+1 =
 SR(L[0]n]) = 0]n+1InnM,n+1[0]n+1] = L[0]n+1]
In the finite structural reflection hierarchy, the first step is the construction of Gödel’s
constructible universe, namely L. The successor stage within this hierarchy is constituted by
two steps. The first step is the application of structural reflection to a specific inner model
producing a sharp and the second step it is the formation of the inner model by adopting
the operation InnM,n containing that sharp. So we have two steps at successor stage.
In fact, the successor stage is constituted by two passages, namely applying structural
reflection to inner model and, then, forming the inner model that contains the sharp
obtained by the precedent step. We should ask ourselves what is the relationship between
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the finite structural reflection hierarchy, namely SR<ω and the core model. Now we state
the following theorem:
Theorem 104. The finite structural reflection hierarchy, namely SR<ω, is properly
contained in KDJ and the finite structural reflection hierarchy is equivalent to the hierarchy
of iterated mice within KDJ
Proof. Assume that Π1 structural reflection relativized to L holds. Then we produce
0]. Then iterate this operation and form the finite structural reflection hierarchy, namely
SR<ω. Relativize the finite structural reflection hierarchy to KDJ . Since by Dodd and
Jensen theorem, for every x ∈ KDJ , if x] exists then x] ∈ KDJ , the finite structural
reflection hierarchy is properly contained in KDJ . The successor step in the structural
reflection produces a sharp that is equivalent by Dodd and Jensen theorem to the formation
of a mouse M ]0. If we iterate the structural reflection operation, we produce 0
]], which is
equivalent to the iterated mouse M ]]0 . Thus, the finite structural reflection hierarchy,
namely SR<ω, is equivalent to the hierarchy of iterated mice within KDJ . 
The interesting aspect of this theorem is that the structural reflection hierarchy, which
is external to KDJ since we pick always cardinals in V, is equivalent to the hierarchy of
mice which is internal to KDJ . Thus, by assuming the finite structural reflection hierarchy,
namely SR<ω, although each embedding implies that we pick cardinals in V, we are working
inside KDJ . At this point, we can state a conjecture that establishes an equivalency
between structural reflection and determinacy. This equivalency is based on some results
obtained by Italy Neeman [Neeman 06]. First of all, we must clarify some notations.
By Gω(A) we denote the length ω game with payoff A and by W (B) we mean the set
{x ∈ R| player 1 has a winning strategy in Gω(Bx)}. For determinacy, see chapter 1 of
this dissertation section 3.
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Theorem 105 (Neeman 06). Let Bi(i < ω) be a recursive enumeration of the W
(n)(<
ω2 − Π11) sets. Then the sharp for n Woodin cardinals and { i | player 1 has a winning
strategy in Gω(Bi)} are each recursive in the other.
Now we can state the Structural Reflection Conjecture:
(SRC) For every natural number n, one can build a canonical inner model K for n-Woodin
cardinals, so that some form of structural reflection for this K is equivalent to Π1n+1-
determinacy.
We may say that this conjecture (if true) could represent a case for philosophical realism.
In fact, if we prove this conjecture, we will establish equivalencies between embeddings of
structures and infinite games. Thus, departing from different points within the mathemat-
ical universe, we describe the same mathematical objects. This conjecture seems to suggest
that mathematical objects are independent from human mind since by adopting very dif-
ferent theories, we describe the same objects. Even if we adopt different descriptions, we
have always the same mathematical objects.
5. The theory of 0†
Having developed a detailed analysis of the transcendence over L, we consider a canon-
ical formulation of transcendence over inner models of measurability. If (L[U ],∈, U) is a
κ-model for some ordinal κ, then there exists under sufficient assumptions a set U ] ⊆ κ anal-
ogous to 0] that generates a closed unbounded class of indiscernibles for (L[U ],∈, U, γ)γ≤κ
. However, because the κ-models for various κ are merely iterates of each other, one might
expect a unifying transcendence principle. In fact, soon after the isolation of 0], Solovay
formulated such a principle: the existence of the set of integers 0† (zero-dagger) [Kanamori
09]. The theory of 0† is specular in many aspects to the theory of 0]. The idea behind
0† is to develop a canonical theory for structures of form (L[U ],∈, U) |= ”U is a normal
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ultrafilter over κ”, with two sets of indiscernibles, one below κ and one above, that to-
gether generate the structure. For M a structure and X and Y subsets of the domain M so
that X ∪ Y is linearly ordered by a relation <, (X,Y,<) is a double set of indiscernibles
for M iff for every formula φ(σ1, .....σn+s) in the language of M; x1 < ......... < xn and
γ1 < ......... < γn all in X; and y1 < ....... < ys and β1 < ....... < βs all in Y,
M |= φ(x1, ......xn, y1......ys) if and only if M |= φ(γ1........γn, β1.......βs). Let the language
L∗ be the language of set theory, together with a predicate for U , augmented by constants
(cε|ε ∈ ω) ∪ (dε|ε ∈ ω).
A remarkable well-founded model is the theory in L∗ of some structure (Lγ [U ],∈, U, xε, yε)ε∈ω
where γ is a limit ordinal greater than ω; for some ordinal κ, (Lγ [U ],∈, U) |= U is a nor-
mal ultrafilter over κ; and (xε|ε ∈ ω), (yε|ε ∈ ω) is a double set of ordinal indiscernibles for
(Lγ [U ],∈, U) such that for every ε ∈ ω,
xε < xε+1 < κ < yε < yε+1
The canonical Skolem terms tφ for φ a formula of L
∗ and corresponding Skolem Hulls
are equal to those formed for the theory of 0] (that we have examined in the precedent
sections). So 0† exists if there is a remarkable well-founded model for inner models of
measurability. Now we can state the following fundamental theorem proved by Solovay.
Theorem 106. (Solovay) [Kanamori 09] (1) 0†exists iff there is a κ-model for some
ordinal κ that has un uncountable set of indiscernibles whose minimum element is greater
than κ. Hence, if there is a κ-model for some κ and a Ramsey cardinal greater than κ,
then 0† exists.
(2) 0† exists iff for every uncountable cardinal λ, there is a λ-model and a double class
(X,Y) of indiscernibles for it such that : X ⊆ λ is closed and unbounded, Y ⊆ On− (λ+1)
is a closed unbounded class, X∪{λ}∪Y contains every uncountable cardinal and the Skolem
hull of X ∪ Y in the λ model is again in the model.
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Since the theory of 0† is similar to the theory of 0], Solovay obtained the following
theorem:
Theorem 107. (Solovay)[Kanamori 09] 0† is absolute for transitive models of ZF.
Theorem 108. (Solovay) [Kanamori 09] The following are equivalent :
(1) 0† exists.
(2) There is a κ-model for some κ and an elementary embedding of that model into itself
with critical point greater than κ.
Therefore if 0† exists, V = L[U ] fails. Now we are in a position to apply structural
reflection to the model L[U ].
Theorem 109. Let C be the class of structures of the form (L[U ]β,∈, γ) where β and
γ are cardinals (in V) and γ < β. Being U a predicate, C is Π1 definable, with parameter
U . Then SR(L[U]) if and only if 0† exists.
Proof. Suppose first that α reflects C where β, γ are cardinals in V and γ < β. Pick
cardinals γ and β, with γ a cardinal in V, such that α < γ < β. Then there are cardinals
γ′ and β′, with γ′ a cardinal in V and γ′ < β′ < α, and an elementary embedding
J : (L[U ]β′ ,∈, γ′) −→ (L[U ]β,∈, γ)
Since J(γ′) = γ, J is not the identity. Let κ be the critical point of J . Thus, κ ≤ γ′ < β′.
Hence by an application of Kunen’s theorem to L[U ] (see [Kanamori 09] 21.1) 0† exists.
Now suppose that 0† exists. κ is a measurable cardinal and L[U ] is the inner model for κ.
I is a closed unbounded set of indiscernibles below κ and J is a closed unbounded class of
indiscernibles above κ such that I ∪ J contains all uncountable cardinals except κ. Every
set X ∈ L[U ] is definable in L[U ] from I ∪ J and the elements of I ∪ J are indiscernibles
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for L[U ]. The truth value of
L[U ] |= φ(α1, ........., αn, β1, .......βm)
is independent of the choice of α1 < ....... < αn ∈ I and β1 < ...... < βm ∈ J . Every set in
L[U ] is definable from I ∪ J . If a ∈ L[U ], there exists an increasing sequence (γ1, .......γn)
of Silver indiscernibles and a formula φ such that
L[U ] |= a is the unique x such that φ(x, γ1, ....., γn).
Let α be a limit ordinal in V. We claim that α reflects C (Π1 definable class of structures in
V). Fix a set of indiscernibles S below κ such that S is a proper subset of I, namely S ⊂ I and
|S| < |α|. Let γ′ and β′ cardinals in V and let {γ′, β′} ∩ S 6= ∅. Suppose (L[U ]β,∈, γ) ∈ C
with α ≤ β. Now let γ′ and β′ be cardinals in V such that γ′ < β′ < α and γ′ ≤ γ . Let β
and γ cardinals in V such that {β, γ}∩{I∪J} 6= ∅. Let J : S∩(γ′, β′) −→ {I∪J}∩(γ, β) be
order preserving and such that J(γ′) = γ and J(β′) = β. Then J generates an elementary
embedding
J : (L[U ]β′ ,∈, γ′) −→ (L[U ]β,∈, γ)
as required. 
There is a difference between external structural reflection where we take classes of
structures definable in V which, then, are relativized to a canonical inner model and inner
structural reflection where we take classes definable within a specific inner model. The
following theorem points out to inner model-theoretic structural reflection.
Theorem 110. 0† exists implies SR(D), for all classes of structures of the same type
that are definable in L[U ], being U a predicate, D is definable, with parameter U .
Proof. Suppose that 0† exists. κ is a measurable cardinal and L[U ] is the inner model
for κ. I is a closed unbounded set of indiscernibles below κ and J is a closed unbounded
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class of indiscernibles above κ such that I ∪ J contains all uncountable cardinals except
κ. Every set X ∈ L[U ] is definable in L[U ] from I ∪ J and the elements of I ∪ J are
indiscernibles for L[U ]. The truth value of
L[U ] |= φ(α1, ........., αn, β1, .......βm)
is independent of the choice of α1 < ....... < αn ∈ I and β1 < ...... < βm ∈ J . Every set in
L[U ] is definable from I ∪ J . If a ∈ L[U ], there exists an increasing sequence (γ1, .......γn)
of Silver indiscernibles and a formula φ such that
L[U ] |= a is the unique x such that φ(x, γ1, ....., γn).
Fix D and a formula φ(x), possibly with ordinals α0, ........, αm as parameters, that defines
it in L[U ]. Let σ be a limit of Silver indiscernibles greater than αm and such that σ is
correct for D, namely, if A ∈ Vσ, then φ(A) holds if and only if Vσ |= φ(A). We claim
that σ reflects D. For suppose B ∈ D. Without loss of generality, B 6∈ L[U ]σ. Since
0† holds, there exist two increasing sequences of indiscernibles: i0, ........, in, in+1 ∈ I and
b0, ......, bn, bn+1 ∈ J with σ ≤ bn. Fix a set of indiscernibles S below κ such that S is a
proper subset of I, namely S ⊂ I and |S| < |σ|. Let be that in S there exists an increasing
sequence of indiscernibles j0, ......., jn, jn+1 with αm < j0. Now there exists a formula
ψ(y, z0, ....., zn) without parameters, such that
B = {y : L[U ]bn+1 |= ψ(y, i0, ......, in, ....., b0, ........, bn)}
Now pick indiscernibles j0, ......jn, jn+1 ∈ S so that j0 < ....... < jn < jn+1 < σ with
αm < j0 and let
A = {y : Ljn+1 |= ψ(y, j0, .....jn)}
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Thus A ∈ L[U ]σ. We have that L[U ] |= φ(B). That is,
L[U ] |= ∀x(∀y(y ∈ x↔ L[U ]bn+1 |= ψ(y, i0, ...., in, ......, b0, ..., bn)) −→ φ(x)).
By indiscernebility,
L[U ] |= ∀x(∀y(y ∈ x↔ L[U ]jn+1 |= ψ(y, j0, ....., jn)) −→ φ(x)).
which implies L[U ] |= φ(A), i. e., A ∈ D.
let J : L[U ] −→ L[U ] be an elementary embedding that sends bσ or iσ to jσ, all σ ≤ n+ 1.
Then by indiscernibility, the map J |A : A −→ B is an elementary embedding. 
The theory of structural reflection applied to L[U ] is similar to the theory of structural
reflection applied to L. Therefore when we form the model L[0†] and we apply structural
reflection to it, we obtain the following result: SR(L[0†]) if and only if 0†† exists. By intro-
ducing the operation InnM and by interpreting structural reflection as the transcendental
successor function (as we have seen before ), we can form the finite structural reflection
hierarchy, namely SR<ω
0†
. The first step of this hierarchy is L[U ]. We can formulate the
finite structural reflection hierarchy for daggers in the following way, for n < ω:
(A)SR0 = InnM,0 = L[U ].
(B)
SRn+1 =
 SR(L[0†n]) = 0†n+1InnM,n+1[0†n+1] = L[0†n+1]
So we examine the Finite structural reflection hierarchy for daggers, namely SR<ω
0†
. We
should ask ourselves which is the core model that contains this finite structural reflection
hierarchy. Let K[U ] be Mitchell’s core model for sequences of measures, then we conjecture
that the following holds:
(SRHCD) The Finite Structural Reflection Hierarchy for daggers, namely SR<ω
0†
, is properly
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contained by K[U ].
Now we will examine the canonical model L[E∗], the canonical inner model for a strong
cardinal. If we apply structural reflection to this inner model, we will produce 0¶, known
in set theory as zero-pistol, which is equivalent to the existence of a non-trivial elementary
embedding j : L[E∗] −→ L[E∗].
6. The theory of L[E∗], extender models
The next step above the hierarchy of measurable cardinals is the hierarchy leading to
a strong cardinal 4.
Definition 107. A cardinal κ is λ -strong if there is an elementary embedding j :
V −→M such that κ = crit(j), λ < j(κ), and P λ(κ) ⊆M . A cardinal κ is strong if it is
λ-strong for every ordinal λ.
A cardinal is 1-strong if and only if it is measurable. An extender is a generalised
ultrafilter designed to represent the strong embeddings needed for strong cardinals.
A (κ, λ) extender corresponds to an elementary embedding π : M −→ N where M and N
are transitive models of ZF−, κ = crit(π), and λ ≤ π(κ).
The model M need not be a model of ZF; indeed we can typically assume that κ is the largest
cardinal in M since PM (κ) is the only part of M which will be used for the ultrapower
construction. Extenders are so called because the embedding π can be extended to an
embedding on a full Model M ′ of set theory, provided that the subsets of κ in M ′ are
contained in those of M.
Suppose that π : M −→ N is an extender and M ′ is a transitive model of set theory such
that PM
′
(κ) ⊆ PM (κ).
If a, a′ ∈ [λ]<ω, and fand f ′ are functions in M ′ with domains [κ]|a| and [κ]|a′| respectively,
4See [Mitchell 11]
168 3. STRUCTURAL REFLECTION
then we say that (f, a) =π (f
′, a′) if and only if (a, a′) ∈ π({(v, v′) ∈ [κ]|a| × [κ]|a′| : f(v) =
f ′(v)}). We write [f, a]π for the equivalence class {(f ′, a′) : (f, a) =π (f ′, a′)}.
Finally we write Ult(M ′, π) for the model with universe
{[f, a]π : f ∈M ′
κ ∩M ′ and a ∈ λ<ω}
and with the membership relation ∈π defined by
[f, a]π ∈π [f ′, a′]π if (a, a′) ∈ π({(v, v′) : f(v) ∈ f ′(v′)}
The ultrapower embedding iπ : M1 −→ Ult(M ′, π) is defined by iπ(x) = [x, ∅]π. Here x is
regarded as a constant, that is, a 0-ary function [Mitchell 11].
We will only be interested in extenders such that Ult(M ′, π) is well-founded and hence
isomorphic to a transitive model, and we will identify Ult(M ′, π) with the transitive model
to which is isomorphic. The ordinal λ is called the length of the (κ, λ)-extender π, and it
it written len(π).
Theorem 111. Suppose that φ(v0, ......, vn−1) is a formula of set theory, and ai ∈ [λ]<ω
for i < n and fi : [κ]
|ai| −→ λ. Then
Ult(M ′, π) |= φ([f0, a0]π..........[fn−1, an−1]π)
if and only if
(a0, ........an−1) ∈ π({(v0, ......vn−1) : M ′ |= φ(f0(v0), .............fn−1(vn−1))})
This statement suggests the alternate definition of an extender as a sequence E of
ultrafilters. The ultrafilter sequence representing a (κ, λ)-extender π is the sequence Eπ =
(Ea : a ∈ [λ]<ω) of ultrafilters defined by
Ea = {x ⊆ κa : a ∈ π({ran(v) : v ∈ x})}.
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Now we can introduce the notion of countable completeness for extenders which is more
complicated than that for ultrafilters.
An (κ, λ)-extender E is countably-complete if for each sequence (ai : i ∈ ω) of sets ai ∈ [λ]<ω
and each sequence (Xi : i < ω) of sets Xi ∈ Ea, there is a function v :
⋃
i ai −→ κ such
that v|ai ∈ Xi for each i < ω.
Theorem 112. If E∗ is a collection of countably complete extenders then any iterated
ultrapower using extenders in E∗ is well-founded.
This completes the preliminary exposition of extenders. The following definition points
out to the property of coherence satisfied by a sequence of extenders.
A coherent sequence of nonoverlapping extenders is a function E∗ with domain of the form
{(κ, β) : β < oE∗(κ)} (where o(κ) is the order of κ) such that
1) if oE
∗
(κ) > 0 then oE
∗
(λ) < κ for every λ < κ
and if β < oE
∗
(κ) then
2) E∗(κ, β) is a (κ, κ+ 1 + β) extender E
3) iE
∗(κ,β)(E∗|(κ+ 1)) = E∗|(κ, β).
The term nonoverlapping refers to clause 1. We will see that nonoverlapping sequences are
adequate to construct models with a strong cardinal. Cardinals very much larger than a
strong cardinal require extender sequences with overlapping extenders. If E∗ is a coherent
nonoverlapping sequence of extenders in V and M is a inner model such that the restriction
of E∗ to M is a member of M, then E∗ is coherent in M. Now we need to start with a
weaker version of coherence in order to obtain long extender sequences which are coherent
in L[E∗].
A sequence E∗ of extenders is weakly coherent if each extender E = (κ, β) is a (κ, κ+1+β)
extender such that oi
EE∗(κ) = β.
At this point I will not discuss the part about the comparison of iterations.
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Theorem 113 (Mitchell 11). Suppose that E∗ is a weakly coherent extender sequence
and that E is a countably complete (κ, κ+ 1, β)-extender in L[E∗] such that oi
EE∗(κ) = β.
Then E = E∗(κ, β)
We continue with three important theorems.
Theorem 114 (Mitchell 11). If E∗ is a weakly coherent extender sequence of countably
complete extenders, then E∗ is coherent in L[E∗].
Theorem 115 (Mitchell 11). If κ is a strong cardinal, then there is a weakly coherent
sequence E∗ of countably complete extenders such that there is a strong cardinal κ1 ≤ κ in
L[E∗].
Theorem 116 (Mitchell 11). If E∗ is a coherent sequence of countably complete exten-
ders in L[E∗] then L[E∗] |= GCH.
Now we can introduce 0¶ the sharp for the inner model L[E∗]. This sharp (if it exists)
implies a transcendence over the inner model containing a strong cardinal. In fact, if 0¶
exists, we have the following non-trivial elementary embedding:
L[E∗] −→ L[E∗].
Since 0¶ has similar properties to 0†, I make the following conjecture (SRS). When we
relativize Π1 definable classes (with parameters) of structures to L[E
∗] we may obtain the
following:
(SRS conjecture) SR(L[E∗]) if and only if 0¶ exists.
Since the theory of 0¶ is similar to the theory of 0† I conjecture that we can form the model
L[0¶] and apply structural reflection to this inner model in order to obtain 0¶¶. Like for
0† we can continue. Like for the theory of 0] and 0†, I conjecture that by starting with 0¶
we can construct the Finite Structural Reflection Hierarchy for zero pistols. In fact, We
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can form a finite transcendental hierarchy of inner models with these sharps by adopting
the operation InnM and structural reflection at successor stage.
7. The HOD conjecture and the Wholeness axioms
Jensen’s covering lemma says that if 0] does not exist and A is an uncountable set
of ordinals, then there exists B ∈ L such that A ⊆ B and |A| = |B|. The conclusion
implies that if γ is a singular cardinal, then it is a singular cardinal in L. Moreover, if β
is a singular cardinal, then (β+)L = β+. Jensen covering lemma implies that L is close to
V. In contrast, if 0] exists and β is an uncountable cardinal, then β is inaccessible in L.
In this case, L is very far from V. Thus, the covering lemma implies the following theorem
that does not mention 0]:
Theorem 117. (Jensen) Exactly one of the following holds:
(1) L is correct about singular cardinals and computes their successors correctly.
(2) Every uncountable cardinal is inaccessible in L.
Canonical inner models other than L have been defined and proved to satisfy similar
covering properties and corresponding dichotomies. Canonical inner models are contained
in HOD.
Definition 108. A set X is ordinal-definable if there is a formula φ such that
X = {u : φ(u, α1, ......, αn)}
for some ordinal numbers α1, ......, αn.
OD is the class of ordinal definable sets. HOD is the class of hereditarily ordinal-
definable sets.
Definition 109. HOD denotes the class of hereditarily ordinal-definable sets:
HOD = {x : Transitive Closure({x}) ⊂ OD}
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The class HOD is transitive and contains all ordinals.
Theorem 118 (Jech 06). HOD is a transitive model of ZFC.
The following theorem highlights the fact that either HOD is close to V or HOD is far
form V.
Theorem 119 (Woodin 12). Assume that δ is an extendible cardinal. Then exactly
one of the following hold:
(1) For every singular cardinal γ > δ, γ is singular in HOD and (γ+)HOD = γ+.
(2) Every regular cardinal greater than δ is measurable in HOD.
The above theorem states the HOD dichotomy without mentioning an anologue of 0]
for HOD. In fact, since no analogue of 0] is mentioned for HOD and we cannot transcend
HOD as in the case of L, we may conjecture that (2) of HOD dichotomy fails. Before
introducing the HOD conjecture, we have to define the notion of ω-strongly measurable
cardinals:
Definition 110. (Woodin) Let λ be an uncountable regular cardinal. Then λ is ω-
strongly measurable in HOD iff there is a κ < λ such that:
(1) (2κ)HOD < λ and
(2) There is no partition (Sα|α < κ) of cof(ω) ∩ λ into stationary sets such that (Sα|α <
κ) ∈ HOD.
We state the HOD conjecture [Woodin 12]:
Definition 111. (Woodin) (HOD conjecture) There is a proper class of regular cardi-
nals that are not ω-strongly measurable in HOD.
Building a canonical inner model with a supercompact cardinal is a major problem
for set theory (as we will see in the next section). For a canonical inner model of a
supercompact cardinal we have to use weak extender models [Woodin 12]:
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Definition 112. (Woodin) A transitive class N model of ZFC is called a weak extender
model for δ supercompact iff for every γ > δ there exists a normal fine measure U on Pδ(γ)
such that:
(1) N ∩ Pδ(γ) ∈ U and
(2) U ∩N ∈ N .
We conclude this brief section with the following theorem:
Theorem 120 (Woodin 12). Let δ be an extendible cardinal. The following are equiv-
alent:
(1) The HOD conjecture.
(2) HOD is a weak extender model for δ supercompact.
(3) Every singular cardinal γ > δ, is singular in HOD and γ+ = (γ+)HOD.
If δ is an extendible cardinal, then no non-trivial elementary embedding maps a weak
extender model for δ supercompact to itself. For this we recall Kunen’s theorem:
Theorem 121. (Kunen) [Jech 06] Let κ be an ordinal. Then there is no non-trivial
elementary embedding
j : Vκ+2 −→ Vκ+2
We state now Woodin’s theorem:
Theorem 122 (Woodin 12). If N is a weak extender model for δ supercompact, then
there is no elementary embedding j : N −→ N with δ ≤ crit(j) and j 6= id.
We will now introduce the Wholeness axioms proposed by Paul Corazza [Corazza 00]
and [Hamkins 99]. They are weakenings of Kunen’s theorem in order to avoid inconsistency
and to have a non trivial embedding of V into itself. The Wholeness axioms are formalized
in the language {∈, j}, augmenting the usual language of set theory {∈} with an additional
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unary function symbol j to represent the embedding. ZFC is expressed in the smaller
language {∈}. Corazza’s first Wholeness axiom, namely WA0, asserts that j is a non-
trivial amenable elementary embedding from the universe V to itself. Elementarity is
expressed by the scheme φ(x) −→ φ(j(x)), where φ runs through the formulas of the usual
set theory. We can state non-triviality by the following formula ∃xj(x) 6= x. Furthermore,
amenability is simply the assertion that j restricted to a set B is a set for every set B.
Corazza [Corazza 00] formulates also the version of the Wholeness axiom, namely WA∞,
which asserts in addition that the full separation axiom holds in the language {∈, j}. This
axiom is the endpoint of a hierarchy of axioms, namely WA0,WA1,WA2, ..........,WA∞
which represent the Wholeness axioms. Now, we can define the Wholeness axiom WAn:
Definition 113. The Wholeness Axiom WAn consists of the following formulas:
(1) Elementarity: All instances of φ(x)↔ φ(j(x)) for φ in the language {∈}.
(2) Separation: all instances of the Separation axiom for Σn formulae in the full language
{∈, j}.
(3) Non-triviality: The axiom ∃xj(x) 6= x.
Kunen’s theorem does not apply because the Wholeness axioms schemes do not have
instances of the axiom of replacement in the full language with j. In fact, Kunen uses the
Replacement Axiom in the full language to know the the critical sequence {κn|n ∈ ω},
defined by κ0 = κ = cp(j) and κn+1 = j(κn), is a set. Now we can state a fundamental
theorem:
Theorem 123 (Corazza 00). If there is an I1 embedding j : Vλ+1 −→ Vλ+1, then WA∞
is consistent with HOD = V . Hence also WA0 is consistent with HOD = V .
So, as a corollary, the Wholeness axioms, whose upper bound on consistency strength is
I3 hypothesis (there is a nontrivial elementary embedding of Vλ into itself) are consistent
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with the Ultimate L conjecture, namely a consistent Ultimate enlargement of Gödel’s
constructible universe.
8. The Ultimate L model
This section aims at explaining briefly the ideas underlying Woodin’s construction of
an inner model for a supercompact cardinal (not yet constructed). This program is based
on Woodin’s results from [Woodin 10]. One of the main motivation for the search of an
ultimate consistent enlargement of L is the validation of the Ω-conjecture. Woodin [Woodin
10], in order to find an inner model of a supercompact cardinal, adopts the concept of long
extenders. Suppose that
j : V −→M
is an elementary embedding with critical point κ. Suppose that η is an ordinal, η > κ,
and let η∗ be the least ordinal such that η ≤ j(η∗). From j one can define the extender of
length η. If the ordinal η∗ is greater than the critical point κ, then E is a long extender.
Recall that the formal definition of the extender E specifies a family of ultrafilters. For
each finite set s ⊆ η let
Es = {A ⊆ [η∗]|s||s ∈ j(A)}.
Thus Es is an ultrafilter. The set
E = {(s,A)|s ∈ [η]<ω and A ∈ Es}
is the extender of length η derived by j, it is also the (κ, η)-extender derived from j.
Definition 114. Suppose that E is an extender.
(1) CRT(E) is the critical point of the elementary embedding
jE : V −→ME
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given by E.
(2) LTH (E) is the length of the extender E.
(3) For each α < LTH(E) let SPT (E;α) be the least ordinal β such that jE(β) > α and
let SPT (E) = sup{SPT (E;α)|α < LTH(E)}.
(4) ρ(E) = sup{η|Vη ⊆ME}.
Woodin [Woodin 10] explains that CRT (E) is the completeness of the ultrafilters as-
sociated to extender, E. LTH(E) is the domain of E. SPT (E) is the space of an extender.
Then Woodin [Woodin 10] defines a premouse as follows:
Definition 115. a premouse is a pair (M, δ) such that:
(1) M |= ZF + Σ2 − replacement.
(2) Suppose that F : Mδ −→M ∩Ord is definable from parameters in M, then F is bounded
in M.
(3) δ is strongly inaccessible in M.
We give next the definition of iteration tree:
Definition 116. Suppose that (M, δ) is a premouse. An iteration tree, T, on (M, δ)
of length η is a tree order <T on η with minimum element 0 and which is a suborder of
the standard order, together with a sequence
(Mα, Eβ, jγ,α : α < η, β + 1 < η, γ <T α)
such that the following hold.
(1) M0 = M .
(2) jγ,α : Mγ −→Mα for all γ <T α < η.
(3) Suppose that α+1 < η. Then α+1 has an immediate predecessor, α∗, in the tree order
<T and:
(a) Eα ∈ j0,α(M ∩ Vδ) and Mα |= Eα is an extender model which is not ω − huge.
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(b) If α∗ < α then SPT (Eα) + 1 ≤ min{ρ(Eβ)|α∗ ≤ β < α}.
(c) Mα+1 = Ult(Mα∗ , Eα) and
jα∗,α+1 : Mα∗ −→Mα+1
is the associated embedding.
(4) If 0 < β < η is a limit ordinal then the set of α such that α < β is cofinal in β and
Mβ is the limit of the Mα where α <T β relative to the embeddings; jα,β.
Hugh Woodin [Woodin 10] wants to generalize the notion of iteration tree for the case
of long extenders. We need a suitable generalization since the most natural generalization
leads to the failure of iterability. Then we come to the definition of (+Θ)-iteration tree
where Θ ∈ Ord:
Definition 117 (Woodin 10). Suppose that (M, δ) is a premouse and that T is an
iteration tree on (M, δ) with associated sequence,
(Mα, Eβ, jγ,α : α < η, β + 1 < η, γ <T α).
Suppose that Θ ∈ Ord. Then the iteration tree, T , is a (+Θ)-iteration tree if for all
α+ 1 < η,
sup{SPT (Eβ)|α+ 1 ≤ β and β∗ ≤ α}+ Θ ≤ ρ(Eα)
where β + 1 < η, β∗ is the T predecessor of β + 1.
Woodin [Woodin 10] is able to adapt the proof of the following theorem to iteration
trees of length α. Firstly, he introduces the following definition.
Definition 118. Suppose that (M, δ) is a premouse,
π : M −→ VΘ
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is an elementary embedding, T is an iteration tree on (M, δ), and b is a maximal branch
of T. Let Mb be the direct limit given by b and let
jb : M −→Mb
be the associated embedding. The branch b is π-realizable if there exists an elementary
embedding,
πb : Mb −→ VΘ
such that π = πb.jb.
Now we can introduce a fundamental theorem that Woodin [Woodin 10] is able to prove
for iteration trees of length α where α ∈ Ord:
Theorem 124 (Woodin 10). Suppose that (M, δ) is a countable premouse,
π : M −→ VΘ
is an elementary embedding,
T = (Mα, Eβ, jγ,α : α < η, β + 1 < η, γ <T α)
is a countable (+2)-iteration tree on (M, δ) and that T has no proper maximal π-realizable
branch. Then η = γ + 1 and for all extenders E ∈ Mγ ∩ Vj0,γ(δ), for all γ∗ ≤ γ, if γ∗ < γ
and
SPT (E) + 2 ≤ min{ρ(Eα)|γ∗ ≤ α < γ},
then Ult(Mγ∗ , E) is well-founded and moreover the corresponding maximal branch of the
induced iteration tree of length γ + 2 is π-realizable.
It is possible to prove the precedent theorem for iterated trees of finite length. Steel
[Woodin 10] proved the theorem for iteration trees of length ω. Woodin [Woodin 10] is
able to prove the theorem for iteration trees of length α, where α is any ordinal. Martin
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and Steel [Woodin 10] proposed two hypotheses concerning iteration trees on V.
(UBH) The Unique Branch Hypothesis:
Suppose that T is an iteration tree on a premouse (VΘ, δ). Then T does not have two
distinct cofinal well-founded branches.
(CBH) The Cofinal Branch Hypothesis:
Suppose that T is an iteration tree on a premouse (VΘ, δ), then:
(1) If T has a limit length then T has a cofinal branch;
(2) If T has a successor length, η+ 1, then T can be freely extended to an iteration tree of
length η + 2.
Unfortunately if there is a supercompact cardinal then these hypotheses are false. So,
Woodin [Woodin 10] formulates other three hypotheses. Firstly, we introduce the following
definition:
Definition 119. An iteration tree, T, is strongly closed if:
(1) T is a (+ 1)-iteration tree; and
(2) each extender, E, occurring in T is LTH(E)-strong in the model from which it is selected
and LTH(E) is strongly inaccessible in that model.
The first hypothesis is the following:
Definition 120. (Strong (ω1 + 1)-Iteration Hypothesis) [Woodin 10] Suppose that
(M, δ) is a countable premouse and that
π : M −→ VΘ
is an elementary embedding. Then (M, δ) has an iteration strategy of order ω1 + 1 for
strongly closed iteration trees on (M, δ).
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Definition 121. (Strong Iteration Hypothesis) [Woodin 10] Suppose that (M, δ) is a
premouse, κ < δ, and that
π : M −→ VΘ
is an elementary embedding such that there is a strong cardinal below π(κ). Suppose that
there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Then (M, δ) has an iteration strategy of order
ω1 which is universally Baire in the codes, for strongly closed iteration trees with all critical
points above κ.
Definition 122. (Strong Unique Branch Hypothesis) [Woodin 10] Suppose that (VΘ, δ)
is a premouse such that T is a countably strongly closed iteration tree on (VΘ, δ) of limit
length. Then T has at most one cofinal well-founded branch.
By assuming this strong hypothesis, we have the following:
Theorem 125 (Woodin 10). Suppose that (VΘ, δ) is a premouse and that Strong Unique
Branch Hypothesis holds.
(1) Suppose that T is a countable strongly closed iteration tree on (VΘ, δ) of limit length.
Then T has a cofinal well-founded branch.
(2) Suppose that
T = (Mα, Eβ, jγ,α : α < η + 1, β + 1 < η + 1, γ <T α)
is a countably strongly closed iteration tree on (VΘ, δ). Suppose that η
∗ < η and that
SPT (Eη) + 1 ≤ min{jEβ (CRT (Eβ))|η
∗ ≤ β < η}.
then Ult(Mη∗ , Eη) is well-founded.
We have other two theorems regarding the Strong Unique Branch Hypothesis:
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Theorem 126 (Woodin 10). Suppose that the Strong Unique Branch Hypothesis holds
and that δ0 is a supercompact cardinal. Then the Strong Unique Branch Hypothesis holds
at all strong cardinals δ ≥ δ0.
Theorem 127 (Woodin 10). Suppose that δ0 is supercompact and that the Strong
Unique Branch Hypothesis holds. Suppose that (VΘ, κ) is a premouse with δ0 < κ. Then
for each ordinal γ there is an iteration strategy for (VΘ, κ) of order γ restricting to iteration
trees with all critical points above δ0.
Now we present a fundamental theorem that was Woodin’s original motivation for the
search of the Ultimate L model.
Theorem 128 (Woodin 10). Suppose that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals,
there is a strong cardinal, and that the Strong Iteration Hypothesis holds. Then the Ω-
conjecture holds.
Now we will examine the closure properties of a weak extender model N (that we have
defined in the precedent section) for a supercompact cardinal. We start with the following
definition:
Definition 123. Suppose that Φ is a class.
(1) oΦmLONG(δ) =∞ if for all γ > δ there exists an extender E ∈ Φ such that
(a) SPT (E) < δ and ρ(E) > γ,
(b) jE((CRT (E)) = δ.
(2) oΦsLONG =∞ if for all γ > δ there exists an extender E ∈ Φ such that
(a) CRT (E) = δ,
(b) SPT (E) > γ.
We have that oVmLONG = ∞ if and only if oVsLONG = ∞. At this point we state two
theorems that witness the closure properties of a weak extender model N for a supercompact
cardinal:
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Theorem 129 (Woodin 10). Suppose that oNLONG(δ) = ∞. Suppose that γ > δ and γ
is a cardinal of N . Suppose that
j : (H(γ+))N −→ (H(j(γ)+))N
is an elementary embedding with critical point κ ≥ δ. Then j ∈ N .
Theorem 130 (Woodin 10). Suppose that oNLONG(δ) =∞. Suppose that γ ∈ Ord,
j : N ∩ Vγ+1 −→ N ∩ Vj(γ)+1
is an elementary embedding with critical point κ ≥ δ. Then j ∈ N .
Now we can define the suitable extender model:
Definition 124. Suppose that M is a transitive class such that for some δ, oMLONG =
∞.
(1) δM denotes the least κ ≤ δ such that oMLONG(κ) =∞.
(2) M is a suitable extender model if the following hold:
(a) There exists a cofinal set IM ⊂ δM and a sequence (Eα : α ∈ IM) in VδM witnessing that
δM is a Woodin cardinal (in V) such that
(Eα ∩M : α ∈ IM) ∈M
and such that for all α ∈ IM,
jEα((Eβ : β ∈ CRT (Eα) ∩ IM))|LTH(Eα) = (Eβ : β ∈ LTH(Eα) ∩ IM, ρ(Eα) =
LTH(Eα) = α, and such that α = CRT (Eβ) for some β ∈ IM.
(b) (Weak Σ2-definability) There exists X ∈ VδM+1 and a formula φ(x0, x1) such that for
all β < η1 < η2 < η3, if X ∈ Vβ and if
(M)Vη1 ∩ Vβ = (M)Vη3 ∩ Vβ
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then
(M)Vη1 ∩ Vβ = (M)Vη2 ∩ Vβ = (M)Vη3 ∩ Vβ,
where for all γ > δM,
(M)Vγ = {a ∈ Vγ |Vγ |= φ(a,X)}
The following theorems point out to the closure properties of a suitable extender model
and show that it is possible to transfer down from V to M very large cardinal notions:
Theorem 131 (Woodin 10). Suppose that M is a suitable extender model and
j : Vλ −→ Vλ
is an elementary embedding such that δM < crit(j) and such that Vλ ≺Σ2 V . Then j(M ∩
Vλ) = M ∩ Vλ and for all γ < λ,
j(M ∩ Vγ) ∈M.
Theorem 132 (Woodin 10). Suppose M is a suitable extender model and
j : Vλ −→ Vλ
is an elementary embedding such that δM < CRT (j) and such that Vλ ≺Σ2 V . then there
exists λ′ ≤ λ. and a nontrivial elementary embedding
j′ : M ∩ Vλ′ −→M ∩ Vλ′
such that j′ ∈M.
Theorem 133 (Woodin 10). Suppose that 2 < n < ω, M is a suitable extender model,
and
j : Vλ −→ Vλ
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is an elementary embedding such that δM < CRIT (j) and such that Vλ ≺Σn V . Then there
exists λ′ ≤ λ and a non trivial embedding
j′ : M ∩ Vλ′ −→M ∩ Vλ′
such that M ∩ Vλ′ ≺Σn M and such j′ ∈M.
Now I apply structural reflection to the Ultimate L model. f we relativize structural
reflection to a weak extender model, N, for a supercompact cardinal, we do not get tran-
scendence over this inner model, but all embeddings of structures are within this inner
model. Firstly, we restate the following theorem:
Theorem 134 (Woodin 10). Suppose that oNLong =∞. Suppose that γ ∈ Ord,
j : N ∩ Vγ+1 −→ N ∩ Vj(γ)+1
is an elementary embedding with critical point κ ≥ δ. Then j ∈ N .
We may state the theorem that witnesses the closure properties of a weak extender
model for a supercompact cardinal.
Theorem 135. Suppose oNLong = ∞, N is a weak extender model for δ supercompact,
N is definable and C is a class of structures Π1 definable (with parameters) in V. Then all
embeddings of classes of structures relativized to N belong to N.
Proof. Let N be a weak extender model for δ supercompact. Let C be the class of
structures of the form (Nβ,∈, γ), where γ and β are cardinals (in V) and γ < β. Suppose
that α reflects C. Pick cardinals γ and β, with γ a cardinal in V, such that α < γ < β.
Then there are cardinals γ′ and β′, with γ′ a cardinal in V and γ′ < β′ < α, and an
elementary embedding :
j : (Nβ′ ,∈, γ′) −→ (Nβ,∈, γ)
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Since j(γ′) = γ, j is not the identity. Let κ be the critical point of j. If κ < δ then j ∈ N
and if κ ≥ δ for Woodin’s theorem [Woodin 10] j ∈ N . Thus, all embeddings of classes of
structures within N belong to N. 
I argue that principles of structural reflection transfer down from V to a suitable ex-
tender model M.
Definition 125 (Bagaria 10). A C(n)-extendible cardinal κ is C(n)-extendible if for
every λ greater than κ there exists an elementary embedding
j : Vλ −→ Vµ
some µ, crit(j)=κ, and Vj(κ) is a Σn-elementary substructure of V.
We can state Bagaria’s theorem:
Theorem 136 (Bagaria 10). The following are equivalent:
(1) SR, i. e, Σn-SR for all n.
(2) There exists a C(n)-cardinal, for every n.
(3) Vopĕnka’s principle.
Since Hugh Woodin [Woodin 10], by assuming that the Ultimate L exists, is able to
transfer down form V to a suitable extender model very large cardinal notions, we should
be able to transfer down from V to M a proper class of C(n)-extendible cardinals (weaker
large cardinals than what Woodin is able to transfer down). We restate Woodin’s theorem
that implies that stronger large cardinals numbers than C(n)-extendible cardinals transfer
down from V to M.
Theorem 137 (Woodin 10). Suppose 2 < n < ω, M is a suitable extender model, and
j : Vλ −→ Vλ
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is an elementary embedding such that δM-supercompact < crit(j) and such that Vλ ≺Σn V.
Then, there exists a λ′ ≤ λ and a nontrivial elementary embedding
j′ : M ∩ Vλ′ −→M ∩ Vλ′
such that M ∩ Vλ′ ≺Σn M and such that j′ ∈M.
Woodin is able to transfer down this very large cardinal numbers so we have to readapt
his proof to transfer a proper class of C(n)-extendible cardinals down from V to M.
Theorem 138. Assume that for every n, there exists a C(n)-extendible cardinal in V
(equivalent to: for every n, there exists a proper class of C(n)-extendible cardinals). Then
in M, for every n there exists a C(n)-extendible cardinal.
Proof. Suppose κ is C(n)-extendible. So for every λ greater than κ there exists an
elementary embedding
j : Vλ −→ Vµ
some µ and Vj(κ) ≺Σn V . Assume δM is a supercompact cardinal. Then we argue that
there exists a ρ ≤ j(κ) and a non trivial embedding
j′ : M ∩ Vλ −→M ∩ Vµ
some µ such that M ∩ Vρ ≺Σn M and j′ ∈ M. Fix X ∈ VδM+1 and a formula φ(x0, x1)
such that M is weakly Σ2 definable in V from X. We have that Vj(κ) ≺Σn V and that
Vj(κ) |= ZFC. So assuming n ≥ 2,
M ∩ Vj(κ) = {a ∈ Vj(κ)|Vj(κ) |= φ[a,X]}.
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Let I be the set of all ρ < j(κ) such that
Vρ ≺ Vj(κ)
and such that X ∈ Vρ. Then I is cofinal in j(κ) and j(I) = I. Note that for each ρ ∈ I,
M ∩ Vρ ≺M ∩ Vj(κ)
and so for each ρ ∈ I,
M ∩ Vρ ≺Σn M.
The theorem follows by absoluteness. But then
∀α < ρ(M,∈) |= ∃ρ > α(ρ is a C(n)-extendible cardinal),
then (M ∩ ρ,∈) |= ∀α∃λ > α(λ is a C(n)-extendible cardinal),
then (M,∈) |= there is a proper class of C(n)-extendible cardinal. 
Since principles of structural reflection hold within a suitable extender model, structural
reflection witnesses that the Ultimate L (if the ultimate L conjecture is true) is very close
to V. Principles of structural reflection that hold in V hold also within the Ultimate L if
the Ultimate L conjecture is true. Thus, the Ultimate L can be considered as the true,
noumenal universe of mathematics as I will explain in the following section.
9. The philosophy of mathematics that I sustain
I argue that we have to distinguish within set theory between the phenomenal meta-
mathematical models and the true noumenal universe of mathematics. Further, we have to
distinguish between the mathematics of models concerning the phenomenal reality of set
theory and the mathematics concerning the true noumenal universe of sets. To understand
this we have to apply a metaphysical Kantian distinction to set theory. Thus, to express
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my philosophical position I have to apply a Kantian distinction to set theory between phe-
nomenal reality and noumenal reality. Kantian noumenon is a posited object or reality
that is known (if at all) without the use of physical senses. The term noumenon is used
in relation with the term phenomenon which refers to an object apprehended by physical
senses. The noumenal world may exist but it is completely unknowable to humans. The
noumenal reality is the reality in itself or thing-in-itself. As expressed in Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason [Kant 781], Human understanding is structured by innate categories of un-
derstanding that the mind uses in order to make sense of raw unstructured experience (the
phenomenal interpretation of reality). For Kant, we can categorize phenomena, but we can
never directly know noumena. Even if noumena are unknowable, they are still needed as a
limiting concept. The existence of the noumenal world limits reason to what he perceives
to be its proper bounds, making many metaphysical questions unanswerable by reason.
For Kant, the phenomenal reality based on physical senses’ apprehension structured, then,
by categories of understanding is the realm of appearance and it is not what it is really (the
reality in itself). While the noumenal reality is what it is really. I argue that in set theory
the phenomenal reality is created by human mind and is represented by metamathemati-
cal models such as L[U ],KDJ , V [G], etc. Thus, metamathematical models are created or
constructed by Human mind according to my beliefs. Also the Ultimate L, if the Ultimate
conjecture is true, belongs to the phenomenal reality of set theory and it is created or con-
structed by Human mind. While the noumenal reality is the immutable, eternal, true world
of sets itself independent from human mind and where sets are not interpreted. I claim that
this distinction disappears within the universe of mathematics if the Ultimate L conjecture
is true. In fact I hold that if we have an inner model (strategic variation), namely LΩS , for
a supercompact cardinal, this inner model, although a phenomenal reality, would coincide
with the true noumenal universe of sets V. This inner model would be very close to V since
it would be like L in the case that 0] does not exist and for a suitable extender M strong
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large cardinal axioms transfer down from V to M. So, if the Ultimate conjecture is true, a
phenomenal reality would coincide with the noumenal true universe of sets V. In this case,
the inner model of a supercompact cardinal would be the true universe of mathematics.
However, at the same time, we can still build models for set theory and accomplish the
mathematics of model. Within the mathematics of models, we explore all possibilities for
mathematics while if the ultimate conjecture is true, truths concerning the Ultimate L,
would be necessary truths characterizing the true noumenal universe of mathematics. The
mathematics of models is characterized by all metamathematical models, inner and outer
models (forcing extensions). However, if the ultimate L conjecture is true, all consistent
enlargements of L (inner models) can be seen as approximations to the true, noumenal
universe of mathematics (the Ultimate L), while the mathematics of models, where we
combinatorially explore all possibilities for mathematics, is essentially characterized by
outer models (forcing extensions). Within the mathematics of models, I have focused my
attention essentially on Pmax,Ω − logic and Woodin maximum that we have seen in the
first chapter (section: set theory). We have to say that Qmax and stationary tower forcing
P<δ,Q<δ produce the same extension as Pmax [Woodin 10b]. As we have seen in the first
chapter (section: set theory), I have focused on Pmax because if NSω1 is saturated then ev-
ery member of H(ω2) is in the iteration of a countable model of a fragment of ZFC [Woodin
10b]. Since these countable models are elements of L(R), their iterations induce a partial
order in L(R). This partial order, Pmax, produces an extension of L(R) where H(ω2) is the
direct limit of the structures H(ω2) of models satisfying every forceable theory (as we have
seen in the first chapter: section set theory). The structure H(ω2) in the Pmax extension of
L(R) by assuming ADL(R) satisfies every Π2 sentence [Woodin 10b]. Taking point classes
such that Γ ⊆ P (R) we have considered Pmax extensions of larger inner models, such as
L(Γ,R), than L(R). We have considered also Ω-logic since within this logic we take all
partial orders. There is a strong connection (as we have seen) between Pmax, Ω-logic and
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Woodin Maximum. In fact, if there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then for every
set of reals A in L(R), every ΩZFC-consistent Π2 sentence for (H(ω2), NSω1 , A,∈) holds
in the Pmax extension of L(R) [Woodin 10b] (as we have seen). Furthermore, suppose that
there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and there is an inaccessible cardinal which is a
limit of Woodin cardinals, then the theory ZFC + Woodin Maximum is ΩZFC consistent
[Woodin 10b]. The phenomenal mathematics of model, where we explore combinatorially
all possibilities for mathematics and so it is based on forcing constructions, can be char-
acterized by Pmax and Ω-logic. In this picture, within the phenomenal mathematics of
models, we have the failure of the Continuum Hypothesis. Instead, if the Ultimate L con-
jecture is true, the Continuum Hypothesis holds within the Ultimate L. Therefore, we have
to distinguish between phenomenal truths, characterizing the mathematics of models, and
noumenal truths characterizing the true noumenal universe of mathematics if the Ultimate
L conjecture is true. However, the phenomenal reality and the true noumenal universe
are connected according to set theory. The true noumenal universe of sets (the Ultimate
L) influences the phenomenal reality of metamathematical of models. In fact, the truth
of the Continuum Hypothesis produces some results within the combinatorial phenomenal
mathematics of models. In fact, there are limits to any possible generalization of the Pmax
variations to the context of CH. Thus, if the Continuum Hypothesis holds then the theory
H(ω2) cannot be finitely axiomatized over ZFC in Ω-logic [Woodin 10b]. Secondly, let
φ(x) be a Σ21 formula and let r be a real number. Suppose that κ is a measurable Woodin
cardinal. Then if P and Q are partial orders in Vκ such that P forces φ(r) and Q forces
the Continuum Hypothesis to hold, then Q forces φ(r). In particular, if κ is a measurable
cardinal and CH holds, then any Σ21 statement true in some small (cardinality less than
κ) generic extension of V is already true [Woodin 10b]. So, if the Ultimate conjecture is
true, a true noumenal truth such as the Continuum Hypothesis, produces results within
the phenomenal mathematics of models. Thirdly, if the Ultimate L conjecture is true, then
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the Ω-conjecture would be true. So, in this case, we would have a determinate set of truths.
The full pluralism within the mathematics of models and the freedom of creating different
models with different truths would be limited. If the Ω conjecture is true, we would have a
definable set of truths with determinate values and so we would limit the possibility having
different models with different truths values for the phenomenal mathematics of models.
We would not have different metamathematical models with different truths but we would
have a set of definable, absolute set of truths shared by all metamathematical models. If
the Ω Conjecture is true and there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals then the set VΩ
is definable in the structure H(δ+) where δ is the least Woodin cardinal [Woodin 10b]. So
the independence of a sentence is not a proof that the sentence has no answer as Hamkins
[Hamkins 10] is arguing by assuming his multiverse philosophy (as we have seen) in the
case of CH. In fact, Hugh Woodin [Woodin 09] argues that if the Ω conjecture is true
all mathematical statements of complexity like CH have determinate truth values. The
connection between the Ultimate L conjecture and the Ω Conjecture is established by the
following theorem:
Theorem 139 (Woodin 10). Suppose that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals,
there is a strong cardinal, and that the Strong Iteration Hypothesis holds. Then the Ω
conjecture holds.
In particular, by assuming the Strong (ω1 +1) Iteration hypothesis and that there is an
extendible cardinal then there is a fine-structural suitable extender model M ⊂ HOD. As
corollaries, we obtain that the HOD conjecture must hold in V and the Ω conjecture holds
within the suitable extender model. We have examined the status of the Ω-Conjecture.
If we could prove the Ω-conjecture, we would have a complete theory respect to |=Ω. In
fact, thanks to Woodin’s Maximum, |=Ω would be a natural notion of logical consequence
to adopt in order to decide every problem in H(ω2). We have compared the result of
completeness of Turing for transfinite progressions (we have seen this in the first chapter:
192 3. STRUCTURAL REFLECTION
section transfinite progressions) and Woodin’s result for Ω-logic (we have seen this in the
first chapter: section set theory). Firstly, both Turing’s and Woodin’s approaches share
a weak similarity. In fact, both approaches imply a maximality principle. In transfinite
Turing’s progressions (as we have seen), we take all theories until ω + 1 and in Ω-logic we
take all forcing extensions. To compare these two approaches by abstracting from their
particular formulation and by accomplishing a sort of phenomenology, we have to evaluate
their success in deciding undecidable mathematical statements. Surely, in the case of
Turing’s completeness theorem (as we have seen), we attempt to prove Π01 statements or,
in the case of Feferman Π02 statements while in Ω-logic we attempt to have a complete
theory of the structure H(ω2) and decide statements such as the Continuum Hypothesis
which has the complexity of Σ21 statement. The success of Ω-logic is based on the fact
that the Ω-conjecture holds. Thus, in order to compare Turing’s approach and Woodin’s
approach, we must introduce and formulate Turing’s Conjecture (as we have seen in the
first chapter: section transfinite progressions). This Conjecture may be formulated in the
following way:
Definition 126. (Turing’s Conjecture) There exists a unique ordinal notation in order
to index theories univocally.
As we will see, this is the main problem for transfinite progressions. Unlike proved
theorems that are atemporal truths, Conjectures are unproved mathematical statements
which do not possess the criteria of atemporality. In mathematics a proved, atemporal
theorem cannot be dismissed, while a Conjecture may be disproved. We might assert that
we believe that a specific Conjecture is true and it is probable that it is true, but we cannot
assert that is an atemporal truth (we relate this notion to Intutionism). So, we can compare
Turing’s Conjecture and the Ω Conjecture by asking ourselves which Conjecture is more
probable to be true and which Conjecture can be believed to be true with more certainty.
Church’s thesis and the consistency of ZFC are other two conjectures very probable to be
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true. In fact, it is almost impossible to think of an informal algorithm which cannot be
formalized as a partial recursive function and thanks to relative consistency proofs, it is
very improbable that a contradiction will be discovered within ZFC. So, we can believe in
Church’s thesis and in the consistency of ZFC with the possible, highest degree of certainty.
On the contrary, Turing’s Conjecture, on which is based Turing’s completeness theorem,
is less probable to be true. We can believe in Turing’s Conjecture with a lower degree of
certainty. In fact establishing that we have a unique ordinal notation is a mathematical
problem that has a greater computational complexity than the problem of establishing if
a truth is a theorem (theoremhood). So, now we can ask ourselves what is the status of
the Ω conjecture. Firstly, the Ω-satisfiability of the Ω-conjecture is a Σ2 statement and
there are no known examples of Σ2-statements that are provably absolute and not settled
by large cardinals. So it is reasonable to expect this statement to be settled by large
cardinal axioms. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Ω Conjecture be false while its
non-trivial Ω-satisfiability be true. Secondly, if an inner model of a supercompact cardinal
(the Ultimate L) will be constructed, then this model can reach all the traditional large
cardinal axioms and, moreover, the Ω Conjecture holds in all these models. So, there is a
strong evidence that the Ω-conjecture is true and it reasonable that the Ω-conjecture will
be proved to be true, becoming a theorem and so, an atemporal truth. Thus, there is a
strong evidence in favor of the Ω-Conjecture. We might add that if there is a proper class
of Woodin cardinals and that for every A ⊆ R, if A is OD then A is universally Baire
then HOD |= Ω conjecture. So we may assert that the satisfaction of the Ω conjecture
rests on the satisfaction of other conjectures such as the HOD conjecture and the Strong
(ω1 + 1) Iteration Hypothesis or the Strong Unique Branch Hypothesis. We can say that
the Ω conjecture is more probable to be true than Turing’s Conjecture. We can believe
in the Ω-Conjecture with an higher degree of certainty than Turing’s Conjecture degree
of certainty. We may compare the Ω-Conjecture with Church’s thesis (we have seen this
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in the first chapter: Gödel’s theorems) and the consistency of ZFC. In fact, we can ask
ourselves if it is possible for all these Conjectures becoming proved, atemporal truths, or
simply mathematical theorems. We can say that Church’s thesis is impossible to become
a theorem. In fact, we should be able to collect all possible informal algorithms and
then formalized them as partial recursive functions. It is impossible to collect all possible
algorithms. Also it is impossible that we will have a direct proof of the consistency of ZFC,
but we can have only relative consistency proofs. In this case, we have a theorem, namely
Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, that makes impossible to have a direct proof of
the consistency of ZFC. So, while even if it is almost impossible, it might be possible to
collect all algorithms and prove Church’s thesis, to prove directly the consistency of ZFC
is impossible because of another atemporal truth, namely Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem. On the contrary, it is very probable that the Ω Conjecture will become an
atemporal, proved truth as all other theorems of mathematics. In fact, it is very probable
that a large cardinal axiom will settle the Ω conjecture or that the Ultimate L will be
constructed implying the truth of the Ω Conjecture.
In order to decide questions within the universe of sets, we should capture the notion of
the noumenal, true, arbitrary set. We have two extreme methods to interpret the notion
of the noumenal, arbitrary set that lie on the notion of power set. On one side, we have
strict definabilism represented by Gödel’s constructible universe, namely L, where we take
all definable subsets at the successor stage. In this case, definabilism is strict because few
large cardinal notions are consistent with L. On the other side, when we construct forcing
extensions, we extend the notion of arbitrary set. In fact, by adopting forcing extensions, we
add new sets. Thus, we should ask ourselves when we capture the notion of the noumenal
set. We have a solution if the Ultimate L conjecture is true. In fact, in this case we
would have a form of extended definabilism. In fact, all known large cardinals would be
consistent with the inner model of a supercompact cardinal. Then, since definabilism is
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kind of strong predicativism and so mathematical notions such as the power set operation
are more precise, the Ultimate L would be the true, noumenal universe of mathematics
where all notions are more precise. We must say that if the Ultimate L conjecture is true,
we do not have the dichotomy between phenomenal reality and noumenal reality within
the universe of mathematics, because the phenomenal reality represented by the Ultimate
L would coincide with the true, noumenal universe of sets V. If we want to develop a modal
logic for the universe of sets and if the Ultimate L conjecture is true, truths concerning
the Ultimate L would be necessary truths such as 2 + 2 = 4. Truths concerning the
mathematics of models would be counter-mathematical possible truths. In fact, if the
Ultimate L conjecture is true, the failure of CH would be a truth for the phenomenal
mathematics of models, but it would be a truth within a counter-mathematical possible
world where mathematics is different, since CH would be a necessary truth within the
Ultimate L.
If the Ultimate L conjecture were not true, I would argue that we have no access to the true,
noumenal world of sets V. In this case, I argue that we cannot accede the world of sets .
Specific phenomenal metamathematical models become a solution for specific phenomenal
truths. If the Ultimate L conjecture were not true, I would argue that we do not have
access to the true, noumenal world of sets. In this case, we have to accept a strong form
of pluralism. We would have only a plurality of phenomenal metamathematical models or
phenomenal universes with their specific own truths. We would not have noumenal truths
but only phenomenal truths. In this case, the solution to the continuum hypothesis is that
we do not have a solution to the continuum hypothesis [Hamkins 10], but the countinuum
hypothesis would be true in some phenomenal models or phenomenal universes and it
would be false in other phenomenal universes. In this case, I will argue that we can make a
philosophical choice and choose a specific phenomenal model. I will argue that the Bounded
Proper Forcing Axiom does settle CH but this would be a phenomenal truth that holds in
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a phenomenal universe. So, If the Ultimate L conjecture were false, we would have only
phenomenal set theory, a plurality of phenomenal models with their specific phenomenal
truths. I would argue that a phenomenal model, where the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom
holds, is philosophically preferable. In fact, we need an Σ2-reflecting cardinal, whose inner
model is L, to prove the consistency of BPFA. So if the Ultimate L conjecture were false,
among the plurality of all phenomenal metamathematical models we would select specific
models supporting our choice with philosophical justifications . If the Ultimate L conjecture
were false, we would have no access to the true, noumenal world of sets V. So in this
case (the ultimate L conjecture is false), I would agree with Hamkins but I would argue
that some mathematical statements, such as CH, have a phenomenal truth value within a
phenomenal model. We would have phenomenal pluralism. In this case the noumenal, set
theoretic reality would be inaccessible to us. If the ultimate L conjecture were false, the
set theoretic noumenon would be inaccessible according to my philosophical beliefs. From
an ontological perspective, my pluralism is different from Hamkins’ pluralism, because my
pluralism is phenomenal and the models or universes are not real, but mere interpretations
of noumenal set theoretic universe V, inaccessible to us if the Ultimate L conjecture were
false.
Maybe, some mathematicians might be concerned that if the Ultimate L conjecture is true,
the mathematical game of set theory is over. I would argue that this is not the case. In fact,
the goal of mathematicians would be discovering the richness of the Ultimate L structure
which the true, noumenal world of sets.
CHAPTER 4
Philosophical Aspects
0.1. Preliminaries to this chapter. In section 1, I am going to discuss some issues
in philosophy of set theory. I will introduce Cantor’s absolute infinite. I will compare
Cantor’s conception of the infinite with the conception of the Absolute principle of two
neoplatonic philosophers, namely Plotinus and Damascius. After that, I will compare re-
flection principles with the apophatic method conceived by these neoplatonic philosophers.
At the end of this section, I will explain how to extend the universe of sets. This part is
important because I want to extend the universe in order to legitimate the use of proper
classes as indexes of iterated structural reflection applied to inner models. In section 2, I
will stress philosophical aspects. I will reintroduce the philosophical distinction between
the phenomenal and the noumenal reality within set theory. I will criticize again Hamkin’s
multiverse philosophy. Then, I will highlight the problematic nature of real numbers. I
will conclude this section by criticizing the formalistic philosophy in mathematics and I
restate that the Ultimate L is the right universe of mathematics. In section 3 I will com-
pare two different axioms of set theory. Then I will introduce the distinction between
the phenomenal and the noumenal power set. I will show how it may be possible to de-
fine the noumenal power set. At the end of this section, I will introduce the concept of
maximization as a principle that can justify large cardinals. I will present a case, namely
weakly compact cardinals, that it may represent a reason to believe in realism. At the end
of this section, I will connect maximization with extrinsic justifications and the Cantor’s
conception of mathematical freedom. In section 4 I will compare a Melissus’ quote with
Cantor’s theorem. In section 5, I am going to discuss Duns Scotus’ idea about the infinite.
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I will argue that we can see the hierarchy of large cardinal as a way to perfection. After
introducing Scotus’s conception of human infinite intellect, I will argue that since Human
Mind can accede the abstract world of set theory, it cannot be reduced to the brain. Hu-
man Mind cannot be reduced and it is supervenient on the brain. In section 6 I will use
a set-theoretical argument to support Anselm’s ontological proof of the existence of God.
I will argue by criticizing Kant that existence can be seen as a predicate of perfection for
abstract spiritual objects. In section 7 I will discuss paradoxes and I will introduce the
Curry-Liar paradox that I conceived.
1. Philosophy of the Infinite: comparison between Cantor’s absolute infinite
and the Absolute principle of Damascius and Plotinus.
Georg Cantor emphasizes the unknowability of the transfinite sequence of all ordinal
numbers, which he thinks of as an appropriate symbol of the absolute: The Absolute can
only be acknowledged, but never known, not even approximately known [Cantor 76]. The
principle of the unknowability of the Absolute seems to have only a metaphysical mean-
ing for Cantor. Cantor distinguishes the proper infinite (transfinite) from the improper
infinite (potential infinite) and from the Absolute infinite. Cantor asserts that the notion
of improper infinite, or potential infinite, was historically accepted [Cantor 76]. For the
German mathematician, the potential infinite is not a kind of infinite but he considers it as
a variable finite number. Cantor distinguishes the potential infinite from the actual infinite
with the following words:
While the potential infinite points out to an indeterminate magnitude, al-
ways finite, variable having values that become small or larger than any
arbitrary and finite upper bound, the actual infinite is a fixed magnitude,
constant, larger than any finite magnitude of the same kind. [Cantor 76]
The set of natural numbers is not only an example of the actual infinite, but also of the
proper infinite or transfinite. Surely, the set of all natural numbers is not the Absolute
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infinite. This means that, although infinite, the set of all natural numbers is limited on
the upper part by other sets which have larger magnitude (power or cardinality), such
as the set of real numbers. Differently from the Absolute infinite, both the finite and
the proper infinite or transfinite share the fact of being limited in their magnitude. The
proper infinite or transfinite can be tamed mathematically, whereas the Absolute infinite
is beyond the limits of human reason, it cannot be understood mathematically. Even if for
many philosophers the actual infinite could not be tamed, for Cantor it was a fundamental
part of mathematics while the Absolute infinite, although a kind of actual infinite, was
beyond the limits of human reason. To Aristotle, who formulated the principle of number
annihilation, namely for every α, α+∞ =∞, Cantor responds by observing that ω+α 6= ω.
According to Cantor, the rejection of the proper infinite was based on the fact that it had
to be subjected to the same laws of the finite. Many philosophers asserted that the number
could be precise only in the realm of the finite, while the actual infinite belonged to the
realm of God. Cantor, instead, conceived the idea that between the finite and the Absolute
an unlimited hierarchy of concepts, the transfinite numbers, exists by whom, though, it is
not possible to understand the Absolute infinite :
Omnia seu finita seu infinita definita sunt et excepto Deo ab intellectu
determinari possunt.[ quoted by Lolli 02]
The Absolute can be indicated, but we cannot have knowledge of It, not even approxi-
mately. This aspect suggests that the sequence of all transfinite numbers can represent the
Absolute, anticipating the awareness that this sequence is not a set.
Cantor’s distinction between the Absolute and the proper infinite (transfinite) mirrors the
distinction of two neoplatonic philosophers, namely Iamblicus (245-325 a.c) and Damascius
(458-538 a.c), between the two transcendent principles, generators of reality. From three
passages of Damascius’ De principiis we can understand the hierarchy of the supreme prin-
ciples according to Iamblicus : The principle totally ineffable (πανταπασιν απoρρητoς)
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precedes the One true and proper (τo απλως εν) [Damascius 02]. Iamblicus’ metaphysics
retaken by Damascius overcame Plotinus (205-270 a.c) philosophy, the first neoplatonic
philosopher. Plotinus set as foundation of reality a unique principle, the One, Who was
ineffable, unutterable, unknowable and indescribable. However in Plotinus’ metaphysics
this One, even if ineffable, in order to create reality, had to be connected to the World and
His attributes characterized the entire reality. So, in Plotinus’ thought it can be found the
following theoretical difficulty: From one side, the principle, the One, was unutterable and
ineffable; from the other side, since He was connected to reality, was describable. In order
to overcome this theoretical difficulty, Damascius (retaking Iamblicus’ idea) introduced a
second principle preceding to Plotinus’ One, absolutely transcendent, ineffable and unut-
terable. The first principle absolutely unutterable generated the second principle, Plotinus’
One, who in Damascius thought was utterable, coordinated to reality and describable. As
Damascius overcame Plotinus and his followers by rendering the second principle, Plotinus’
One, utterable and describable, Cantor was able to tame the proper infinite (the transfinite)
mathematically inquirable. It is possible to say, instead, that between the Absolute infinite
of Cantor and Damascius’ absolutely transcendent principle there is a perfect conceptual
identity. For both thinkers, God is absolutely unutterable, indescribable and beyond the
limits of human reason. It is not possible to deny his existence (or prove his existence) be-
cause we cannot say anything. For Damascius, the Skeptics can doubt about the existence
of the second principle, but not about the absolutely trascendent One, beyond human rea-
son limits. Concerning Cantor, the Skeptics can reject the proper infinite, the transfinite,
(the finite human mind cannot tame the actual infinite), but they cannot deny the existence
of the Absolute infinite because He is beyond the limits of human reason limits (beyond
the domain of human reason). In the history of ideas, Descartes made a mistake because
with his ontological proof he put God under the scope of human reason. So in this way
for human beings it is possible also to deny His existence or prove that God does not exist
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whereas in Cantor’s or Damascius’ thought this is impossible. Like Cantor and Damascius,
a theologician Karl Barth [Barth 10] said that human beings cannot understand and know
anything about God’s nature because it is possible that God (beyond the human logic) put
Adolf Hitler in heaven and Saint Francis in hell.
The total unutterability, ineffability of Damascius’ principle and Cantor’s Absolute infinite
gave rise to two respectively different methodologies in order to speak about what is not
possible to speak about. According to Hao Wang [Wang 96], Kurt Gödel asserts that:
All principles to constitute the axioms of set theory should be reducible to
a form of Ackermann’s principle: the Absolute infinite is unknowable. The
strength of this principle increases when we obtain systems of set theory
increasingly stronger. The other principles are only heuristic. Thus, the
central principle is the reflection principle, which will be understood better
when our experience will increase.[Wang 96]
Peter Koellner [Koellner 091] uses the following words to describe reflection principles :
The reflection principles aim at articulating the informal idea that the height
of the universe is absolutely infinite, and so it cannot be characterised from
below. These principles assert that every sentence true in V, is true in some
smaller Vα.[Koellner 091]
Reflection Principles derive, as we have seen, from the reflection theorem of Levy and
Montague 1 For many authors reflection principles represent intrinsic justification of large
cardinals axioms (large cardinal axioms). It is possible through reflection to speak about
the Absolute infinite. Initial segments of the universe reflect properties which cannot char-
acterize directly the Absolute infinite because He is unknowable. Reflection is an indirect
method to speak about what cannot be characterized. The idea of reflecting properties
1Every formula of the first-order language of set theory true in V reflects to some Vα. That is, for every
formula φ(x1......xn) and every a1......an ∈ V there is an α such that: V |= φ(a1.....an)if and only if Vα |=
φ(a1......an).
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of the universe is based on Cantor metaphysical conception that the Absolute infinite is
unknowable.
The neoplatonic philosophers, when they spoke about the absolutely transcendent Princi-
ple, which could not be characterized, used the apophatic method, or via negationis. From
the impossibility of nominating correctly the Principle, or characterizing it with some pos-
itive attributes, takes origin the attempt of giving, anyway, a description enumerating all
names and attributes which cannot refer to it. The apophatic method plays a fundamen-
tal role in Plotinus’ Enneads where The One is described as being without limit, without
figure and parts, neither in some place neither in any place, neither moved neither still,
not in the time, lacking of qualities and lacking of being, neither One, etc [Plotinus 09].
The One (the principle absolutely transcendent) is beyond all positive determinations. It is
very interesting the following assertion of Damascius [Damascius 02]: About the Supreme
Principle we cannot say anything. This sentence seems to give rise to a semantic antinomy
similar to the Liar paradox : The sentence talks about other sentences, forcing to avoid
those sentences that have as object the Supreme Principle; However the sentence itself
mentions the Supreme Principle, and, although negative, it describes The One. Both the
apophatic method and reflection principles are methodologies to talk respectively about
the Supreme Principle and the Absolute infinite, totally unknowable otherwise. The first
methodology goes higher and higher. In fact, by negating every attribute, we put the
Supreme Principle beyond every determination. Reflection goes lower and lower. Initial
segments of the universe reflect properties which cannot characterize directly the Absolute
infinite.
Joan Bagaria [Bagaria 13] uses the following words to describe reflection principles:
This principle of the unknowability of the Absolute, which in Cantor’s work
seems to have only a metaphysical (non-mathematical) meaning, resurfaces
again in the 1950’s in the work of Ackermann and Levy (as we have seen
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before), taking the mathematical form of the principle of reflection. Thus,
in Ackermann’s set theory, in fact a theory of classes, which is formulated
in the first-order language of set theory with an additional constant sym-
bol for the universe of all sets V, the idea of reflection is expressed in the
form of an axiom schema of comprehension: Ackermann’s reflection : Let
φ(x, x1, z1.......zn) be a formula which does not contain the constant symbol
V. Then for every a1, .......an ∈ V , ∀x(φ(x, a1......an) −→ x ∈ V ) −→ ∃y(y ∈
V ∧ ∀x(x ∈ y ↔ φ(x, a1, ......an))).
A consequence of Ackermann’s reflection is that no formula can define V, or
OR, and is therefore in agreement with Cantor’s principle of the unknowa-
bility of the Absolute. However, Ackermann’s set theory (with foundation)
was shown by Levy (1959) and Reinhardt (1970) to be essentially equiva-
lent to ZF, in the sense that both theories prove the same theorems about
sets. Thus Ackermann’s set theory did not provide any real advantage with
respect to the simpler and intuitively clearer ZFC axioms and so it was
eventually forgotten. [Bagaria 13]
But, from a philosophical perspective, Ackermann’s set theory is very interesting. In fact,
within this theory it is possible to prove the existence of classes like P (V ), PP (V ), PPP (V ).
In a few words, in Ackermann’s theory we can prove the existence of subclasses of proper
classes. 2 Reinhardt, following Ackermann, introduced the theory of Ω-classes where he
admits classes like On + 1, On + ω, On + On, et. At this point it immediately arises the
following question : is it possible to inquire and to extend the universe? and moreover, is
it possible to legitimate proper classes and to use them as indexes in iterated structural
reflection? I believe that the possibility of extending the universe is connected with the
possibility of giving a positive solution to Burali-Forti’s antinomy and Cantor’s antinomy. I
2It is also philosophically interesting that for Ackermann what a set (menge) is, is not a well-defined notion.
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think, in fact, that these two antinomies are generated by the fact of putting a block to the
natural first Cantorian generating principle of set theory, namely taking successor stage. If
we apply Cantor’s theorem to the universal class, namely V, we produce a paradox because
at the same time V contains all other sets and there is a class, the power set (the sub-class)
of V, that for Cantor’s theorem is bigger and it is not contained in V. But if we could
extend the universe of sets and V were only an initial segment of a larger universe, then
even if we apply Cantor’s theorem to the universal class, we would not have a paradox
any more. Taking limit stage (the second generating principle of set theory according
to Cantor) is not so immediate and natural as taking successor stage, so if we consider
the class of all ordinals On or the universal class V and we put a block to the natural
and essential operation of set theory, namely the generation of the successor number, we
produce paradoxes that threaten the pillars on which set theory is built. Bertrand Russell
believed that even if Cantor’s antinomy, Burali-Forti’s antinomy and Russell’s paradox
seem to be different, they have the same mathematical form. I strongly disagree with
him. Cantor’s and Burali’s antinomies derive (according to my conception) from the fact
of blocking the possibility of taking successor stages whereas Russell’s paradox is based on
a linguistic self-referential sentence. On one hand, we can consider Cantor’s and Burali’s
antinomies as structural contradictions, on the other hand Russell’s paradox seems to have
a linguistic or semantic nature. So in order to legitimate the use of proper classes, such as
On + ω, as indexes of iterated structural reflection and give a positive solution to Cantor’s
and Burali-Forti’s paradox, we can see if it is possible to extend the universe. Cantor’s
antinomy is generated by the power set operation applied to the universal class. It is not
very clear what taking all arbitrary subclasses of the universal class actually means. The
power set of the universal class is not an operation which can be considered legitimate.
When we consider proper classes, it is meaningless to imply operations which force us to
take all subclasses without control. In fact, also the power set of ω is a vague operation.
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All subsets of ω is a sentence which does not have a precise meaning. On one side, I
can consider only definable subsets of ω, as in L, thus making the continuum hypothesis
true , on the other side i can construct models (forcing extensions) where all ZFC axioms
are true and the cardinality of the power set of ω is ℵω, namely a very large number in
ZFC. So if the power set of ω is a vague operation, the power set of the universal class
is not a legitimate operation. Thus it is possible to inquire in which way we can extend
Cantor’s universe. Even if P (VOn) (the power set of Universal class) does not have a
precise meaning and it is not a legitimate operation, the operation P def (VOn) seems to be
a meaningful operation. In a few words, taking all definable subclasses of proper classes is
a legitimate operation. We are adding L (Gödel’s constructible universe) upon the vertex
of Cantor’s universe. Surely, suppose that we have a theory for this extended universe.
Suppose that we have axioms for this extended universe. Since it is an extension of Cantor’s
universe, we can call it the first constructible Gödelian universe. Considering all arbitrary
subclasses of a proper class is meaningless, but referring to only definable subclasses of a
proper class is a valid operation. Both the universal class (V) and the class of all ordinals
On are definable by ∆0 formulas, so Cantor’s universe (initial rank) is a member of the
successor, namely the first constructible class of the first Gödelian universe. The first two
initial ranks of the first constructible Gödelian universe are the following : LG0 = VOn and
LG1 = P
def (VOn). Since we take only definable subclasses of the universal class, in the first
Gödelian universe we do not increase the number of sets comparing with the elements of the
Universal class, V (Cantor’s Universe).3 Cantor’s antinomy and Burali Forti’s antinomies
specific for Cantor’s universe vanish completely in the first Gödelian universe. Cantor’s
paradox is a direct consequence of Cantor’s theorem. Cantor’s paradox states that there is
no greatest cardinal number. To understand this paradox, we have to follow this reasoning:
V is the universal class, P (V ) ⊆ V and so, P (V ) ≤ V ; But this aspect contradicts the fact
3Cantor’s universe is enlarging because at the successor stage we adopt the real power set operation for
arbitrary sets, whereas in the first Gödelian universe at the successor stage we take only definable subclasses
of a proper class and we do not add new elements which have a cardinality larger than the universe V itself
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that, by Cantor’s theorem, if V were a set, we would have V < P (V ). To give a solution to
Cantor’s paradox, we are forced to deny that Universal class exists as a set and we call V a
proper class, a mathematical object which does not belong to the universe (or ontology)
of ZFC. In the first Gödelian universe, we have the successor of Universe class and we
are stating that the Universal class is the initial segment of this first Gödelian universe.
The assumption P (V ) ≤ V is not anymore true in the first Gödelian universe. In fact, we
have LG1 ≥ LG0 where LG1 is the successor stage and LG0 corresponds to Cantor’s universe
or simply to the universal class. The concept of the greatest element becomes a relative
concept: the universal class V is the greatest element relatively to Cantor’s universe but it
is not anymore the unique greatest element in the first Gödelian universe. So in the first
Gödelian universe the universal class is not anymore a complicated mathematical object,
but it belongs to the universe (or ontology) of this universe...... For Burali-Forti’s paradox
we can have the same reasoning. In fact, this paradox originates from the fact that if the
class of all ordinals were an ordinal, it would be isomorphic to a proper initial segment
of itself. But, if the class of all ordinals is simply an initial segment of a larger universe
(Gödel’s first universe), then the problematic issue regarding this paradox would disappear.
However, we will have Cantor’s antinomy and Burali Forti’s paradox specific for the first
Gödelian universe. Then to solve the antinomies specific for the first Gödelian universe
we have to transcend it (extend it) by creating the second Gödelian universe and so on. I
said before that the concept of the greatest element is a relative concept. Therefore, we
would have the greatest element in the first Gödelian universe, namely V G1On (the set of
all sets and classes of Cantor’s universe and the first Gödelian universe). So if we do not
transcend (extend) the first Gödelian universe by creating the second Gödelian universe,
Cantor’s paradox applies again to the first Gödelian universe. So we can ask in which
way we can transcend the first Gödelian universe. The answer is simple. We can take
all definable subclasses of the Universal class of the first Gödelian universe, namely V G1On .
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Surely, after creating the second Gödelian universe, we will face the same problem since
Cantor’s paradox applies also to this universe. So we have to transcend it (extend it)
by generating the third Gödelian unverse. We must take all definable subclasses of the
universal class of the second Gödelian universe namely, V G2On . Then, we continue in this
way. We cannot stop creating new universes in order to escape from Cantor’s paradox.
The reasoning for Burali-Forti’s paradox is the same. In a few words in order to solve
the Cantor’s and Burali-Forti’s antinomies we must be potentialist concerning all these
universes (all extensions of Cantor’s universe). It is always possible to add a new universe.
2. Stressing philosophical aspects: the Kantian distinction again within set
theory and the problematic nature of real numbers
Realism has been, maybe, the first philosophy of mathematics. In fact, we can find in
Proclus’ writings (4th century a.c) the following assertion : the idealizations of geometry
are innate forms precedent and independent from any experience. Also Descartes uses the
same words to describe geometry:
When I imagine a triangle, although in any place of the world there is not
a similar geometric figure outside my thought, and there has never been,
however a certain nature, or form, or essence determined by this figure,
which is immutable and eternal, neither I created, neither depends from my
spirit, does not stop existing. [Descartes 641]
Following contemporary thought we can distinguish between simple realism which sustains
that set theory, or mathematics, is the study of an objective universe, namely the universe of
sets, and plentiful platonism which affirms the existence of different universes corresponding
to different no-contradictory theories formulated in first-order logic. Philosophers, who
support simple realism, believe that propositions such as the continuum hypothesis, which
are undecidable in the accepted current theory, Zermelo-Frankel theory with AC or its
extensions (large cardinal axioms) have a truth value, not yet known, in the universe of
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which ZFC axioms are a description, obviously incomplete. On the contrary, plentiful
platonism sustains that these propositions do not have a truth value; there are universes
in which they are true and universes in which they are false; there are different universes.
Following plentiful platonism, Joel David Hamkins [Hamkins 10] develops the multiverse
conception which asserts the existence of many universes of mathematics. First of all,
according to Hamkins, whole mathematics can be reduced to set theory and since in set
theory we have different models like L, V [G](outer models), L[U ] (inner models), L[W ],
L[E], Ult(V), etc.. we can consider these models as different universes of mathematics
with different true propositions. Even if Hamkins’ theory is very interesting, I disagree
with Hamkins for an ontological perspective. In fact, I believe that all these models belong
to metamathematics and so they are simply phenomenal interpretations of the unique,
immutable, noumenal universe of sets V. .
At this point, I am asking myself why we have many problems to discover the real nature of
third-order arithmetic (to obtain absoluteness results in third-order arithmetic). I believe
that the nature of irrational numbers is problematic. Real numbers are constituted by
rational numbers and irrational numbers. We know that rational numbers are countable,
so irrational numbers are uncountable.
In his poem on nature, Parmenides describes two views of reality (we shall focus only
on the first view). In the way of truth, he explains how reality (called as what-is) is
one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, necessary, and unchanging.
Natural numbers, integers (Z) and rational numbers are parmenidean because they are
timeless, uniform, necessary and, above all, unchanging (I am not mentioning parmenidean
monism). If we draw a straight line, all these numbers correspond to a precise point. On
the contrary, irrational numbers might be better described by Heraclitus’ maxim: No man
ever steps in the same river twice (there is a ever-present change in the universe). Irrational
numbers seem to move continuously and they do not seem to be timeless (the magnitude
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of an irrational number seems to be an everlasting process). Since after a decimal there
is always another decimal, to calculate the magnitude of an irrational number, we have to
imply a constant change. Furthermore, it is impossible to put an irrational number on a
straight line. If we imagine an infinite Turing Machine that positions numbers on a straight
line (a counterfactual situation), after an infinite amount of time, the Turing machine will
be able to position all rational numbers, whereas for irrational numbers it will not produce
any answer, but it will go on forever. There is also another issue involved in the conception
of irrational numbers. They involve the concept of the infinite. The square root of two is a
finite number, but the decimals continue forever. So I am asking myself how it is possible
that a finite concept can involve infinity.
William O. Quine characterizes irrational numbers in the following way:
Then it is discovered that the rules of our algebra can be much simplified
by conceptually augmenting our ontology with some mythical entities, to
be called irrational numbers [Quine 51]
So for Quine, irrational numbers even if mythical entities, since they are useful, they belong
to the ontology of mathematics. It seems to me that Quine, like Gödel for strong axioms of
infinity, is justifying extrinsically the existence of irrational numbers. They are mythical,
they are not numbers like natural numbers, but they are useful so they can belong to the
world of mathematics. The theoretical difficulty of extrinsic justification, which for Gödel
corresponds to the fruitfulness of the consequences of adopting a peculiar axiom and for
Quine corresponds to the usefulness of simplifying mathematical results, is the following:
if mathematics is a creation of human mind, we can use extrinsic justification to enlarge
our ontology or accept an axiom without problems, but if mathematics is a description
(as I think) of an external, objective, independent, immutable and eternal world, extrinsic
justification must be connected with intrinsic justification which is based essentially on a
conceptual analysis. If we have to make a choice, first of all we should look at intrinsic
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justification and secondly at extrinsic justification.
Irrational numbers seem to be a creation of human spirit, they do not seem to belong
to the world of sets and, so, maybe, the theoretical difficulty of finding a solution to the
continuum problem is generated by the problematic nature of these numbers. However, it
is possible to argue that we can relate the continuum problem solely to pure set theory and
so, we can speak about subsets, countable and uncountable sets without mentioning any
number systems. Unfortunately, there is a strong connection between irrational numbers
(real numbers) and subsets of a countable set. In fact we can write an irrational number
in binary expansion and we will have a string of 0s and 1s, e.g. 0100011111000000.....
without an end. We can see this string as values of a characteristic function and so each
string can correspond to an infinite subset of a countable set. Therefore, maybe, in order
to find a solution to the continuum problem accepted by the whole mathematical com-
munity, we should clarify the nature of irrational numbers. Even if I believe in a unique,
eternal, acasual world of sets and I hope that set theorists will obtain absoluteness results
for third-order arithmetic, we can take, as Universe for the mathematical game, a Universe
which belongs to the phenomenal metamathematics. Surely I consider metamathematics
as a creation of human mind and exclusively a phenomenal interpretation of the real world
of sets. But, if a model contains all large cardinal notions, it can be viewed as a satisfac-
tory universe where we can accomplish mathematics. If a model contains all large cardinal
notions, it is rich enough and we can hope that only few notions of the real, immutable,
acausual world of sets are left aside. Since the power set operation for arbitrary sets is
vague (I will speak about the noumenal power set later on), i prefer the definable power set
operation, more precise for mathematics. Therefore Woodin’s Ultimate L (if the Ultimate
L conjecture is true), which is an inner model containing all large cardinal numbers and as
all other inner models is characterised by definability (the power set operation is precise),
can be considered as perfect Universe for mathematics. In this very large inner model,
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the continuum hypothesis is true and so also Analysis should mirror this result. So to
make a joke, even if I am realist, I become intuitionist because I am forced to consider the
Ultimate L, which is simply a creation of human mind, as the real universe of mathematics.
If the Ultimate L conjecture is false, I believe that the continuum hypothesis is settled by
the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom, but this would be a phenomenal truth which holds
within a phenomenal models that we choose philosophically among a plurality of different
phenomenal models or universes.
At this point, I would like to combine structuralism with my semi-realistic conception.
Structuralism affirms that mathematics is the study of structures. However, a structuralist
does not say what structures really are. Nevertheless, structuralism must explain in which
way structures are studied and inquiried mathematically. For instance, structuralism can
use an informal semantics where the fundamental notions are primitive and not defined:
structures are characterised by properties, concerning relations and functions, which are
true in the structures; but neither the concept of truth nor the concept of property are
analysed. Structures are considered as primitive logical concepts and the study of struc-
tures is accomplished in the informal semantics. Unfortunately, this approach does not
take in consideration the development of mathematical logic in the last century and the
use of informal semantics seems to say that mathematics studies what it studies. Another
solution can be the axiomatic approach. We can avoid whole semantics and we can say
that structures are characterised by axioms: when a structure is given, we postulate, by
using symbolic writings, conditions which must be satisfied by operations and relations.
Properties of structures are consequences which are deduced from the axioms. So, struc-
turalism might resemble formalism or deductivism. The formalist position is assumed by
Bourbaki [Lolli 02].
Gabriele Lolli in his fascinating book, at some point introduces platonic structuralism ac-
cording to which structures are sets. I agree with this position and even if structuralism
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does not define structures, i think that platonic structuralism might overcome this problem
in the following way : structures are families of sets bound together by the membership
relation. A structure which is constituted by a family (very small o very large) of sets
and characterised by the relations (membership) between the sets of the family, is a small
universe. Each structure is a different small universe where we accomplish different cal-
culations. In my semi-realistic conception, we have the immutable, independent, eternal,
acasual world of sets and then we have metamathematical models and structures which
are creation of human mind. There is a fundamental difference between metamathematical
models and structures. Metamathematical models have a semantic pretension. In fact, a
model aims at rendering all axioms true and some mathematical propositions true. Struc-
tures do not have this pretension. In my conception, we create structures by choosing
specific sets and establishing conditions for the membership relation. Certainly we can
know the nature of sets and the characteristics of relations in the structure, but this is
the phenomenal reality 4 (like for metamathematical models). Even if in the case that
the Ultimate L conjecture is true, I consider the Ultimate L the noumenal universe for
mathematics, I still believe that the ultimate L is a phenomenal reality.
At this point, i would clarify why the formalistic conception of mathematics is not a good
philosophy of mathematics. Formalism does not inquiry the essence or the meaning of
numbers, but only how numbers are used. Mathematics, in the formalistic conception, is
like playing with signs which are empty (meaningless). They get their meaning from certain
rules within specific mathematical games. Mathematics is a game with its specific rules.
According to J.Thomae [Lolli 02] arithmetic is like chess with different typology of rules,
but still a game. David Hilbert considered arithmetical equations as strings of signs which
were meaningless outside the formal system and meaningful only within the system. The
formal system must be consistent. Contradictions should always be avoided. The formal
4Retaking a Kantian distinction, the phenomenal reality is the apparent world whereas the noumenal reality
is the objective, independent, true universe of sets
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system is characterised by a mechanical, blind deduction within the system, using the rules
of the system. The other aspect is the construction of the system itself: the choice of the
language, axioms and rules which delimit the mathematical game of all internal possible
symbolic activities. I think that formalism is fascinating but we should distinguish between
the instant of intuition and the moment of metacognition. To see that an axiom is true
or to find a solution to a mathematical problem are mathematical actions which occur at
the level of mathematical intuition. Maybe the proof itself is mechanical, but the starting
point, namely the truth of an axiom, and the ending point, the solution to the problem,
are not mechanical at all, but they belong to the realm of intuition. Nevertheless intuition
is not a rational process, but it characterises our irrationality and, as Kant was thinking, it
belongs to sensibility. Intuition is independent from games and rules. When we grasp the
truth of an axiom, independently from the rules of the games, we are naturally referring
to something (relations and mathematical entities) which can be independent objects or
creations of human mind external to the formal system. Intuition makes us denoting some-
thing that is external, meaningful, independent from the formal system (the mathematical
game). To understand the truth of an axiom, we cannot only see the string of symbols
itself but we have to accede a reality which can be the immutable world of sets or a human
spirit creation. We can say that what we have done mathematically is only a mechanical
proof within the game and we have understood the meaning of the symbols only from the
rules of the game, only at the level of metacognition. Solely when we reflect about what we
have done, a moment after intuition, we can adopt a formalistic point of view. Formalism
should explain the instant of intuition. For example to understand that the axiom which
assert the existence of a strongly inaccessible cardinal constitutes a model of ZFC, we have
to use intuition (at least I believe). First of all, we have to grasp the fact that a strongly
inaccessible cardinal cannot be reached from below. To understand this, we are referring to
an external, meaningful object. Secondly we have to grasp what the axiom of replacement
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is saying (the possibility of generating all functions within ZFC). At the end, we have to
combine the truth of these two axioms and grasp the fact that no function can reach a
strongly inaccessible cardinal (there is no cofinal function) and so a strongly inaccessible
cardinal is a closure point for the axioms of ZFC. All these passages require intuition where
we are denoting something independent. Only at the level of metacognition we can say
that putting together two strings of symbols (the formulas for the two axioms) we are able
to deduce mechanically within the ZFC game that a strong inaccessible cardinal is a model
of ZFC.
At this point I want to come back to a problematic issue for realism. A simple realist
is a realist not only for ontological entities but also for truth values. A plentiful realist
is a realist for ontological entities but not for truth values since each structure can have
different mathematical true propositions. So beyond ontological realism, there is also a
truth value realism. But there is a very problematic theoretic difficulty for this kind of
realism, namely Tarski’s theorem about the indefinability of truth. For this theorem, the
concept of mathematical truth is vague, if the language is informal, or we have to consider
a huge hierarchy of metalanguages always more and more complicated. The main problem
is the following: to define the truth of mathematical propositions of the universe of set (or
mathematics), we need a theory in which this universe is the object, so a theory which can
prove that the whole existent mathematics is not contradictory. This is impossible. But
we can still speak of local truths relative to specific metamathematical models. However
Tarski’s theorem represents a serious problem for simple realism.
The Ultimate L can represent a solution (philosophical) for Tarski’s theorem (when this
theorem is used as a case against simple realism). In fact the nature of this metamath-
ematical model is parodoxical : the Ultimate L contains at the same time local truths,
since it is still a metamathematical model, and universal truths, since it has got all large
cardinal notions and it can be seen as a close representation of the real universe of all sets.
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So for Tarski’s theorem (when it is used as a case against simple realism) we should adopt
the Ultimate L as a solution.
3. The plausibility of a new axiom, namely ZFC + 0] exists
Now I want to compare the axiom 0] exists with the axiom of constructibility. For
Kunen’s impossibility theorem, we cannot have an embedding of the universe V into itself
(j : V −→ V is inconsistent), but if 0] exists, we can have an embedding of L into itself.
Therefore the existence of 0] contradicts the axiom of constructibility, namely V = L. So
the choice between ZFC + 0] exists and ZFC + V = L is a fundamental philosophical
question which for its importance it deserves to be treated immediately. Many set theorists
reject the axiom of constructibility because they judge it too restrictive. In 1938 Kurt Gödel
wrote the following :
The axiom of constructibility added as a new axioms seems to give a natural
completion of the axioms of set theory, in so far as it determines the vague
notion of an arbitrary infinite set in a definite way. [Wang 96]
From 1947 on, Kurt Gödel changed his view about the axiom of constructibility and he
rejected it. However, instead of following the majority of set theorists that reject this
axiom, we should ask ourselves why Gödel during this initial period was accepting it. The
main reason is that the notion of arbitrary set is vague. For instance, if we take the power
set operation, we are forced to face a problem of vagueness. We do not know what is the
meaning of taking all subsets of ω. The word All is vague. By forcing method, the sentence
all subsets of ω can be interpreted metamathematically and the number of subsets of ω
can be equal with a large cardinal notion while in L by taking all definable subsets of ω
the continuum hypothesis holds. In L, the vague notion of arbitrary set is made precise.
In set theory, from one side we have a great variety of beautiful models, from the other
side we cannot settle the continuum hypothesis. Towards the solution of CH, I believe
that we have two options, namely the top down road or the bottom up road. The top
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down is the usual method which consists in searching for new axioms. I call this way top
down because we go higher and higher in the universe to settle something like CH which is
located lower in the hierarchy of the actual infinite. On the contrary, the bottom up method
consists in deepening our analysis of the power set operation and the notion of arbitrary
set that is connected to it. If we have to focus on the power set operation, we have three
options. First of all, there is definabilism which corresponds to the construction of L (the
constructible universe). From one side L avoids strictly impredicative definitions, but from
the other side the construction of L is based on the original impredicative use of the class
of all ordinals. Therefore even if L can be seen as an extreme form of predicativism, the
constructible universe is characterised by an impredicative use of the class of all ordinals.
Secondly we have arbitrariness that forces us to take all arbitrary subsets of a given set.
While defininabilism is connected with L and other inner models like L[U ], the conception
of arbitrariness is linked to outer models (forcing method). As it usually happens in the
history of ideas that a third way between two options is preferable, so it seems that the
third way represented by combinatorialism can give a solution to the power set operation.
Now we have to clarify what combinatorialism is. Paul Bernays uses the following words
in order characterise combinatorialism:
Modern analysis, etc, abstracts from the possibility of giving definitions of
sets, sequences and functions. These notions are used in a quasi-combinatorial
sense by which I mean: in the sense of an analogy of the infinite to the finite.
Consider, for example, the different functions which assign to each member
of the finite series 1,2,..... n a number of the same series. There are nn
functions of this sort, and each of them is obtained by n independent de-
terminations. Passing to the infinite case, we imagine functions engendered
by an infinity of independent determinations which assign to each integer
an integer, and we reason about the totality of these functions. In the same
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way, one views a set of integers as the result of infinitely many independent
acts deciding for each number whether it should be included or excluded.
We add to this the idea of the totality of these sets. Sequences of real num-
bers and sets of real numbers are envisaged in an analogous manner. In
[Maddy 97]
So according to combinatorialism, there is one function from reals to reals for every way
of making 2ℵ0 independent assignments of a real to a real. Ignasi Jané [Jane 05] applies
the combinatorial method to the power set operation. Now I will try to describe his view.
First of all, he deals with the Gödel set of (power set) operation which assigns to any
given domain D a new domain D*, the power domain of D, which consists of the sets of
objects in D. When D is a finite domain of n elements, not only we can tell that there
are exactly 2n distinct selections of D-objects, but we also know how to describe them
explicitly. So in the finite case, the power domain D* can be described in full as the
totality of D-sets. But no such procedure works for the infinite case. We can introduce
the conception of combinatorial D-set, that is, of a plurality selected by arbitrarily and
independently deciding for every object in the domain whether to select it or not. The
problem is that we do not know what a combinatorial set is. Moreover the combinatorial
approach to D-sets is meaningful and will single out a domain only under the assumption
that such domain exists. For all these problems, Ignasi Jané asserts that we do not describe
D* as the totality of all D-sets, but we postulate the existence of a domain called D* and
we define a D-set to be an object of D*. We require that D* is maximally extensional over
D, namely D* cannot be extended without loss of extensionality. Ignasi Jané explains his
view with the following words:
Strictly speaking, then, we do not know what all D-sets are and we do not
know what D* is. Nevertheless, we can reason about D*, we can define some
D-sets and we can argue for the existence of D-sets with certain properties.
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Thus, no matter what plurality of D-objects we would ever acknowledge,
there should be a D-set corresponding to it. In particular, in D* there is a set
corresponding to each plurality of D-objects which we know how to specify
in some given context, as there are D-sets corresponding to those pluralities
specifiable in terms of other members of D*. D* is thus conceived as being
closed under various operations, some of them inspired by the suggestion of
combinatorial sets. In a sense, we can think of D* as the ideal completion
of open-ended range of specifiable pluralities of D-objects. [Jane 05]
This approach is surely fascinating and it takes some aspects of definabilism even if in
a combinatorial way (ideal completion of open-ended range of definable pluralities of D-
objects). In my opinion a combinatorial set should be based on choice functions. Actually a
combinatorial set should be a choice set abstracting from the possibility of giving definitions
of set and using (if necessary) impredicative conditions. When a condition (definition) is
given, which can be also impredicative, we abstract from that condition and we form
the choice set by selecting all elements which satisfy that condition, making independent
determinations. Therefore the problem of finding a combinatorial set is related to the
plausibility of the axiom of choice. Kurt Gödel believed that this axiom was true. Georg
Cantor was using a different principle that we can call the iterable choice principle. This
principle was based on the idea that at time 1 we select one element, at time 2 we select
another element, at time 3 a different element and so on throughout the infinite. Cantor’s
principle is more realistic 5 since it is characterised by a temporal component, while the
axiom of choice is atemporal and changeless since in one shot we have a choice set. I said
changeless because it seems to me that the choice set belongs to an immutable, atemporal,
eternal and acausal (this last aspect brings up a philosophical problem about the perception
of mathematical entities) world of mathematical forms.
5By using the word realistic, I mean that this principle belongs to the physical world and not to the
changeless, eternal platonic world of mathematics.
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So we have seen that the axiom of constructibility, even if restrictive, makes precise the
notion of arbitrary set and it renders the power set operation fixed and definite. So maybe
this is the main reason why Gödel was believing in this axiom. In fact, we have seen that
many problems arise in the case of the power set operation. So it seems to me that (adopting
a Kantian distinction) we have to distinguish between the phenomenal power set and the
noumenal power set. The phenomenal power set is what we interpret metamathematically
and renders the metamathematics of set theory so rich. The noumenal power set is the real
operation that inhabits the platonic world of mathematics and it is beyond (for now) our
understanding. It is possible to sum up my realistic conception, which makes the distinction
between the phenomenal and the noumenal reality in set theory, with the following maxim:
God gave us sets (noumenal reality), we (humans) metamathematically (phenomenally)
interpret them. Before moving to the fundamental philosophical issue of this chapter, a
striking question arises in my mind. I am always asking myself how it is possible that
a finite human mind can grasp the concept (largeness) of, for example, a supercompact
cardinal. In the Grundlagen, Cantor affirms that a finite human mind can understand the
transfinite because the transfinite is subjected to some immutable laws that humans can
conceive and assume. I believe, as I will explain later, that the fact that we can capture the
concept of the infinite can be assumed to support my dualist thesis in philosophy of mind.
At this point, coming back to our original question, namely the choice between the axiom
of constructibility and the axiom asserting the existence of 0], we have to introduce some
principle that would enable us to decide between these two axioms. The first principle that
I want to discuss is maximization. Penelope Maddy [Maddy 97] describes maximization as
follows:
The idea is to motivate the case against restrictive theories by appeal to
MAXIMIZE, so the central claim will be that restrictive theories somehow
restrict isomorphism types [.....] There are things like 0] that are not in
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L. And not only is 0] not in L, its existence implies the existence of an
isomorphism type that is not realized by anything in L. [......] So it seems
that ZFC + V=L is restrictive because it rules out the extra isomorphism
types available from ZFC + 0] exists. [Maddy 97]
So if we adopt the principle of maximization, we should choose the theory ZFC + 0] exists
because it implies the existence of more sets (more isomorphism types). Surely, maximiza-
tion is an important principle and many set theorists adopt it because they want to have
a richer universe. So this principle justifies axioms that render the universe of set theory
richer and richer. However we must always avoid inconsistency. I believe that maximization
is related to three ideas, namely extrinsic justification, a realistic conception of mathemat-
ics, and the Cantorian conception of freedom. Gödel asserts that extrinsic justification is
based on the fruitfulness of the results. In a few words, an axiom should be evaluated
on the basis of the results that we can obtain from it. But as Maximization pushes set
theorists further and further, so extrinsic justification forces set theorists to go further and
further (infinitely many Woodin cardinals, proper class of Woodin measurable cardinals).
So, maximization is related to extrinsic justification since from one side the constructible
universe is too restrictive and from the other side, we have to transcend Gödel’s universe
to obtain fundamental results for second-order arithmetic and third-order arithmetic. It
seems to me that maximization is related also to a realistic conception of mathematics. It
seems that when we maximize by accepting intuitively a particular axiom, we are discov-
ering a new reality as scientists discover new planets and new atomic particles. Certainly,
some set theorists would respond that there is no objective reality of sets but only a reality
which is created by human mind and we can call it, the intra-subjective mathematical real-
ity. However, there is a case in set theory that supports my conviction in realism. When we
study large cardinals and we deepen our analysis of weakly compact cardinals, we become
aware of a striking aspect which forces us to believe that maybe weakly compact cardinals
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exist independently from our mind. Firstly, a weakly compact cardinal is uncountable and
satisfies the partition property κ −→ (κ)22. Secondly a weakly compact cardinal satisfies
the tree property. Furthermore a cardinal κ is Π11 indescribable if and only if it is weakly
compact. Moreover there is the issue of infinitary languages. A collection of Lλφ sentences
is satisfiable iff it has a model under the expected interpretation of infinitary conjuction,
disjunction and quantification; and is κ-satisfiable iff every sub-collection of cardinality less
than κ is satisfiable. For a cardinal κ > ω, κ is weakly compact iff any collection of Lκκ
sentences using at most κ non-logical symbols, if κ is satisfiable. So we have seen that the
notion of weakly compact cardinal is derivable from totally different parts of set theory
and we get the same notion. We depart from partition calculus, reflection or infinitary
languages and we grasp the same notion. It is this interdefinability (or multidefinability)
that forces me to believe that maybe this large cardinal notion exists independently of our
mind.
At the end, maximality is connected with the Cantorian conception of freedom. In the
Grundlagen, Cantor affirms that the main feature of mathematics is its freedom. A math-
ematician should be free to introduce new mathematical concept, unless contradictory. If
we see the large cardinal hierarchy, we notice that every cardinal notion is the natural
evolution (in many cases) of concepts that are located lower in the hierarchy. The more
the model M6 is similar to the universe V, the larger cardinal notion we obtain. Since
no large cardinal notion causes contradiction until now (except for a Reinhardt cardinal
in the presence of the axiom of choice), if we stop at the level of a measurable cardinal,
6The model M is the transitive collapse of some Ultrapower of the universe. After taking the ultrapower
of the Universe V (well-founded), we generate a triangle of embeddings: an embedding of the universe
V into the Ultrapower, an embedding of the ultrapower into its transitive collapse M and at the end, an
embedding of the Universe directly into the model M itself. So when we generate the embedding of the
universe V into the transitive model M, we discover the first measurable cardinal (the critical point of the
embedding). Then departing from the first measurable cardinal and putting conditions on the image of the
critical point, namely j(κ), in M (enlarging M), we obtain larger and larger cardinal notions
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then our freedom of introducing new concepts would be limited. The set theorist Men-
achem Magidor asserted that the intrinsic justification of the axioms is based mainly on
the analysis of the concepts involved. If we deepen our analysis of the large cardinal no-
tions, well, mathematical freedom can be seen as the intrinsic justification of new axioms.
Mathematician must be free to introduce new mathematical concepts unless contradictory.
If we look at the large cardinals hierarchy, a Reinhardt cardinal generates a contradiction
in ZFC (Kunen’s inconsistency result). Mathematical freedom fits perfectly with the large
cardinals hierarchy. Measurable, strong, superstrong, supercompact, extendible cardinals
represent a consistent enlargement of M, so if we are free, we cannot limits and we must be
free to introduce them as axioms. Thus mathematical freedom is connected to maximality.
4. Melissus of Samo and Georg Cantor
At this point, I want to focus my attention on a thought that comes from ancient greek
philosophy for two reasons. I would like to apply an idea that comes from an ancient greek
philosopher to modern set theory.
The philosopher I want to speak about is Melissus of Samo. This philosopher was born
around the sixth century B.C. Melissus was the last philosopher of the Eleatic school and
his critical discussion about the Parmenidean principle (what it is,τo εoν) and his assertion
about the infiniteness of this principle opened the way to the development of ancient greek
philosophy.
The unity of τo εoν was declared clearly from Parmenides when he defined it as One
and continous. Parmenides also asserted that since the τo εoν (the principle of real-
ity) is one, nothing which could stay close to it could be born and this principle could
not be divided because it is the same in all its parts. But since Parmenides attributed
the finiteness to τo εoν, this aspect produced the following theoretical difficulty: If it is
one and finite, it must admit something beyond itself. For Melissus the τo εoν is not
born, it was always present, it will be present forever, it does not have beginning, it
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does not have an end and it is infinite. Moreover, for Melissus the τo εoν is One, oth-
erwise it would confine to something else and infinite otherwise it would confine to the
void. Let us consider the following Melissus’ assertion: ει γαρ απειρoν ειη, εν ειη αν :
ει γαρ δυo ειη, oυκ αν δυναιτo απειρα ειναι, αλλ′ εχoι αν πειρατα πρoσ αλληλα (If it
is infinite, it must be one: if they were two, they could not be infinite, but each of them
would be the boundary of the other).
The first thing to notice is the word απειρoν which means infinite and derives from α
(without) and πειρας, ατoς, τo (end, boundary, limit). The απειρoν (indefinite, infinite,
limitless) was the first principle (αρχη) of reality for the presocratic philosopher Anax-
imander (611 B.C). For this thinker, The απειρoν was unlimited in its source, it could
create without experiencing decay, so that genesis would never stop. The απειρoν was an
abstract principle and it was no longer a point in time, but a source that could perpetually
give birth to whatever will be.
Aristotle writes (Metaphysics, 3-4) that the Presocratics were searching for the element
that constitutes all things. While each Presocratic philosopher gave a different answer as
to the identity of this element (water for Thales and air for Anaximenes). Anaximander
understood the beginning or first principle to be an endless, unlimited primordial mass
(απειρoν), subject to neither old age nor decay, that perpetually yielded fresh materials
from which everything we perceive is derived.
Now coming back to Melissus’ assertion, we can compare Melissus’ thought with Georg
Cantor’s thought. In set theory, we do not have only one infinite, but a hierarchy of infi-
nite cardinal numbers (alephs, the transfinite) where at each successor stage we obtain a
bigger infinite. By Cantor’s theorem, the set of natural numbers N is smaller than the set
of real numbers R. This aspect contradicts Melissus’ maxim since for the greek philosopher
we cannot have two things which are infinite otherwise they would be the boundary of each
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other (they would be finite). We could answer that natural numbers and real numbers be-
long to two different ontological planes and you are simply comparing them. The problem
is that, by assuming AC, both the set of natural numbers and the set of real numbers can
be well-ordered and so we represent them as aleph numbers. The set of natural numbers
is the first aleph, namely ℵ0, whereas by the forcing methods we can assign to the set of
real numbers different alephs, namely ℵ1,ℵ3,ℵω......etc. If we assume Melissus’ maxim, we
can say the following: being two infinite sets, according to Melissus’ maxim, the set of all
subsets of the set of natural numbers seems to limit superiorly the set of natural numbers
and the set of all subsets of all subsets of a countable set seems to limit superiorly the set of
all subsets of a countable set , etc. According to Melissus maxim, if something is infinite,
it must be unique and we cannot have infinite sets bigger than other infinite sets. Melissus
would have said to modern set theorists that they look at the infinite with the eyes of
finiteness. In fact, if all sets were countable, there would be one infinite and there would
be no theoretical difficulty for Melissus. However, Melissus would disagree with modern
set theory when we say that we have an infinite set bigger than another one. However,
we have Cantor’s theorem, an atemporal truth, that cannot be questioned if we introduce
the actual infinite. Thus, we may say that the knowledge of the mathematical infinite for
ancient philosophers was not correct. The set of real numbers does not limit superiorly
the set of natural numbers, but thanks to Cantor’s theorem, when we compare these two
sets regarding cardinality, we become aware that the set of real numbers is bigger than the
set of natural numbers because, thanks to diagonalization procedure, some real numbers
do not correspond to natural numbers. Since the main feature of mathematics is iteration,
the possibility of iterating specific operations, we can iterate Cantor’s theorem and create
the hierarchy of all alephs. This hierarchy, even if it contains infinite sets bigger than other
sets, is fully justified because we have a theorem (Cantor’s theorem) an atemporal, actual
truth that it cannot be questioned. If we accept the concept of actual infinite, Cantor’s
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theorem is not a conjecture that it can be potentially, temporally true and we may argue
that it is false. Thus, we must conclude that Melissus’ quote is not correct. The infinite is
not unique, but we have a plethora of infinite sets.
5. John Duns Scotus, the infinite and philosophy of mind
John Duns Scotus (1270-1308), called the subtle doctor, was a Franciscan. It is com-
monly supposed that the scholastic philosophers (following Aristotle) believed in the idea
that the infinite was potential, not actual. Here is a passage by Scotus suggesting that
they did not.
O Lord God, are not the things that can be known infinite in number and
are they not all known actually by an intellect which knows all things?
Therefore, that intellect is infinite which, at one and the same moment,
has actual knowledge of all these things. Our God, yours is such an intel-
lect. The nature that is identical with it then is also infinite. I show the
antecedent and consequence of this enthymeme. The antecedent: Things
potentially infinite in number (things, which if taken one at a time are end-
less) become actually infinite if they exist simultaneously. Now what can
be known is of such a nature so far as a created intellectual is concerned, as
is sufficiently clear. Now all that the created intellect knows successively,
your intellect knows actually at one and the same time. Then, the actual
infinite is known. I prove the major of this syllogism, although it seems
evident enough. Consider these potentially infinite things as a whole. If
they exist all at once, they are either actually infinite or actually finite. If
finite, then if we take one after the other, eventually we shall actually know
them all. But if we cannot actually know them all in this way, they will
be actually infinite if known simultaneously. The consequence of this en-
thymeme I prove as follows. Whenever a greater number requires or implies
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greater perfection than does a smaller one, numerical infinity implies infi-
nite perfection. For example, greater motive power is required to carry ten
things than to carry five. Therefore, an infinite motive power is needed to
carry an infinity of such things. Now in the point at issue, since the ability
to know two things distinctly implies a greater perfection of intellect than
the ability to know only one, what we proposed to prove follows. This last
I prove to be so because the intellect must apply itself and concentrate if
it is to understand the intelligible distinctly. If then it can apply itself to
more than one, it is not limited to any one of them and if it can apply itself
to an infinity of such it is completely unlimited. [Duns Scotus 82]
For Scotus the divine intellect is infinite. However for him the actual infinite exists also
in nature. From the impossibility of counting all things of nature which are potentially in
number, he concludes that all these things are actually infinite if taken simultaneously. This
thought may be true. In fact since we cannot enumerate all things of the universe, maybe
they are infinite if taken simultaneously. For Scotus this actual infinite in nature can be
understood by only an infinite intellect. From this he derives that this infinite intellect must
be infinite perfect and unlimited. Let us look closer at two aspects in Scotus’ quotation.
Firstly, Scotus asserts that a greater number implies a greater perfection than a smaller
number does. This aspect may be considered in relation to the large cardinal hierarchy.
Some large cardinal notions seem to perfection the features of large cardinals which are
located lower in the hierarchy. For example, in the case of measurable cardinals, comparing
V with M where κ is the critical point of some elementary embedding j : V −→ M , we
have that Vκ is contained in M, but, instead, few elements of Vj(κ) are present in M. Maybe
the image of κ, namely j(κ), is very high but M is very thin. Thus, we can perfect this
aspect of measurability and establish that Vj(κ) ⊆M . In this way, we obtain stronger large
cardinal notions such as a superstrong cardinal. Therefore Scotus’ idea of perfection
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can be found also in the large cardinal hierarchy where perfection implies the concepts of
closure and completeness.
The other idea from Scotus’s quote that deserves attention is the following : if an intellect
applies itself to an infinity, it is completely unlimited. The Human intellect is able to
accomplish mathematical calculation about the infinite and it can perceive all different
kinds of infinity distinctly. The human intellect respects the laws of the infinite, as Cantor
was asserting in the Grundlagen, and so human beings are able to tame the transfinite. For
Cantor, the human mind is finite but it can understand the actual infinite. I start to think
that since the human intellect can conceive and use distinctly all large cardinal numbers
without causing contradictions (unless Kunen’s theorem), maybe the human intellect is
distinct from the brain. Moreover, the human intellect can construct inner and outer
models for almost all large cardinal numbers, and so it can make precise calculations about
the infinite. Maybe, the physical state of the brain cannot capture the idea of the infinite
but the intellect (mind) that supervenes on it can know intuitively the infinite. Maybe our
physical support is fundamental for our Mind which supervenes on it, but then Mind is
irriducible to the brain because our intellect can accede the world of abstract objects that
physical states cannot accede. In fact, from my study about the infinite, I start to support
Supervenience in philosophy of mind. I believe that Mind must be separated from its
physical support, namely the brain. On the contrary, reductive physicalism sustains the
identity between Mind and Brain and implies the reduction of mental states to physical
states. I believe, as I said before, in Supervenience that is a non-reductive physicalism. In
fact, I believe that Mind supervenes on the Brain, but then Mind cannot be reduced to the
brain. There is an asymmetric dependency between Mind and brain. Brain is fundamental
for Mind, but after Mind supervenes on the Brain, it cannot be reduced to physical states.
While there cannot be only mental possible worlds, there can be only physical worlds.
I do not believe that physical states can understand or conceive abstract mathematical
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objects, while Mind can accomplish this action. So the fact that, according to Cantor,
Mind can tame the infinite, renders Mind irriducible to physical states. I use the concept
of the infinite to show that Mind is irriducible to brain. Descartes [Descartes 641] used the
idea of the infinite to prove the existence of God. The study of the infinite forces me to
support this kind of non-reductive physicalism, namely Supervenience. Putnam sustains
that mental states cannot be reduced to physical states because a single mental state can
have multiple physical states that realize it. By assuming the irriducibility of Mind, Putnam
advocates functionalism, a theory in philosophy of mind which holds that mental types
and properties are functional types located in a higher level of abstraction than physical
states. Mental properties are second-order functional properties whereas physical states
are first-order properties. Furthermore, Davidson holds that Mind is irriducible to the
brain because mental states are anomalous. Mind is anomalous because it has its features
completely distinctive from physical states. The anomality of Mind makes impossible to
find Laws which can connect mental states to physical states. I believe in Putnam’s and
Davidson’s arguments. I add to these arguments that Mind is irriducible to brain because
Mind can accede the world of sets or the abstract world of mathematics. A possible world
characterized by only physicalism (we have only cerebral states and we do not mental
states which supervene on them) cannot accede the world of sets. After the Supervenience
occurs, we have two completely different domains, namely the domain of Mind and the
domain of Brain, and the domain of Mind cannot be reduced to Brain, at least according
to my view. I believe that each mental supervenient state (second-order functional state)
has multiple subvenient physical states which realize it, but this mental state cannot be
reduced to a physical state. I believe also that supervenient Qualia (qualitative mental
states, phenomenal properties) have multiple subvenient physical realizators but at the end
Qualia cannot be reduced to physical states. The laws ruling mental states are completely
different from the laws ruling physical states and so, we do not have bridge laws which
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connect mental domain with physical domain. A reduction is impossible. Surely, we have
to explain the problem of mental causation. We should ask ourselves if mental states can
cause physical states. I believe that the answer to this question is negative. I assume
that the world is physically closed. We can have only a physical state or multiple physical
states which cause other physical states. Causation must be only physical. We have to
distinguish between phenomenal causation and noumenal causation. phenomenal causation
occurs when we interpret supervenient mental states as causes of other mental states or of
subvenient physical states. The noumenal causation occurs when we describe as subvenient
physical states cause other physical states. Adopting the words of Block, mental states
are causally epiphenomenal. Mind is causally irrelevant. I believe that Mind, even if it
is irriducible, is causally an epiphenomenon. Jaegwon Kim [Kim 00] asserts that it is
possible reduce mental states to physical states by revising the reduction model (bridge
laws) introduced by Nagel. I believe that this is impossible since mental states are realized
by multiple physical states that might have a complex network of logical implications
that we cannot know. Now to conclude this section, I want to introduce the following
thought. The principle aim of Artificial Intelligence was that of creating thinking machines
or generating artificial minds. Historically, departing from universal Turing machines,
computer scientists have been developing Software more and more complicated in order
to create thinking machines. They based their research on the concept of Software. I
believe that this approach is wrong. In fact, since I believe that Mind supervenes on the
Brain and the physical support is necessary, i think that Artificial Intelligence must base
his research on the Hardware. Firstly, It is essential to create artificial neural networks. I
support in Artificial Intelligence the theory of connectionism. In 1962 Rosenblatt developed
Perceptron the first neural artificial network capable of calculating many mathematical
functions. Another example of connectionism is NETTALK constructed by Sejnowsky.
This artificial neural network is capable of reading every english word. At the end, I
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believe that artificial Mind might supervene on complicated artificial neural networks and,
maybe, it might be able to accede the abstract world of mathematics.
6. Reinhardt Cardinals and Anselm’s argument
let us begin with some considerations about Anselm’s ontological argument for the
existence of God. The first ontological argument was proposed by Anselm of Canterbury
in 1078 in his Proslogion. Anselm defined God as ....that than which nothing greater
can be conceived..... He suggested that even the fool can understand this concept, and
this understanding itself means that the being must exist in the mind. The concept must
exist either only in our mind, or in both our mind and in reality. If such a being exists
only in our mind, then a greater being, which exists in the mind and in reality, can be
conceived. Therefore, if we can conceive of a being than which nothing greater can be
conceived, it must exist in reality. Thus, a being than which nothing greater could
be conceived, which Anselm defined as God, must exist in reality. At this point we can
see how the argument works. When Anselm pronounces the expression that than which
nothing greater can be conceived, everyone can understand the meaning. This notion
is in the intellect, but it cannot be only in the mind. In fact, that which exists only in the
mind is less than that which exists both in the mind and in reality; Thus if that than which
nothing greater can be conceived exists only in the mind, we can think about something
greater, namely that than which nothing greater can be conceived, which exists in the mind
and in reality. We have a contradiction. In fact, we would affirm that than which nothing
greater can be conceived is that than which something greater can be conceived. Therefore
God exists. Even if Anselm describes God with an expression, his conception is similar
to that of Plotinus, Damascius and Iamblicus which we face in the precedent section. For
Anselm, God is beyond human reason and he actually adopts the apophatic method or via
negationis. In fact, Anselm’s expression is still negative. It is not a positive sentence about
God. The philosopher belongs to what we have called negative theology. Anselm explains
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negative theology in Proslogion in the following way: If God is not greater of everything
that can be thought, then God is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived;
but God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, therefore God is greater than
everything that can be thought. Here, by using his negative expression, Anselm is asserting
that God is beyond every human thought. For Anselm, God is incomprehensible like for
neoplatonic philosophers (precedent section). However, if we say that Anselm belongs
only to the negative theology and he uses only the apophatic method or via negationis,
we are making a mistake. Thanks to his negative expression, Anselm is able to describe
God’s nature with positive attributes. In fact, we should say that Anselm adopts the
apophatic method only initially. God is still beyond human thoughts, but thanks to his
initial negative expression, Anselm is capable of deriving the essential positive attributes
that describe God’s essence. For example Anselm affirms that God is the supreme good.
But if God were not the supreme good, he would not be that than which nothing greater
can be conceived. Then Anselm asserts that God is omnipotent. But if God were not
omnipotent, he would be that than which something greater can be conceived. Anselm
starts with something negative, but then he is able to derive logically from that expression
all positive attributes which characterise God. I believe that Anselm’s proof is logically
convincing and now I will try to respond to other philosophers who criticized this proof.
The first philosopher-theologician, who argued against Anselm’s proof, was Gaunilo. The
argument of this philosopher has got two issues. First of all we have the example of the
most perfect island that can be thought. According to Gaunilo, you can think about the
most perfect island, but this does not mean that the island exists also in reality. Gaunilo
makes a mistake. In fact, he identifies that than which nothing greater can be conceived
with that which is greater than everything. The idea that the island is greater than all
other islands for richness of goods, does not have anything to do with the expression that
than which nothing greater can be conceived. In fact I can always think about a greater
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island, because the idea of the most perfect island is finite and I can always add something
to this idea. The second Gaunilo’s critique is more persuasive. He says that we cannot
understand in clear way Anselm’s expression which defines God as that than which nothing
greater can be conceived. For Gaunilo, the nature of God is totally incomprehensible and so
also Anselm’s expression is meaningless. We have an extreme case of negative theology. For
Gaunilo, you cannot say anything about God, neither a negative expression. You cannot
reject this objection. In this case you can agree or disagree with Gaunilo. If you say
that human beings are not capable of understanding Anselm’s negative expression because
God’s nature is totally and absolutely incomprehensible, then you agree with Gaunilo. I
personally disagree with Gaunilo. I believe that we are able to comprehend the exact
meaning of Anselm’s negative expression. Then there is Kant’s objection contained in
his Critique of Pure Reason. The German philosopher proposed that the statement God
exists must be analytic or syntetic - the predicate must be inside or outside of the subject,
respectively. If the proposition is analytic, as the ontological argument takes it to be,
then the statement would be true only because of the meaning given to the words. Kant
claimed that this is merely a tautology and cannot say anything about reality. However, if
the statement is synthetic, the ontological argument does not work, as the existence of God
is not contained within the definition of God (and, as such, evidence for God would need to
be found). Kant writes that being is obviously not a real predicate and cannot be part of
the concept of something. He proposed that existence is not a predicate, or quality. This is
because existence does not add to the essence of a being, but merely indicates its occurrence
in reality. He stated that by taking the subject of God with all its predicates and then
asserting that God exists, I add no new predicate to the conception of God. He argued
that the ontological argument works only if existence is a predicate; if this is not so, then
it is conceivable for a completely perfect being to not exist, thus defeating the ontological
argument. I disagree with Kant. Before arguing against Kant, I must reflect on the concept
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of contradiction and introduce the notion of extendible and Reinhardt cardinals. In my
opinion, contradictions limit the ontology of mathematics. For example, the universal class
(for Cantor’s antinomy) and the class of all ordinals (for Burali-Forti antinomy) are proper
classes, are not sets and so, they do not exist in ZFC universe. Contradictions force us
to exclude these mathematical objects from the ontology of the mathematical universe.
The class of all sets which do not belong to themselves (for Russell paradox) is avoided
in ZFC by limiting the abstraction principle conceived by Frege and by introducing the
limited axiom of separation (only if a set is already given, then a property can define a
subset of it). Therefore also in this case contradictions force us to exclude from the ZFC
universe the Russellian class. A Reinhardt cardinal implies the existence of an elementary
embedding of V into itself, but because of Kunen’s inconsistency result we are forced to
exclude Reinhardt cardinals from the ontology of ZFC. Also in this case, contradictions
limit the ontology of the mathematical universe. Now it is the moment to introduce the
notion of extendible cardinal in the following way:
Definition 127. κ is η-extendible iff there is a σ and a j : Vκ+η ≺ Vσ with crit(j) = κ
and η < j(κ). κ is extendible iff κ is η-extendible for every η > 0.
An extendible cardinal is a very large cardinal notion, since the whole theory of Vκ+η
is preserved in the embedding. A Reinhardt cardinal would be larger since whole V is
preserved in the embedding. But (as we saw above) a Reinhardt cardinal does not exist
in the universe of ZFC. Therefore, in this case, existence is fundamental to establish an
hierarchy. Whereas Reinhardt cardinals are excluded from the hierarchy of ZFC because
of inconsistency, extendible cardinals belong to the hierarchy. Therefore we can assert
that existence is a predicate for abstract and immaterial objects. I think that we have to
distinguish between two ontological planes, namely the platonic, abstract and immaterial
ontological plane for mathematical objects and God, and the factual plane for things in
reality. Existence is a predicate in the immaterial and platonic ontological plane and forces
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us to consider extendible cardinal belonging to the hierarchy and so a preferable and better
notion than a Reinhardt cardinal (in ZFC), whereas it is not a predicate in the factual plane
for things of the physical reality. Therefore, existence can be seen as a predicate for large
cardinal numbers and God.
7. Paradoxes and the Curry-Liar paradox
In the precedent sections I spoke about Cantor, Burali-Forti and Russell antinomies,
now I want to discuss other paradoxes. The main reason for doing this is that I believe
that through paradoxes we can characterize Cantor’s absolute infinite. The first paradox
that i want to examine is Berry’s paradox which is connected with the problem of giving
precise definitions in mathematics. The Berry’s paradox is a self-referential paradox arising
from an expression such as the smallest positive integer not definable in fewer than
twelve words (note that this defining phrase has fewer than twelve words). Berry was
a junior librarian at Oxford (like Boole was a librarian at the university of Cork) and
he discussed this paradox with Russell. Berry’s self referential sentence arises from the
more limited paradox which arises from the expression the first undefinable ordinal. We
can consider the following expression: the smallest positive integer not definable in
under eleven words. If there are positive integers that satisfy a given property, then
there is a smallest positive integer that satisfies that property; This is the integer to which
the above expression refers. The above expression is only ten words long, so this integer is
defined by an expression that is under eleven words long. This is a paradox: there must be
an integer defined by this expression, but since is self-contradictory (any integer it defines is
definable in under eleven words), there cannot be any integer defined by it. Berry paradox
points out that definitions can be vague. Definitions must be precise. This antinomy is very
similar to the Liar and Russell paradox. In fact, it is a self-referential sentence. A language
that speaks about itself is very dangerous. If we remain at the same level of language, the
Liar and Berry paradox do not have a solution because they generate a vicious circle,
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but if we form a stratification of languages (meta-languages), these antinomies can have
a solution. They cannot have an ending point or a roof. In fact, we would have Russell
and Berry paradox specific for the object language, then for the meta-language 1, then for
the meta-language 2, then for the meta-language 3, etc. We would have solution to Berry
and the Liar paradox, when higher levels of language (higher meta-languages) reflect on
lower levels of language (lower meta-languages), but then we would have these antinomies
specific for the higher levels of language. Therefore, the hierarchy of meta-languages must
be potentially existent.
In logic, Richard’s paradox is a semantical antinomy in set theory and natural language
first described by the french mathematician Jules Richard in 1905. The original statement
of the paradox has a relation to Cantor’s diagonal argument of the uncountability of real
numbers. The paradox begins with the observation that certain expressions in English
unambigously define real numbers, while other expressions in English do not. Thus, there
is an infinite list of english phrases that unambigously define real numbers; arrange this list
by length and then order lexicographically, so that the ordering is canonical. This yields
an infinite list of the corresponding real numbers: r1, r2......,etc. Since real numbers are
dense (between two real numbers, there is always a third real number), we can consider








Go down the diagonal, taking the n-th digit of the n-th real number rn (in our example
produces 01001) and flip each digit, swapping 0s and 1s (in our example produces 10110).
By construction, this flipped diagonal real number differs from r1 in the first place, from r2
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in the second place and so on. So our diagonal construction defines a new real (a richardian
real) which differs from all the other reals. Now define a real number (richardian real) in
the following way: the n-th digit of the n-th real number rn is the opposite (if
it is 0, it is 1 and if it is 1, it is 0). This definition is an expression in English which
unambiguosly defines a real number r (a richardian real number). Thus r must be one of
the rn numbers. However, r was constructed so that it cannot equal any of the rn. This
is a paradoxical contradiction. If we take formalised languages, it is possible to say that
a formula φ(x) defines a real number if there is exactly one real number r such that φ(r)
holds. Then it is not possible to define, in ZFC, the set of all formulas that define real
numbers. For, if it were possible to define this set, it would be possible to diagonalize over
it to produce a new definition of a real number, following the outline of Richard’s paradox
above.
One problem in logic is the nature of many irrational numbers. We do not know how they
are. Alan Turing was very keen on computing real numbers but we do not know their
nature. At this point, i want to discuss this philosophical thought. When you have a
matrix of real numbers, namely a list of real numbers, you can form the antidiagonal set (a
richardian real). Now we can think to add this antidiagonal set to the precedent matrix,
then we have a new matrix. We can diagonilise out from this matrix and form a new
antidiagonal set (the second richardian real). By accomplishing this operation, we form
the third, the fourth richardian real and so on. This operation can be iterated through
the infinite and it does not have any bound. So, maybe we can think that we might
charcterise a large part of irrational numbers as richardian reals. If this operation does not
have a bound, we can always diagonilise out until the set of richardian reals overlaps the
set of irrational numbers. So, maybe it is wrong, but irrational numbers could be seen as
richardian reals.
At this point, I want to discuss Curry paradox. This antinomy occurs in naive set theory
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and naive logics, and allows the derivation of an arbitrary sentence from a self-referring
sentence and some apparently innocuous logical deduction rule. For example, if we say if
this sentence is true, Catalunya is an independent European state. Even if I hope
that Catalunya will be independent, for the moment the consequent of this conditional is
clearly false. The sentence if this sentence is true, Catalunya is an independent
European state is itself true. The quoted sentence is of the form if A then B where A
refers to the sentence itself and B refers to Catalunya is an independent European
state. The usual method for proving a conditional sentence is to show that by assuming
that hypothesis (A) is true, then the conclusion (B) can be proven from that assumption.
Therefore, for the purpose of the proof, assume A. Because A refers to the overall sentence,
this means that assuming A is the same as assuming if A, then B. Therefore, in assuming
A, we have assumed both A and if A, then B. From these, we can obtain B by modus
ponens. Therefore Catalunya is an independent European state, but we know that is false,
which is a paradox. We can reason also in the following way. Suppose that the sentence A
is false. Then, for the law of material implication, the only possibility admitted is that the
antecedent of this conditional ( A is true) is true, whereas the consequent (then Catalunya
is an independent European state) is false. But sustaining that the antecedent is true is
the same as defining true A, contradicting in this way what we have said. Therefore, we
must conclude that the sentence A is true, and this forces us to say that is true also the
proposition Catalunya is an independent European state. Curry paradox is very
important since it is the only paradox that is negation-free (this aspect is important for
paraconsistent logics). People who think that, in order to avoid paradoxes, we should use
only positive defining properties, should be aware of the existence of this paradox. This
paradox is really problematic in mathematical logic. The paradoxical sentence is an apriori
truth and so it can be true in every system of logic since it does not need to be supported
by any other postulate. From this paradoxical sentence, it is possible to derive as true the
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sentence B (Catalunya is an independent Euoropean state) and its negation (Catalunya is
not an independent European state). It is very similar to the law of Pseudo Scotus, namely
from the absurd we can derive any propositions. In fact, we can apply this paradoxical
sentence to each proposition and then prove it. By proving anything, you render the formal
system inconsistent. Arthur Prior from the paradox of Curry derives the existence of god
in the following way:
C= If C is true, then God exists. To avoid the paradox, the consequent
(God exists) must be true.
. Now I want to highlight a sentence that I conceived, namely if this sentence is true,
the consequent of this conditional is false. I combine Curry paradox with the Liar
paradox. The amusing thing about this paradox is that when we have Curry paradox
because we interpret as false the consequent of this conditional, for the dynamic of the liar
paradox (if the consequent is false, because it is saying that it is false then it is true) we
escape from the Curry paradox. We have a second level of abstraction in the Curry-Liar
paradox. When we say that the consequent is false and so at the first level of abstraction
we have Curry paradox, then (for the dynamic of the liar paradox) at the second level of
abstraction we do not have anymore Curry paradox. However if we judge the consequent as
true and so at the first level of abstraction we do not have the Curry paradox, then (for the
dynamic of the liar paradox) at the second level of abstraction we do have Curry paradox.
If a contradiction implies another contradiction, you remain in the realm of absurdity, but
with the Curry-Liar paradox (nested contradictions) we can escape from absurdity thanks




1 1970 Jack Silver used indiscernibles as a concept in set theory. When he was a student
in Berkeley, he was able to isolate the concept of 0], a great divide in the landscape of large
cardinals. The concept of 0] is originated by the analysis of L (the constructible universe)
based on the construction of Silver indiscernibles. Now we can state the following important
theorem:
Theorem 140. (Silver) If there is a Ramsey cardinal then: (1) if κ and λ are uncon-
table cardinals and κ < λ then (Lκ) is an elementary substructure of Lλ, (2) There is
a unique closed unbounded class of ordinals I containing all uncoutable cardinals such that
for every uncountable cardinal κ : |I ∪ κ| = κ, I ∪ κ is a set of indiscernibles for Lκ and
every a ∈ Lκ is definable in Lκ from I ∪ κ.
The elements of the class I are called Silver indiscernibles. Before going further, we need
to focus on the reason why we have introduced the concept of Ramsey cardinal. This large
cardinal notion comes from the partition calculus, as we have already seen. Let κ be an
infinite cardinal, let α be an infinite limit ordinal α ≤ κ, and let m be a cardinal 2 ≤ m < κ.
The symbol κ −→ (α)<ωm denotes the property that for every partition F of the set [κ]<ω
(the finite subsets of κ) into m pieces, there exists a set H ⊂ κ of order-type α such that
for each n ∈ ω, F is constant on [H]n. A cardinal κ is a Ramsey cardinal if κ −→ (κ)<ω.




is uncountable and we can use it as a set of Silver indiscernibles.
By the Reflection Principle if φ is a formula, then there exists an uncountable cardinal κ
such that L |= φ(a1......an) if and only if Lκ |= φ(a1.......an), for every a1, ......an ∈ Lκ.
By the precedent theorem the right hand side holds if and only if Lλ |= φ(a1.....an) for
all cardinals λ ≥ κ. Therefore if Silver indiscernibles are used to generate L, we have a
great reflection phenomenon. Thus, by the precedent theorem, we have (Lκ,∈) ≺ (L,∈)
for every uncountable cardinal κ. As a consequence of the Theorem, Silver indiscernibles
are indiscernibles for L: if φ(v1.....vn) is a formula then L |= φ[a1.....an] if and only if
L |= φ[b1.....bn] whenever a1 < ........ < an and b1 < ........ < bn are increasing sequences in
I.
Every constructible set is definable from I. For what we have said before, every formula
φ(v1.......vn) is either true or false in L for any increasing sequence of Silver indiscernibles.
Moreover, the truth value concides with the truth value of Lℵω |= φ[ℵ1......ℵn] since Lℵω ≺ L
and ℵ1.......ℵn are Silver indiscernibles. At the beginning of this chapter, we have introduced
the concept of 0], now we can define it in the following way: 0] = {φ : Lℵω |= φ[ℵ1......ℵn]}.
If Silver’s theorem holds, then 0] exists. The set 0] is, strictly speaking, a set of formulas.
But as formulas can be coded by natural numbers, we can regard 0] as a subset of ω.
Devlin-Paris showed how to get 0] from a combinatorial consequence of κ −→ (ω1)<ω2 .
This large cardinal property has less consistency strength than a Ramsey cardinal. Now
we can introduce the following two theorems:
Theorem 141. Assuming 0], every set in V definable in L without parameters is count-
able.
Proof. If x ∈ L is definable in L by a formula φ, then the same formula defines x in
Lℵ1 , thus x ∈ Lℵ1 . 
In particular, every ordinal number definable in L is countable.
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Theorem 142. Assuming 0], every uncountable cardinal is inaccessible in L.
Now, recall that a cardinal κ is Mahlo if it is regular and the set of all inaccessible
cardinal below κ is stationary, namely this set intersects all closed unbounded subset of κ.
We can introduce the following theorem
Theorem 143. Every uncountable cardinal is a Mahlo cardinal in L
The proof of Silver’s theorem 2 is based on a theorem of Ehrenfeucht and Mostowski
in model theory, stating that every infinite model is elementarily equivalent to a model
that has a set of indiscernibles of prescribed order-type. We shall use the canonical well-
ordering of L to endow the models (Lλ,∈) with definable Skolem functions. For each
formula φ(α, β1........βn), let hφ be the n-ary function defined as follows: hφ(β1.......βn) =
{the < −least α such that φ(α, β1.....βn, ), ∅ otherwise}.
We call hφ, φ ∈ FORM , the canonical Skolem function. For each limit ordinal λ, hLλφ is an
n-ary function on Lλ, the Lλ interpretation of hφ, and it is definable in (Lλ,∈). For each
limit ordinal λ, the functions hLλφ , φ ∈ FORM , are Skolem functions for (Lλ,∈) and so a
set M ⊂ Lλ is an elementary submodel of (Lλ,∈) if and only if M is closed under the hLλφ .
If X ⊂ Lλ, then the closure of X (the Skolem hull) under the hLλφ is the smallest elementary
submodel M ≺ Lλ such that X ⊂M , and is the collection of all elements of Lλ definable in
Lλ from X and ordinals < λ. The construction of the Skolem hull is very common in logic.
The downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and Gödel’s completeness theorem are based
essentially on this construction. The Skolem hull implies the phenomenon of reflection. By
Levy’s reflection principle, Σ1-formulas are reflected by an initial segment of the universe.
From a philosophical perspective, this is very interesting, since all logical operations that
we can accomplish in structures of higher cardinality, can be done in structures of lower
cardinality. The Skolem hull, which implies a kind of structural reflection, makes us able
2I took many issues from [Jech 06]
242 5. APPENDIX
to simplify our logical calculation.
Let λ be a limit ordinal and let M=(A,E) be a model elementarily equivalent to (Lλ,∈)
. The set OnM of all ordinal numbers of the model M is linearly ordered by E; let’s use
x < y rather than x E y for x, y ∈ OnM . A set I ⊂ OnM is a set of indiscernibles for M
if for every formula φ, M |= φ(x1, ........, xn) if and only if M |= φ(y1, ......, yn), whenever
x1 <, ......, < xn and y1 <, ......, < yn are elements of I. Let h
M
φ denote the M-interpretation
of the canonical Skolem functions. Given a set X ⊂ A, let us denote by HM (X) the closure
of X under all hMφ , φ ∈ Form. The set HM (X) is the Skolem hull of X and is an elementary
submodel of M.
If I is a set of indiscernibles for M, let Σ(M, I) be the set of all formulas φ(v1.....vn) true
in M for increasing sequences of elements of I:
φ(v1......vn) ∈ Σ(M, I) ↔ M |= φ(x1, .....xn) for some x1......xn ∈ I such that x1 < ...... <
xn.
A set of formulas Σ is called E.M set (Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski) if there exists a model M
elementarily equivalent to some Lλ, λ a limit ordinal, and an infinite set I of indescirnibles
for M such that Σ = Σ(M, I).
Lemma 20. If Σ is an E.M set and α is an infinite ordinal number, then there exists a
model M and a set of indiscernibles I for M such that: 1) Σ = Σ(M, I), 2) the order-type
of I is α, 3) M = HM (I)
Now I would like to pay attention to the third clause of the lemma which is asserting
that the model M is equal to its Skolem hull. In this case the Skolem functions instantiate
formulas by picking elements of I, namely the indiscernibles of the model. For each E.M
set Σ and each ordinal α, let us call the (Σ, α)−model the unique pair (M,I) given by the
precedent lemma. At the end we will show that the existence of a Ramsey cardinal implies
the existence of an E.M. set Σ having a certain syntactical property (remarkability) and
such that every (Σ, α)-model is well-founded. Let’s start with well-foundeness first.
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Lemma 21. the following are equivalent, for an E.M set Σ: 1) for every ordinal α, the
(Σ, α) model is well-founded, 2) for some ordinal α ≥ ω1, the (Σ, α) model is well-founded,
3) for every ordinal α < ω1, the (Σ, α)-model is well-founded.
We shall now define remarkability. We consider only (Σ, α)-models where α is an
infinite limit ordinal. Let us say that a (Σ, α) −model (M,I) is unbounded if the set I is
unbounded in the ordinals of M, that is, if for every x ∈ ORDM there is y ∈ I such that
x < y.
Lemma 22. The following are equivalent, for any E.M. set Σ: 1) for all α, (Σ, α) is
unbounded, 2) For some α, (Σ, α) is unbounded, 3) For every Skolem term t(v1......vn) the
set Σ contains the following formula : if t(v1.....vn) is an ordinal, then t(v1......vn) < vn+1.
Thus we say that an E.M. set Σ is unbounded if it contains the precedent formula for
all Skolem terms t. Let α be a limit ordinal, α > ω1, and let (M,I) be the (Σ, α)-model.
For each σ < α, let iσ denote the σth element of I. We say that (M,I) is remarkable if it is
unbounded and if every ordinal x of M less than iω is in H
M (in : n ∈ ω).
Lemma 23. the following are equivalent for any unbounded E.M set Σ: 1) For all
α > ω the (Σ, α)- model is remarkable, 2) for some α > ω the (Σ, α) model is remarkable,
3) For every Skolem term t(x1..........xm, y1........yn) the set Σ contains the formula: if
t(x1........xm, y1..........yn) is an ordinal smaller than y1, then t(x1.......xm, y1........yn) =
t(x1.......xm, z1......zn).
Remarkability implies a conception of completeness since the indiscernibles are un-
bounded and for every ordinal in an initial segment there is a correspondent Skolem term.
Coming back to the issue of the section, we have to say an E.M. set Σ is remarkable if it is
unbounded and contains the formula of the precent lemma (clause (3)) for all Skolem terms
t. An important consequence of remarkability is the following: Let (M,I) be a remarkable
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(Σ, α) model and let γ < α be a limit ordinal. Let J = (iσ : σ < γ) and let B = H
M (J).
Then (B, J) is the (Σ, γ) model and the ordinals of B form an initial segment of the ordinals
of M.
We call an E.M set Σ well-founded if every (Σ, α) model is well founded:
Theorem 144. (Silver) If there exists a Ramsey cardinal, then there exists a well-
founded remarkable E.M. set.
If there exists a Ramsey cardinal, then Theorem 84 holds. For every limit ordinal α,
the (Σ, α) model is a well-founded model elementarily equivalent to some Lγ , and so is
isomorphic to some Lβ.
Lemma 24. If κ is un uncountable cardinal, then the universe of the (Σ, κ) model is Lκ
For each uncountable cardinal κ, let Iκ be the unique subset of κ such that (Lκ, Iκ) is
the (Σ, κ) model . Iκ is closed and unbounded in κ.
Lemma 25. if κ < λ are uncountable cardinals, then Iλ ∩ κ = Iκ and HLλ(Iκ) = Lκ
Using this lemma we can prove both (1) and (2) of Theorem 84, except for the unique-
ness of Silver indiscernibles. We let I =
⋃
{Iκ : κ is an uncountable cardinal}. For each
uncountable cardinal κ, I ∩ κ = Iκ is a closed unbounded set of order type κ, and is a set
of indiscernibles for Lκ; moreover, every α ∈ Lκ is definable in Lκ from Iκ and it follows
that κ ∈ Iλ; hence I contains all uncountable cardinals. Also, since Lκ = HLλ(Iκ), we have
Lκ ≺ Lλ. The next two lemmas prove the uniqueness of Silver indiscernibles and of the
corresponding E.M. set.
Lemma 26. (Silver) There is at most one well-founded remarkable E.M. set.
We, therefore, define 0] in the following way: 0] is the unique well-founded remarkable
E.M. set if it exists. The uniqueness of Silver indiscernibles now follows from:
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Lemma 27. For every regular uncountable cardinal κ there is at most one closed un-
bounded set of indiscernibles X for Lκ such that Lκ = H
Lκ(X).
Thus we have pointed out that (1) and (2) of Theorem 84 hold under the assumption
that 0] exists. On the other hand, if (2) of Theorem 84 holds, then 0] exists because,
(Lω1 , I ∩ ω1) is a remarkable well-founded model with ℵ1 indiscernibles. So if there is a
Ramsey cardinal, then 0] exists. That will follow from the following lemma:
Lemma 28. Let κ be an uncountable cardinal. If there exists a limit ordinal λ such that
(Lλ,∈) has a set of indiscernibles of order-type κ, then there exists a limit ordinal γ and a
set I ⊂ γ of order-type κ such that (Lγ , I) is remarkable.
It follows that if κ is Ramsey, then (Lκ,∈) has a set of indiscernibles of order-type
κ. Then, there exists a remarkable model (Lλ, I) where I has order-type κ. Σ(Lγ , I) is
well-founded and remarkable and hence 0] exists.
The set 0] is, strictly speaking, a set of formulas. But as formulas can be coded by natural
numbers, we can regard 0] as a subset of ω.
Lemma 29. (Silver) The property (Σ is a well-founded remarkable E.M. set) is absolute
for every inner model of ZF. Hence M |= 0] exists if and only if 0] ∈ M in which case
(0])M = 0].
Since a well-founded ultrapower of the universe induces an elementary embedding ju :
V −→ Ult, and conversely, if j : V −→M is a nontrivial elementary embedding, then it is
possible to define a normal measure on the least ordinal moved by j. Let j be a nontrivial
elementary embedding of the universe, and let M be a transitive model of ZFC, containing
all the ordinals. Let N = j(M) =
⋃
α∈Ord j(M ∩ Vα). Then N is a transitive model of ZF
and j : M −→ N is elementary: M |= φ(α1.....αn) if and only if N |= φ(j(α1), .......j(αn)).
In particular, if M = L, then j(V ) |= (N is the constructible universe), and so N = L, and
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j|L is an elementary embedding of L in L. Thus if there exists an elementary embedding
of L (into L), then V 6= L. If 0] exists, then there are nontrivial elementary embeddings
of L. In fact, let j be any order-preserving from the class I of all Silver indiscernibles
into itself. Then j can be extended to an elementary embedding of L; we simply let
j(tL[γ1.....γn]) = t
L[j(γ1), ....., j(γn)] for every Skolem term t and any Silver indiscernibles
γ1 < ......... < γn. Also the converse is true, if there is a nontrivial elementary embedding
of L, then 0] exists:
Theorem 145. (Kunen) The following are equivalent : 1) 0] exists, 2) There is a
nontrivial elementary embedding j : L −→ L.
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[Jane 05] Jané Ignacio (2005), The iterative conception of Sets from a Cantorian perspective. Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of science. Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress. Edited
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